Income inequality and the distribution of the costs and benefits of agricultural support by Renwick, Alan William
Income Inequality and the Distribution of the Costs and Benefits of
Agricultural Support
A thesis submitted to the University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Food Marketing
by
Alan William Renwick B.Sc (Hons)
April 1992
NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
092 50600 8
Income Inequality and the Distribution of the Costs and Benefits of
Agricultural Support
Abstract
Agricultural production in the UK, as in most industrialised countries, has benefited
from support for a considerable period of time. The method of support has changed
from the operation of deficiency payments in the period leading up to the UK's
accession to the European Community (EC), to the adoption of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) since 1973. A policy that supports one sector of the
economy must involve costs to other sectors. In the case of agricultural support, it is
usually the taxpayers or consumers (or both) who bear the costs. A considerable
amount of work has been undertaken to measure the level of support received by
farmers and the costs borne by the rest of society. However, this work has stopped
short of a systematic analysis of the distribution of the benefits (costs) between farmers
(households) at different income levels and the effect that this has on the level of
income inequality within society.
Analysis of the dairy sector highlights that support is cOncentrated on the higher income
farms, although the level of inequality associated with the distribution of this support
has not been altered by the UK's adoption of the CAP or by the subsequent
introduction of milk quotas. A policy alternative, which restricts the quantity of
production available for support, is analysed and is shown to reduce income inequality
within the dairy sector. As for costs, the adoption of the CAP led to a dramatic
equalisation in their distribution, thus increasing the burden of the lower income
households. However, more recently the distribution of costs has remained fairly
stable. More importantly, it is shown that agricultural policy increases income
inequality for the UK as a whole.
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Chapter 1 Introduction and General Considerations
1.1 Aims and Definitions
This study is concerned with the inequality of income distribution and the possible
effects of agricultural policy on this distribution. Income distribution is a vast topic and
the purpose of this opening chapter is to consider some of the general concepts and to
discuss which areas are of particular concern to agriculture. Specific points will be
analysed later in the study. The following quotes, from a number of authors who have
studied inequality, highlight the nature of the topic:
"It is difficult to imagine a more controversial subject. The inequality of
incomes has been debated for centuries without passions waning or a clear
picture emerging" (Pen, 1971, p1).
"The relation between inequality and rebeffion is indeed a close one"
(Sen, 1976, p1).
'Inequality' is in itself an awkward word, as well as one used in connection
with a number of awkward social and economic problems. The difficulty is that
the word can trigger quite different ideas in the mind of the listener, depending
on his training and prejudicies" (Cowell, 1977, p1).
These quotes highlight that the topic of inequality is an emotive one. Cowell reasons
that 'equality' can either be judged simply in mathematical terms, as saying two or more
values are the same or; "On the other hand, the term 'equality' evidently has compelling
social overtones as a standard which it is presumably feasible for society to attain" (p1).
This study is primarily concerned with 'equality' in relation to income distribution. In
this sense, inequality may produce images of third world countries with shanty towns
next to high rise luxury apartments. However, inequality is also of concern in the UK,
hence the acceptance of a progressive tax system (that is high income earners paying
proportionately more of their income in tax than low income earners). Pen and Cowell
both note that the idea of 'equality' is subjective. It is not the purpose of this study to
try and define the 'ideal' income distribution. In general, however, a reduction in
inequality can be considered 'good', all other things being equal.
The next consideration is: what is 'income' and which income distribution should be
examined? Pen considers three types of income distribution; the personal distribution
(referred to as the size distribution of income), the functional distribution, and
distributive shares. The latter two relate to the distribution of the level of renumeration
enjoyed by factors of production and the distribution of national income between
factors of production, respectively. Although the effects of agricultural policy on the
rewards to factors of production is of interest,1 it is also outside the scope of this study.
Pen's 'personal distribution' relates to the individuals' share of total 'income'. This is
the 'economic well-being' of the individual.
Cowell suggests three personal characteristics which can be used to measure a person's
well-being:
Wealth. This represents a person's total immediate command over resources, to
include money in the bank, value of stocks and bonds, house, car and everything that
the person owns. There are, according to Cowell, two problems with such a measure.
First, how are the disparate posessions to be valued? For example, what is the real
'market price' of a person's house? Second, the measure makes no allowance for the
future potential earnings of the individual, for example, the income generating potential
of education.
Lifetime Income. This includes a comprehensive index for the entire set of
opportunities enjoyed by a person. The problem with this measure is that actual
'For example work on the capitalisation of agricultural support into land prices has been undertaken by
Trail (1980) and Harvey (1989).
2
lifetime income can only be measured once the recipient is dead. Therefore, future
incomes need to be anticipated and estimated, which is a difficult task.
Income. This is defined by Cowell as the increase in a person's command over
resources during a given time period, and is for all practical purposes the best measure.
It is restrictive in relation to the all-embracing ideas of the previous two measures and
has the problem that it involves the setting of an arbritrary time unit, thus ignoring past
accumulations. However, to the pragmatist, there are two clear advantages. First, data
on income are more widely available; second, if the measure includes unearned capital
gains and income in-kind, as well as earnings, it may be considered a sufficiently
comprehensive measure. In general terms, it is clear that any income defmition needs
to be both measurable and comparable.
Once income has been defined, another problem arises with definition of the recipient.
The term individual has already been used, but it is not clear that this is correct. Pen
illustrates the problem (in a slightly sexist fashion) by discussing a wife working part-
time. As an individual she may be deemed 'poor'. However, if her income is added to
that of her husband a different picture may emerge. This raises the question: should the
individual, the family or the household be used as the unit of measurement?
For farmers, the unit of measurement would appear to be pre-determined, because the
income generally measured is that generated from the farm as a business rather than the
individuals within the farm household. However, definition of the unit is not this
straightforward. Hill (1990) in a paper entitled 'In search of the EC's agricultural
community' argues that there is no clear definition of what constitutes a 'farmer'. Hill
(1982)2 also argues against using the income from farming as the only income measure
and concludes that other sources of income to the farm household should be
considered. The definition of the recipient is clearly a crucial factor in the analysis of
income distribution.
2}Tffl's work will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
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Much of the work on inequality has concentrated on why it exists. Sociologists and
economists have tried to explain variations in incomes. These theories allow for a
number of factors such as inheritance, ability and chance. Relating these theories to
agriculture, it is clear that evidence of each can be found. An individual who inherits a
large farm on fertile land is likely to have more income-generating potential than one
who inherits a small farm on infertile soil. Second, the more land owned by an
individual, the more chance that some of this land will be in an area required for
building, or will have mineral deposits etc. thus raising the value of the land
considerably. The richer you are the more chance you have to become even richer.
However, a farmer's own ability must be considered. For example, a bad farmer on
good soil may generate less income than a good farmer on poor soil. Other factors are
important; those who suffer form poor health and lack of education are likely to have
low incomes, whilst those who have opportunities to be better educated or to meet the
'right' people, are likely to earn greater income. Whilst the subject of why some
farmers are richer than others is of interest, it is not the aim of this study to produce the
definitive explanation as to the processes causing income inequality. What is of
concern is whether the distribution that exists has changed, and whether this change is
related to agricultural support policies.
A great deal of the work on inequality has revolved around the problems of quantifying
the degree of inequality inherent in a distribution. Any assessment of inequality within
agriculture needs to consider this work, so that changes over time and differences
between distributions can be compared.
Mention has been made of the concepts of inequality, income definition and
distribution. The other concern of this study is agricultural policy. Agriculture in the
United Kingdom (UK), as in much of the industrialised world, has been supported for
many years. A number of methods of support exist, ranging from those that raise the
4
market price received by producers to those which restrict the quantity supplied. The
reasons for support vary, but perhaps the clearest justifications are found in the much
quoted Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, which forms the basis for the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Community (EC). B.E. Hill (1984, p19)
lists the objectives as stated in Article 39:
The Common Agricultural Policy shall have as its objectives:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimal utilisation
of the factors of production, in particular, labour,
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular
by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture;
(c) to stabilise markets;
(d) to assure the availability of supplies;
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
Therefore, in the EC, support was justified on the grounds of concern over food
security, farm incomes and fluctuating food prices. However, Hill (1982) argues that
the main aim of the CAP is to support the income of farmers.
In welfare terms, agricultural policy may be justified if it results in a transfer of income
from the wealthy in society to the poor. However, it is not clear that it is the poor who
benefit from agricultural policy, or the rich who bear the costs. Different policies have
different costs and benefits, and one way of assessing them is to analyse the effect they
have on the distribution of income between those whose benefit and those who bear the
costs. Agricultural policy is a benefit to the farmers receiving support and a cost to
those who have to pay for this support. Depending on the method of support, the cost
is principally borne by either the consumer (in the form of higher food prices), the
taxpayer (through higher taxes), or both. The transfer occuring through support relates
to a branch of economics (grants economics) which came to the fore in the late 1960s
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and early 1970s.3 Economists were concerned that the majority of economic theory
was based on the two-way transfer. That is, an individual (or firm) gives
goods/services to another individual (or firm) in exchange for money/goods. Grants
economics concentrates on cases where income or goods are given for no renumeration;
the one-way transfer. Agricultural policy can be seen as such a transfer, for example,
from either consumers and/or taxpayers to farmers.
The agricultural sector therefore presents an ideal medium in which the distributional
effects of one-way transfers of income can be measured. Comparisons between the
distribution of costs and that of income will enable the nature of the transfer to be
assessed. Whether the cost of support is borne by the taxpayer or the consumer has
significant income distribution implications. Two points have to be made clear. First,
low income households spend proportionately more of their income on food; second,
as already mentioned, the tax system in the UK is progressive. Therefore if support is
based on higher food prices it is likely that the low income households will bear a
disproportionate amount of the costs, whereas if support is based on taxation it will be
the high income households who bear more of the costs. Part of the aim of this study
is to assess whether the costs of agricultural support are progressively (that is, the rich
bear proportionately more of the costs) or regressively (that is, the poor bear
proportionately more of the costs) distributed, by quantifying the level of inequality
displayed.
The above discussion has highlighted that before an examination of inequality of any
kind can be undertaken a number of defmitions and assumptions must be made. For
the purpose of this study the following general definitions apply: the measurement of
'well-being' is income (as defined by Cowell); the income unit is the farm business;
and the distribution analysed is the size distribution of incomes. Initially, this study
deals with a small part of the population, farmers, the size distribution of income and
3See, for example, Boulding and Pfaff (1972).
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the effects of a government policy on this distribution. Thereafter, the effect of the
costs of agriculutural support on the personal distribution of household income is also
analysed.
1.2 Outline of the Study
This chapter has addressed general concepts involved in the study of income inequality.
Chapter 2 will assess earlier work which has analysed either the effect of agricultural
policies on farm incomes or the distribution of income between farmers. In particular,
researchers' approaches to general concepts such as definition of income, quantification
of inequality and the measurement of support received by farmers will be analysed.
Chapter 3 will attempt a more detailed study of the theoretical aspects of the
measurement of inequality. In Chapter 4 farm income data will be used for a practical
assessment of income inequality in the North of England. In Chapter 5 the analysis
will be extended to a national level, and also a more detailed examination of the
relationship between support and income will be undertaken. Chapter 6 contemplates
the income distribution effects of a proposed agricultural policy alternative. Chapter 7
concentrates on the distribution of income and costs between households and assesses
the sensitivity of the results. Chapter 8 summarises the findings of the study.
7
Chapter 2 Review of the Literature on Inequality in Agriculture.
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this review is to identify a valid method for examination of the
distribution of income and support within agriculture. By examining the methods and
findings of previous work it should be possible to gain some overall view of the
various aspects involved in such a task. The distribution of agricultural income and the
effects of farm support policies on this distribution has long been a subject of concern
on both sides of the Atlantic, with the majority of the work undertaken in America.
The review could take a number of possible forms, including an American/European
split. However, due to the nature of the work reviewed, a chronological approach is
the most practical. The literature on income distribution and the possible effects of
agricultural policies is diverse, reflecting individual authors' particular interests. In
general, this review is concerned with assessing how previous research has answered
the questions posed in the opening chapter, namely choice of income measure, the
estimation of levels of support and how support is apportioned between farms.
2.2 Review of Literature
Early work in the US appeared to be concerned with the political justification and
reasoning behind farm support, rather than distributional effects. Fuller (1965) argued
that farmers were supported because they were poor, and that there was a public
perception of farmers as the underdogs of society. Fuller recognised the underlying
problem with this line of reasoning: "What is remarkable is that so much political
sympathy for the farmer as an undifferentiated eclectic abstraction has not been matched
by an equal concern for the really poor as against the not so poor within agriculture" (p
1245). Fuller realised that although farm incomes, on average, were low, no account
of the distribution within the farming community was made. His basic argument was
that the farmers organisations tried to maintain an "undifferentiated image of
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disadvantage" leading to the public perception that as long as support was going to
agriculture, in whatever form, it was benefiting the disadvantaged of society. "The
failure of political sympathy for 'the farmer' to be specific...has meant that the bulk of
program benefits for more than thirty years have been rewarding to the owners of land
and unrewarding to the owners of labor" (p 1245).
Fuller ifiustrated his work with examples of how political lobbying ensured that support
programmes were implemented which maintained the obscurity as to who was getting
what, and also without limits to the support received per farm, in preference to policies
which might limit the amount of support. Fuller's work is useful, as a background on
why agricultural support occurred and what type of policies were adopted, although no
attempt was made to measure the distributional effects of policy.
Robinson (1965) attempted to analyse the income distribution effects of those policies
which Fuller claimed were adopted due to political pressures. One of the first
conclusions drawn by Robinson was that "The distribution of income among farmers,
regions and factors of production unquestionably has been influenced to some degree
by farm and income programmes" (p 1224). He noted the difficulty in separating the
effects of policy from those of market forces and technology. He also argued that such
items as research, education, credit facilities and general economic policies would affect
the distribution. Robinson split agricultural support programmes into three broad types
with each examined in terms of the effect on income distribution: Price support
programmes; Allotment and Land Retirement Direct Payment programmes.
Robinson disagreed with Schultz (1964) who argued that price support programmes
actually worsened the distribution of income within agriculture. He reasoned that as
production is highly skewed, then support, which is based on the level of production,
will also be skewed. Therefore, skewed production was not a function of support per
Se. He illustrated his argument by showing that farms which produced non-supported
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products (eggs, poultry, fruit, vegetables) had increased in size at the same rate as those
producing heavily supported products (milk, cereals). The conclusion he drew was
that, without support, farmers would have less capital to invest in new technology, but
that this did not effect the size distribution of finns.
Robinson reasoned that if support programmes were eliminated the reduction in support
would occur in relation to proportion of sales, and unless there were differences in the
product mix or revenue-to-cost ratios between large and small farms, the distribution of
income would not be effected. To assess whether or not large and small farms have a
similar relationship between costs and revenue, Robinson developed a 'net income
multiplier' (simply the ratio of gross farm receipts to net income). The results for
different sales classes can be seen in Table 2.1. Farms with sales of greater than
$20,000 a year had a multiplier of 5.2, inferring that a 10% reduction in farm prices
would lead to a 52% fail in net income. The ratio was much lower for smaller farms (in
terms of sales class), and Robinson concluded that the removal of support should
reduce the income of larger farmers more than smaller farmers and lead to a moderate
reduction in income inequality.
Table 2.1 Net-Income Multiplier for US 1961 to 1964
Farms with Sales of:	 Net Income Multipliera
$20,000 or above	 5.2
$10,000 TO $19,999 2.6
$5,000 TO $9,999	 2.3
$2,500 TO $4,999
	
2.0
Below $2,500	 1.8
a) associated with a 1% change in Producer Prices and
assuming no change in production costs
Source: Robinson (1965)
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To test the hypothesis that removal of support would reduce inequality, Robinson
analysed data for the 10 years prior to 1965. He noted that the terms of trade4
 to
agriculture had worsened. Given the above 'net income multipliers', this should have
led to a more equal distribution of income. Robinson tested this by analysing over time
the ratio of average net income of different sized farms (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 Ratio of Average Net Farm Income per Farm,
by Sales Categories, US 1959 to 1964.
Year	 High to Mediuma
 Low to Mediumb
1959	 2.6	 0.6
1960	 2.6	 0.6
1961	 2.8	 0.6
1962	 2.8	 0.6
1963	 2.7	 0.6
1964	 2.9	 0.6
a)Ratio of net income of farms with sales of $20,000
+ to farms with sales of $5,000 to $9,999
b)Ratio of net income of farms with sales of $2,500
to $4,999 to farms with sales of $5,000 to $9,999
Source: Robinson (1965)
Table 2.2 shows that, despite the apparent worsening of the terms of trade, the ratio
between high and medium sales class farms had increased. Higher income farms were
doing better than the lower income farms, in relative terms. Robinson concluded that a
reduction in the terms of trade would not lead to a permanent redistribution of income
against those who have a high ratio of costs to revenue (i.e., farmers with large total
sales and high net income multiplier). This supported his argument that removal of
price support would not result in income redistribution. There is a basic flaw in
Robinson's analysis, in that he assumes farmers in the high sales group all have the
highest income. Although income is correlated with sales, it is by no means an exact
relationship. Therefore, although the ratio between high and low sales class farms had
increased, despite a worsening of the terms of trade, this does not imply the same for
4Terms of Irade in this sense relates to the prices iceived for farm products and the costs of the inputs
used to produce them.
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high and low income farms. Robinson makes judgements about income distribution
from inadequate data.
Robinson argued that if agricultural support was removed, the price of those factors of
production that have a relatively inelastic supply schedule would decline more than
those factors that have uses outside of agriculture (and therefore a more elastic supply
curve). This should ensure that the price of land would fall more than that of fertiuiser,
fuel, tyres and industrial goods. Therefore, those farmers owning land would suffer a
capital loss (either real or potential depending on when the land was bought), whilst
those renting land would be affected less, assuming farm rental values were adjusted
accordingly. This conclusion is supported by Gaffney (1965), who argued that the
majority of farm supports were capitalised into land values and that the real effect of
agricultural support policies was to transfer income to land owners rather than farmers.
The remainder of the analysis undertaken by Robinson was very simplistic. He
attempted a regional analysis in which balance sheets for two regions were shown, one
of which produced heavily supported products. The effect on the two regions of the
removal of support in the short-run was, not surprisingly, very different, with the non-
supported region showing a marked improvement in its relative position. From a brief
analysis of the income distribution effects of allotment allocations (area quotas),
Robinson concluded that they reduced the move towards more concentrated production.
He also reasoned that as government payments are concentrated on grain production,
then those areas that produce grain receive the most benefits.
The main conclusions Robinson drew from his analysis of the effects of agricultural
policy were:
1) Owners of land gained relative to other input owners.
2) Regions that grew heavily supported crops gained in relation to those regions that
produced non-supported crops.
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3) Those farms that used home grown feeds gained in relation to those who bought-in
feed.
4) The allotment allocations meant that high-cost producers gained in relation to low-
cost producers.
5) Farmers in the corn belt gained from government payments in relation to those in the
North-East and the West of the country.
The work of Robinson highlights potential problems with analysing the effect of
support on income distribution. His analysis attempts no quantification of the degree of
inequality either with or without support policies. The questions raised are valid but the
answers are very subjective.
In contrast to Robinson, Boyne (1965) analysed actual changes in income distribution
between farm households and rural households. Using data on family income, he
highlighted a consistent trend over the period of a reduction in inequality for farmers
and farm manager families. This appears to contradict the findings of Robinson who
argued that there had been little difference in the relative distribution of income during a
similar period.
Boyne examined the distribution of income but did not relate it to agricultural policy.
He began by asking a number of questions (which any analyst of income distribution in
agriculture should ask). "First, given the heterogenity in agriculture, what subgroups
should be used for measurement purposes? Second, what income concept should be
used?" (p 88). His conclusion was pragmatic, in that the answers were dictated by the
type of data available! Boyne used national income survey data, which split rural
families into three groups: Farmers and Farm Managers, Labourers and Foremen, and
Rural Farm Families. The income measure was total family income which comprised
of total money income for each member of the household. Total money income
included wages and salaries, net self-employment income, income from interest, rents
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and social security payments. This was a comprehensive income measure, and
included off-farm income sources of the farm family.
Boyne presented his results in a number of ways. First, to illustrate the relative
position of farmers to that of the rest of society, the percentage of the farm population
in each quintile of the national income distribution was calculated (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Percentage of Farmers within Each Income Quintile of National
Distribution (US 1948,1960)
Year	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Top 5%
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
1948	 47.3
	
19.2	 12.8
	
9.3	 11.4
	
5
1960	 49.9
	
25.4	 10.2
	
7.7	 6.9
	
1.7
Source: Adapted from Boyne (1965)
By definition each income quintile related to 20% of the population. Therefore, in
order to have a similar income distribution to the rest of the US, 20% of farmers should
be in each quintile. In 1948,47.3% of farms had total family incomes that put them in
the bottom 20% of the population in income terms. By 1960 this had risen to just
under 50%. At the other end of the scale, the percentage of farm families in the top
20% fell from 11.4 to 6.9%. It would appear that the relative position of farm families
in the US deteriorated during the period under analysis. Boyne also noted that the
median income had risen over the period by just 15% for farm families, whereas the
increase for non-farm families was 41%.
The results in Table 2.3 illustrate how work at the time substantiated the feeling that the
majority of farm families were 'poof and that support was necessary. The majority of
farms had very low total family incomes. Boyne, however, noted that these figures did
not include income in kind, which later studies (for example, Bryant and Zick, 1985)
show to be a major part of rural families income. However, he estimated that the likely
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effect of income in kind would be to shift farms up income bands, without really
effecting the relative distribution of income within agriculture.
Boyne proceeded to compare the distribution of income within the agricultural sector,
using both quintile analysis and Gini coefficients. He analysed the distributions
between the three main groups considered earlier. For the purpose of this review, only
the results for the category Farmers and Farm Managers will be assessed (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4 Percentage of Total Income received by Farmers and
Farm Managers.
Year	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Top 5%
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
1948	 2.4	 6.6	 12.6	 19.9	 58.4	 32.5
1951	 3	 7.9	 13.6	 21.1	 54.5	 26.2
1963	 3.2	 8.5	 14.7	 23.1	 50.5	 20.8
U.s.a	 6
	
13	 17	 23	 41	 16
a)average for all US,1948-63
Source: Adapted from Boyne (1965)
Boyne concluded that the distribution of income to Farmers and Farm Managers had
changed during the period (illustrated by the decline in the share of the top 5%). In
comparison, the figures for the whole of the US had changed very little during the
period (the average shown in the last row of Table 2.4 is an accurate representation of
the distribution throughout the period)
Examination of the Gini coefficient, 5 as would be expected, reflected the findings of the
quintile analysis. The Gini coefficient declined by 16% from 0.55 in 1948 to 0.46 in
1963. The Gini coefficient for the US as a whole was about a third lower than that for
5The Gini coefficient will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Here it is suffice to state that
it is a means by which inequality in distributions can be measured. The coefficient can range from 0
indicating that the distribution is perfectly equal, to 1, indicating the most extreme inequality.
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Farm and Farm Managers, indicating that Farm incomes were more unevenly
distributed than that of the rest of the population.
Boyne acknowledged two main problems with his analysis. First, as already
mentioned, no measurement of income-in-kind was made, which is a major
contribution to farm household welfare. Second, no attempt was made to analyse
regional patterns in inequality, or to break down farms into specific categories. Both
problems relate to availability of data.
A more specific analysis, dealing with the distributive effects of US cotton support
programmes was undertaken by Bonnen (1968). This work is of particular interest,
because it involves an examination of the distribution of support as well as highlighting
possible methods for estimating the actual level of support. Estimation of the level of
support involved two approaches. The first simply calculated the level of support as
the difference between the price received in each state and the average price that would
have been received on the next best market (in this case the US export price), and then
multiplied this figure by the level of production in each state. The figures were
weighted to allow for differences in the quality of cotton produced between regions.
Bonnen noted that this method did not allow for possible changes in the quantity
produced and exported after the removal of support.
The second approach attempted to allow for changes in demand. Using available
demand elasticities, Bonnen estimated the fall in world price that would have to occur to
remove the surplus production (whilst maintaining a fixed level of stocks). The
difference between this world price and the state average price was deemed the margin
of support. Again, this method did not allow for changes in the supply of the product,
brought about by the removal of the allotment programme and the lower price, and
therefore cannot be considered as a long-run estimate. However, it did allow for some
quantity changes and in this sense may be regarded as an improvement on the first
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method. The two margins of support were described by Bonnen as extremes; the first
method an under-estimation and the second an over-estimation of the level of support
received by farmers. The different estimates of the level of support, and the regional
differences are shown in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 Regional Variations in Level of Benefits to Cotton Producers
	
Method 1	 Method 2
Region	 Average per	 Average per	 Avemge per	 Average per
	
Farm	 Acre	 Farm	 Acm
South East	 438	 33	 949	 71
Delta	 1,107	 45	 2,400	 97
South West
	
1,043	 20	 2,263	 44
West	 5,934	 79	 12,869	 171
US	 1,002	 35	 2,172	 75
Source: Adapted from Bonnen (1968)
The different assumptions about the market situation had a considerable effect on the
estimated level of support. Bonnen argued that the per farm differences could be
explained largely in terms of differing farm sizes. However, the per acre figure
suggests variation in yields (even allowing for variations in the quality of cotton
produced). Bonnen also analysed the distribution of support, within states and
regions, using Gini coefficients to indicate the degree of inequality. The regional
fmdings (Table 2.6) highlighted large differences. Overall the distribution of support
was very unequal, with a Gini of 0.65 for the US as a whole.
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Table 2.6 Gini Coefficients For Distribution of
Cotton Supporta
Region	 Gini
South East	 0.57
Delta	 0.66
South West 0.54
West	 0.68
US	 0.65
a Results are for Method 2
Source: Adapted from Bonnen (1968)
The study by Bonnen concentrated on regional differences in levels of support, rather
than the distribution between farmers at different income levels. The analysis
highlighted that if the assumptions about the market situation were altered, large
variations in estimated levels of support could occur.
The year after his work on the distribution of cotton supports, Bonnen (1969), reported
in Schultze (1972), extended his analysis to most of the major crops grown in the US.
This work differed in methodology quite considerably from that of his earlier work. In
order to estimate the benefits received by farms, he assumed that they would be
proportional to acreage size. From this distribution he estimated Gini coefficients for
different crops (Table 2.7). This assumption removed the need to estimate the level of
benefits actually going to each farm or for any information on the levels of production,
i.e. acreage size was used as a proxy for support.
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Table 2.7 Gini Coefficients for Selected Farm Programmes (mid 1960s)
Commodity	 Gini	 Commodity	 Gini
Income	 0.47	 Peanuts	 0.52
Wheat	 Price Support	 0.57	 Tobacco	 0.48
	
Direct Payments 0.48	 Sugar Beet
	
0.46
Total	 0.57
	
Feed Grains Price Support 0.59	 Sugar Cane
	
0.80
	
Direct Payments 0.41	 Cotton	 0.65
Total	 0.57	 Rice	 0.63
Source: Adapted from Schultze (1972, after Bonnen, 1969)
Schultze, whilst recognising that the method adopted by Bonnen had the
aforementioned advantages, raised a number of points concerning the disadvantages:
1) It failed to provide information on the income level of farmers receiving the benefit.
This meant that the welfare effects of the policies could not be assessed. Schultze
reasoned that "The income distribution effects of farm programs can be best judged by
the distribution of benefits by income size class and by the absolute magnitude of the
support provided to each group" (p 97).
2) It is wrong to assume a perfect correlation between acreage size class and economic
size class. Not all large farms have high sales and income, and not all farms with high
sales and incomes are large acreage farms.
3) The fact that many farms produce more than one product means that distributing
benefits by farm size group on a crop by crop basis does not reveal the distributive
effects of multiple enterprises.
The method of distributing support by acreage size is not, therefore, a satisfactory way
of measuring the distributive effects of agricultural policy. Schultze, after reviewing
the work of Bonnen, conducted his own very detailed analysis of the distribution of
support and income. Although published much later, Schultze examined the same time
period as Robinson and Boyne. However, any similarity ends here. Schultze's work
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was based on an analytical framework and, in his own words, addressed the question
"Who gets the subsidies?" Specifically, to what extent do farm programs represent a
transfer of income from a relatively affluent urban population to a relatively depressed
and low-income farm community?" (p 95). He noted that in 1969 the average income
of farm families was 33% lower than that of non-farm families and therefore any
transfer of income may have appeared justified. However, he argued that this was not
the case, because the transfers were related not to the income of the farm families, but
to the volume of production "Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of the farm
subsidy program it is not a welfare program in the sense of transferring income to low-
income farm families" (p 96).
Schultze measured the benefits of farm support programs "principally in terms of the
income farmers received beyond what they would have received in the absence of the
programs" (p 96). The concept and justification of support was addressed by Schultze,
but the bulk of his work was concerned with examining the distributional effects of
agricultural policy. To this end he noted that, "Determining how the benefits of US
farm programs are distributed among farmers of different income levels presents three
major problems: measuring the magnitude of the benefits; estimating the distribution of
benefits to farms grouped according to economic class; and relating the economic class
grouping to a net income grouping" (p 100).
Schultze used published data to estimate the level of support received by farms in the
form of direct payments. The level of support per unit of the commodity was calculated
as the total level of direct payments divided by the total level of production. Unlike
Bonnen (1969), Schultze also attempted to measure the quantity effects of price support
policies. Schultze noted certain factors that have to be estimated in order to measure the
magnitude of price support policies in the long-run rather than the short-run. These are:
1) The acreages planted and yields of various crops with acreage restrictions removed
and loans and intervention purchases removed.
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2) The price elasticities of demand, both domestic and export, for the commodities
involved.
3) The impact of lower grain purchases on livestock feeding, production and sales.
4) The impact of lower returns from previously supported crops on the production and
prices of other commodities. Because of the substitutability, both in production and
consumption, among farm commodities, the effect of removing price supports would
extend to returns from other commodities as well as from price supported crops.
5) The changes in production costs that would occur under free market conditions.
Increased output due to the removal of quotas would tend to raise costs, but several
factors would tend to reduce them: prices for purchased feed, seed, and livestock
would be lower; removal of acreage restrictions would improve the mix of inputs (land,
labour and capital) and thereby lead to lower costs; and, with sharply lower incomes,
farmers' ability to purchase machinery and other capital would be curtailed.
The model used by Schultze to estimate the 'free market' situation was the first major
attempt measure the distribution of support by estimating the long-run level of support
received, i.e. measuring support in terms of the changes in prices and quantities
produced after removal of support. The advantage of this approach is that it gives a
more realistic idea of how much support is received by farmers. The disadvantage is
that it requires many assumptions, much time and considerable resources.
The model was used to estimate the loss associated with each major farm commodity,
following removal of price supports and acreage restrictions over the period 1961 to
1967. This loss was then distributed to each economic class of farms 6 in proportion to
the class's share of production of that commodity. The losses for each commodity
were summed to give a total loss for each class. Table 2.8 presents Schultze's findings
for 1964.
6Economic Class in Schultze's study is comparable to Sales Class in other US studies. With class 1
representing the largest farms and class 6 the smallest, in terms of sales.
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0.14
0.26
0.4
4.2
12
7.2
Schultze's results show clearly the uneven distribution of agricultural support. Class 1
farms (the farms with the highest sales) represented only a small proportion of the total
number of farms, but received the most support. Schultze argued that the results
supported his view that agricultural support policies were not welfare policies. The
work by Schultze was the most comprehensive to date.
Table 2.8 Distribution of Benefits and Income by Economic Class (1964)
Economic
Class
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
Aggregate Benefits 	 ($ Billions)
1.44
0.34
1.78
42.3
15.4
31.8
Price Supports
Direct Payments
Total
Distribution of Benefits
Price Supports
Direct Payments
Total
Income and Benefits per Farm
0.66	 0.61	 0.37	 0.18
0.44	 0.58	 0.38	 0.19
1.1	 1.19	 0.75	 0.37
(Percent of Total)
19.3	 17.9	 11	 5.3
20.3	 26.4	 17.4	 8.6
19.7	 21.3	 13.4	 6.6
($ 000)
Farmers Net Income
Net Income from Farming
Price Supports
Direct Payments
Total
27.3	 11.8	 8
23.3	 9.5	 6
9.9	 2.5	 1.3
2.3	 1.6	 1.2
12.2	 4.1	 2.5
	
6.3	 5	 5.1
	3.5 	 2	 1
	
0.7	 0.4	 0.1
	
0.7	 0.4	 0.2
	
1.4	 0.8	 0.3
Net Income under 'Free Market' 11.1 5.4	 3.5	 2.1	 1.2	 0.7
Source: Adapted from Schultze (1972)
At around the same time of Schultze's study, work in the UK by Josling and Hamway
(1972) attempted to assess the effects of agricultural support on income distribution and
the possible changes that were likely to ensue after accession to the European
Community (EC). In essence it was a comparison between deficiency payments
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(which operated by paying a fixed sum per unit of production) and price support
(which involved higher market prices).
The data source for this study was the Farm Management Survey (FMS, now known
as the Farm Business Survey, FBS), which included data on production and income
from some 2000 farms in England and Wales. The definition of income used was Net
Farm Income (NFl), calculated as the farmers returns from the business of farming.
This income concept can be criticised on the grounds that no information on off-farm
sources of income, or on the income of other members of the household was acquired.
In comparison, the majority of US work involving the use of income includes family
income and income from off-farm sources, thus giving a more comprehensive view of
the actual welfare position of the farmer. The work of Josling and Hamway therefore
does not relate directly to the relative welfare aspects of agricultural policy, but can still
be useful in examining the relationship between the distribution of support in relation to
that of farming income.
Support for each commodity was estimated simply as the per unit figure (published by
the government in the Annual White Paper on Agriculture) multiplied by the individual
farm's level of production of that commodity. The research did not account for
possible effects of the marketing boards. It was, like the early American work, a static
analysis. Estimation of the 'free market' level of income involved simply deducting the
estimated level of support from NFL. Possible changes in demand and supply that were
likely to occur were not accounted for. The authors acknowledged the problem with
the static approach but defended it on the grounds that, "Static comparisons have value,
however, in that they indicate the original direct impact of the changes in prices and
methods of support to which producers and households will respond" ( p 51). The
advantage of Josling and Hamway's approach was that it enabled the level of support to
be calculated simply and quickly.
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In order to examine differences in the distribution of support between farm types,
Josling and Hamway grouped farms according to the enterprise(s) that comprised the
majority of the total production, or required the most labour. Gini coefficients were
used to measure the distribution of support for each farm programme and for NFL.
Selected results are shown in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9 Gini Coefficients for Selected Farm
Support Programmes (UK 1969)
Programme/Income Gini
Potatoes	 0.60
Cereals	 0.52
Fat Pigs	 0.51
Total Support	 0.34
NFl	 0.30
Non Support Income 0.22
Calf Subsidy	 0.18
Source: Josling and Hamway (1972)
Josling and Hamway note: "It can be seen from the table that income including support
payments is distributed with a higher inequality coefficient than would be the case if no
support policy existed" (p 58). They, therefore concluded that agricultural support
increased the level of inequality. 7 Another conclusion drawn from the results was that
"Programmes which appear to distribute benefits unequally tend to be those price
support schemes which operate through the price guarantee system" (p 58).
Josling and Hamway compared the income distributions under a 'free market' situation
with that under deficiency payments, and the likely distribution once the UK acceded to
the EC (Table 2.10).
71t should be noted, however, that the results indicate a low level of inequality within the agricultural
sector even with support. A Gini coefficient of 0.30 for NFl is low compared to the national
distribution of income which was 0.39.
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Table 2.10 Disiribution of Farm Incomes under Different Policies
Policy	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 Gini
Quartile	 Quartile	 Quartile	 Quartile
No Support	 13
	
25	 21	 41	 0.22
Deficiency Payments 13
	
17	 22	 48	 0.30
Price Support	 15
	
10	 25	 50	 0.32
Source: Josling and Hamway (1972)
They concluded that whichever of the two policies was in force, inequality would be
higher than under a 'free market' situation. However, the move from deficiency
payments to price support would slightly increase inequality. The findings of the study
by Josling and Hamway were similar to those of Schultze, despite the different
approach. Schultze concluded that the majority of benefits were going to the high
income farms. The results of the analysis by Josling and Hamway showed that support
was more unequally distributed than income, so the high income farmers were
benefiting more. Thus, work on both sides of the Atlantic reached similar conclusions
about the nature of farm support.
The work by Bell (1973) was, to a certain extent, related to that of Josling and
Hamway. The study was limited in that only a section of the FBS data set (the
Northern region) was used. Two measures of farm income were employed; NFl as
used by Josling and Hamway, and an Adjusted Net Farm Income (ANFI). The
calculation of ANFI involved replacing the imputed rent for owner-occupiers and the
value of family labour on the farm. The author argued that the adjusted figure gave a
more accurate representation of the welfare position of the farm. However, ANFI
represented only a slight improvement over NH, because off-farm income was not
assessed.
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Bell made reference to work by Benson (1970) which developed practical
considerations about the application of the Gini coefficient. Benson referred to the
work of Bonnen (op. cit) and Boyne (op. cit) as examples of studies using Gini
coefficients which failed to specif' the actual procedures followed. The purpose of the
work by Benson was to highlight possible shortcomings with the application of the
Gini coefficient. In research into the distribution of gross income earned by cotton
producers, he found that results in some cases were completely different from a priori
expectations. On closer examination it was found that the results suffered from cell8
and aggregation bias. Cell bias can be split into two types; inter-cell and intra-cell.
Benson argued that as the calculation of the Gini coefficient requires stratification of the
data, a problem can arise with the number of cells chosen. By using graphical
illustrations, Benson argued that the fewer cells chosen for calculating the Gini, the
lower its value (thus indicating a more even distribution). The number of observations
in each cell is also important. The process of dividing farms into cells ensures that
observations in the same cell are represented by a linear function. Thus, Benson
argued that "When a large number of observations fall within one cell much of the
information about the distribution is lost" (p 445). In an extreme case, if 100% of
observations fell in one cell the Gini would be zero.
The problem of aggregation bias arises when different distributions are combined to
form one distribution. Benson considered the effects of combining individual state data
on cotton support to form national data. The Gini for Arizona (0.372) was the lowest
from any state (the national figure being 0.686). Since the distribution of benefits in
Arizona appeared more evenly distributed, it would seem logical that if that state was
removed from the analysis, the Gini for the US as a whole would rise. This was not
the case; in fact the Gini actually fell. The reason for this apparent anomaly is related to
differences in the mean values of support between states. Benson concluded that it was
8 FOr the calculation of the Gim coefficient, it is necessay to group the data according to some size
variable and each of these groupings is termed a cell.
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not possible to infer the effect that the Gini for one state will have on the national
figure. "In summary, when state distributions of benefits are heterogeneous,
inferences drawn from the ordinal ranking of state Gini ratios may be very misleading"
(p 447).
Bell used the findings of Benson to question the methods behind the Josling and
Hamway work and to develop his own research. Josling and Hamway's grouping of
farms was based on farm size classes, 9 so each cell consisted of unequal numbers of
farms. Also, only four cells were used. The research by Benson inferred that these
two factors could have seriously biased the findings of Josling and Hamway. Bell, in
calculating the Gini coefficients for the Northern region FBS data, split the data into 10
equal groups ranked by NFl, to reduce the likelihood of inter- and intra-cell bias. As
the data were for one region only, the question of aggregation bias did not arise.
Bell's work involved an examination of inequality over a period of time (unlike
Bonnen, Josling and Hamway, and Schultze). For the majority of the period, the Gini
coefficient for support payments was lower than that for NFl (Table 2.11), indicating
that support payments were more equally distributed than income. 10 This was,
however, not the only significant result. In Table 2.11, the Gini for ANFI is
consistently lower than that for NFL, indicating a more equal distribution. According to
Bell, this finding indicated that farmers who had low NFl were in fact owner-
occupiers, who used unpaid family labour on the farm and therefore their relative
wealth was higher than the NFl figure indicated.
9 Measured in terms of Standard Man Days (SMDs).
10 Th fmdings were in direct contrast to those of Josling and Hamway.
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Table 2.11 Gini Coefficients for Income and Support (1962 to 1971)
Year	 NFl	 ANFI	 Support
Payments
1962	 0.39	 0.35
	 0.44
1963	 0.42	 0.38	 0.40
1964	 0.48	 0.42	 0.38
1965
	 0.41	 0.38	 0.33
1966	 0.43	 0.39	 0.32
1967	 0.44	 0.42	 0.32
1968	 0.42	 0.39
	 0.33
1969	 0.45	 0.42	 0.32
1970	 0.48	 0.46
	 0.32
1971	 0.40	 0.38	 0.34
Source: Bell (1973)
Bell did not restrict his study to a year-by-year examination, but proceeded to undertake
a form of longitudinal analysis. The justification for this type of examination was that
farms will move between income groups in different years due to the variable nature of
farm incomes, and that the distribution in any one year may not reflect the true position.
Bell argued that farmers are motivated by an expected stream of income over several
years rather than a one year result.
In order to attempt a longitudinal analysis, Bell chose a base year to allocate farms to a
particular income decile. The data on incomes for each farm in the following years
were then located in the same dedile as the base year income. The income flow was
discounted at 9% (argued to be the medium term rate of interest used by the Agricultural
Mortgage Corporation). Therefore, the figure calculated ('present value') was the total
income to that farm over a ten year period, discounted accordingly. From these figures
new Gini coefficients for both support payments and income were calculated (Table
2.12).
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Table 2.12 Comparison between Present Value Gini and
10 year average
Income	 Present	 1962-7 1
Value	 Mean
Income with Supports 	 0.35	 0.40
Income without Supports 0.58
Source: Bell (1973)
Bell concluded that agricultural policy had helped to prevent greater inequality, because
income without support was more unevenly distributed than income with support. He
argued that for all but the top 15-20% of farmers, government support payments were a
major component of farm income. He reasoned that although large farmers benefit
more from subsidies in absolute terms than lower income farmers, the lower income
farmers were more dependent upon them. Comparison between the present value
figure and that for the mean of the 1962 to 1971 year by year analysis led Bell to
conclude that, because the former figure is lower than the latter, it can be argued that
temporary market fluctuations may mislead when analysing the distribution of income
between farmers.
Bell raised a number of points that other authors have not addressed. The long term
analysis, although fraught with difficulties, was an attempt to extend the study of farm
income distribution beyond the (possibly misleading) one year stage. The difficulties
with this analysis relate to the absence of knowledge as to the individual farmer's
motivations. As Bell noted, farmers may be at different stages of their "wealth
producing potential". For example, some may be foregoing income generation to build
up a capital stock. This means that results can not be accepted as a true indication of
the medium term income flow. However, the longitudinal approach still had the
advantage of removing from the analysis of income distribution the effects of year-to-
year fluctuations in farmers incomes.
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The final part of Bell's study was concerned with examination of how the tax system
redistributes income between farmers, more specifically, how the extra benefits which
large farmers receive are removed by the tax system. Bell reasoned, "One may, of
course, wish to question the efficiency of a system which provides subsidies only to
remove them by taxation"(p 12), but concluded that a possible effect of taxation was to
reduce the level of inequality associated with government support policies.
Hill (1982, 1984) was concerned with the measurement of farm incomes for welfare
purposes. Whilst not strictly within the parameters of a review of the literature on the
distribution of agricultural support, the work is important because it raises questions as
to the applicability of using certain definitions of income for measurement purposes.
The main consideration of the earlier work of Hill, is that the income levels of farmers
are of prime concern to agricultural policymakers throughout the world. However, Hill
argues, that within the EC there are no available measures to assess the welfare
situation of the farmer. For example, in the UK, every year, the Departmental Net
Income Calculation (DNIC) is made for agriculture as a whole. Hill argues that this
figure is virtually meaningless because it gives no indication of the distribution of
income or of how the incomes of farmers producing different products are affected. If,
as Hill argues, there is a dearth of income data, then it is difficult to assess the impact of
government support programmes on that income. The measures that are available are
criticised by Hill on four counts:
1) Annual measurements of the global income of the farming sector of the economy
give no indication of the distribution of that income between individual farmers or of
the changes of income from year to year.
2) Total income of the farm household may differ widely from income from farming
alone.
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3) Views may differ as to the items which should be taken into account when
calculating the residual sum which forms the farmer's net income, and in particular the
ireatment of capital gains.
4) Any measurement confined to current income, and ignoring assets owned by farmers
is likely to be inadequate in reflecting total economic well-being.
The later work of Hill was concerned with the use of Inland Revenue data (through the
Survey of Personal Incomes) to try and gain information about other sources of
incomes for farmers.
In contrast to the dearth of income data in the EC, an example of the detailed data on
farmers total incomes in the US can be found in Ahearn et al (1985). They use survey
data consisting of detailed information about the sources of income to the farm operator
household. The definition of income is given as income from the farm operation and
income to the farm operator household from off-farm sources. This is split into the
following groups:
Three sources of farm income:-
a) Business farm income from the production of agricultural commodities, to include all
cash income, net of cash expenses, depreciation, and 'in kind' benefits to hired labour.
b) Household farm income the household earns directly from the business, to include
imputed rental value for farm dwellings, the value of products produced and consumed
on the farm and wages and fringe benefits the business pays the household for its
labour.
c) Income from government farm programmes involving only direct payments.
Four sources of off-farm income:-
a) non-farm wages and salary.
b) wages and salaries earned from work on other farms.
c) business and professional income.
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d) income from all other sources.
It is clear that the definition of income used is comprehensive and an advancement on
earlier work. Aheam et a!, like Schultze, recognise the problems involved in equating
sales classes with income classes (Table 2.13). The largest farms (by sales class) have
a high percentage of farms with negative income. However, they also have the greatest
percentage of very high incomes.
Table 2.13 Distribution of Income of Farm Households by Sales Class (US,1984)
Value of Sales ($000)
Total Income Class	 <10	 10 to 39 40 to 99 100 to 499 ^ 500
($000)
Negative Income	 12	 18	 18	 17	 17
Oto9	 25	 19	 11	 6	 1
10to24	 32	 32	 25	 10	 3
25to39	 19	 19	 21	 12	 5
40to59	 8	 8	 15	 17	 4
^60	 3	 4	 9	 38	 69
Gini Coefficient 	 0.51	 0.58	 0.51	 0.46	 0.30
Source: Aheam et a! (1985)
Although there is a large proportion of high sales class farms that have negative
incomes, there are very few low sales class farms that have very high incomes. Ahearn
et al conclude that although off-farm income does supplement the farm income of low
sales class farms, it does not bring them up to parity with the high sales class farms.
The Gini coefficients reported in Table 2.13 relate to the distribution within each sales
class. The distribution of income is most equal within the highest sales class, whilst
income inequality is greater within the lower sales classes.
Due to the deficiencies of using sales classes as a means of grouping farms, Ahearn et
a! analyse the contribution of different sources of income to farms ranked by income
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classes. Results for selected income classes (those at the extremes of the distribution)
are reproduced in Table 2.14.
Table 2.14 Average Income By Income Class and Source
Income Source
	 Income Class ($)
0 to 9,999	 > 60,000	 Total
Average % of Average % of Average % of
Income Total	 Income Total	 Income Total
Business Farm	 -5,039	 -96
	
77,930	 53	 749	 3
Household Farm	 4,960	 95
	
16,743	 11	 7,689	 29
Govt. Payments	 565	 11
	
7,009	 5	 1,982	 7
Total Farm	 486	 9
	
101,683	 69	 10,420	 39
Non-Farm Wages
Business and Professional
Wages from other Farms
Other Off-Farm
Total Off-farm
Total Household Income
	
1,990	 38
	
722	 14
	
165	 3
	
1,859	 36
	
4,737	 91
	
5,223	 100
	
10,591	 7
	
24,163	 16
84,000
	
11,502	 8
	
46,340	 31
	
148,023	 100
	
8,216	 31
	
4,065	 15
	15 	 1
	
3,772	 14
	
16,213	 61
26,633 100
Source: Adapted from Ahearn eta! (1985)
A number of points about the distribution of government farm payments in relation to
household income can be inferred from Table 2.14. First, high income farms include
those with large farm business earnings and also those with high levels of off-farm
income. Second, the low income farms appear to be those that are making on average a
fairly substantial loss from farming. 11 This loss is offset by the off-farm and other
income sources. Ahearn et a! conclude that: "The more even distribution of household
farm income and the uneven distribution of off-farm income towards the smaller farms
partially offsets the greater concentration of farm business earnings and government
payments on the larger farms" (p 1089).
ttThe table does not include the figures for negative income farm households. The loss fmm the farm
business for this group was on average $52,200.
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Ahearn et al attempt to disaggregate the Gini for total household income into Gini
coefficients for each source of income, using a method introduced by Lerman and
Yitzhaki (1985). The results are shown in Table 2.15.
Table 2.15 Gini Coefficients by Source of Income
Source of Income	 Gini
Business Farm	 0.91
Household Farm	 0.60
Govt. Payments	 0.90
TotalFarm	 0.66
Non-Farm Wages 0.84
Business and Professional 0.99
Wages from other Farms 0.97
Other Off-Farm	 0.90
Total Off-farm 0.76
Total Household Income 0.60
Source Adapted from Aheam eta! (1985)
The Gini coefficients indicate a very unequal distribution of income. The high level of
inequality for business farm income is purely a result of the large variation in earnings.
Whereas for the other sources of income, the Gini by source is higher than the total
Gini, because not all households earn any income from a particular source. Ahearn et
al commit a cardinal sin (according to the work of Benson) in their use of the Gini
coefficient. The survey data produces a Gini Coefficient for income of 0.60. (This in
itself is perfectly valid, although no mention is made of the number of cells into which
farms are grouped or the proportion of the population within each cell). The problem
occurs when the results are compared to the earlier work of Carlin and Reinsel (1973)
which gave a Gini coefficient for farm operator households of 0.48. Kinsey (1985), in
a paper assessing the work of Ahearn et al, notes that the definition of income used is
different from Carlin and Reinsel's and the authors themselves acknowledge that the
stratification of the data is different. The problem arises because a number of farms
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actually report negative income. Carlin and Reinsel ensured that the first cell in the
distribution consisted of enough of the population to make it positive. Ahearn et a!,
recoded negative income figures to zero. The effects of these alterations can be seen in
Gregory (1986) and in Kinsey (1985). It is suffice to note that the Gini results of
Carlin and Reinsel are incomparable to those of Ahearn et a!.
The study by Ahearn et a!, although not considering the possible effects of agricultural
policy (other than direct payments) on income distribution, does address a number of
problems found in earlier work. The defmition of income is comprehensive. The
analysis is concerned with farms ranked by income rather than by sales class, and Gini
coefficients for the separate income sources are also considered.
Blandford (1985) reasons that although much has been written about the distribution of
farm programme benefits, it does not appear to be a major item on the political agenda
in the United States. The main purpose of his study is to analyse the effects of direct
payments and to shed light as to their future as a means of agricultural support. It is
based on the argument that despite deficiencies of the present system, income support
measures will continue to be used.
Blandford's analysis is limited to an examination of the total cost of direct payments,
and of the distribution of direct payments and farm income by farm type and region. In
examining the distribution of direct payments and farm income (Table 2.16), he shows
that if farming income alone is considered, then payments in recent years have
represented a significant proportion of average net farm income, although if off-farm
income is considered then the ratio of payments to income is substantially smaller.
(This is indicated in the final rows of the table, showing the ratio of payments to NFl
and total income)
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Table 2.16 Direct Payments and Farm Income by Sales Class (US 1984-5)
Sales Class ($'OOO)
Income/Payments 	 <40	 40-99	 100-499 >500	 Total
%
Farm Size Distribution 	 71.9	 14.3	 12.6	 1.2	 100
Total Government Payments
Average per Farm:
Government Payments
Net Farm Income
Off-Farm Income
Net Farm and Off-Farm
Ratio of Gov. Payments to:-
NFl
NFl-i-Off-Farm Income
Note: n/a = not applicable
Source: Blandford (1987)
10.6	 22.2	 54.7	 12.6	 100
$ 1985 (per farm)
526	 5,515	 15,532	 37,117	 3,564
-1,732	 4,700	 47,708	 631,423 13,030
20,336	 10,254	 11,037	 15,432	 17,667
18,603	 14,955 58,745	 646,854 30,697
%
n/a	 117.3	 32.6	 5.9	 27.4
2.8	 36.9	 26.4	 5.7	 11.6
Two points can be made about these findings. First, the figures are averaged between
all farms irrespective of whether they receive benefits or not. Therefore, it is likely that
for those farms that receive support payments the ratio of payments to income will be
higher than the figure shown. Second, these figures show the importance of off-farm
income to the agricultural sector.
An examination of the distribution of income across sales classes is undertaken by
Blandford, and this reveals that the importance of government payments to net farm
income varies across the sample. The uneven distribution of total payments per farm is
highlighted, with the largest (in terms of sales) receiving on average $37,000 and the
smallest $500. The largest 14% of farms received 67% of the total payments.
Blandford argues that these figures are useful, but they do not give a complete picture.
Reference is made to a study of the distribution of payments to farms classified by their
debt to asset ratio. This showed that those with a high debt to asset ratio (>40%)
received a larger proportion of payments than those that were under less financial
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stress. Blandford argues that this finding indicates that support is going to those farms
that are in greater financial need of it, which is an interesting development in the
analysis of the effect of support policies.
The analysis of the level of support received by farms, based on their farm type (i.e.
cotton, grain, etc.) shows large variations in the payments per farm. For example,
cotton farms on average received $43,000 dollars in 1985, whilst the average over all
farms was only $3,500.12 The intra-state comparison also shows great variation in the
level of support. However, this largely reflects the concentration of types of farms and
farming in different regions. Blandford argues that the intra-state comparison is useful,
because it highlights the states in which direct payments are an important part of
farmers incomes and therefore those areas that are likely to be significantly affected by
policy changes.
The use of both NFl and off-farm income enables a comparison of the relationship
between support payments and the total income of the farmer. However, no Gini
coefficients are calculated to estimate the level of inequality associated with direct
payments. Inequality measures are essential if greater knowledge about the
distributional aspects of direct payments is sought. To distribute benefits by farms
grouped by sales class has already been shown to be erroneous by Ahearn et al,
because of the large number of large sales class farms that have negative incomes.
Highly aggregated data are used in Blandford, so in many cases estimated support is
distributed between all farms in a particular group rather than those who actually receive
it.
t2Again there is a problem with aggregation, because within a group farms that did not partake of
support programmes were included in calculating the average supports per farm. This would lead to an
understatement of the benefits going to those farms that were operating under a support programme.
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Gregory (op.cit.), whilst not assessing the effects of support policies on income
distribution, conducts a detailed analysis of the use of inequality measures for assessing
farm income distribution. Many of the problems associated with earlier work - those
concerning the choice of inequality measure, the definition of income, and the effects of
negative incomes - are dealt with in full by Gregory. As an examination of inequality in
farm income, between farm types in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the study is
comprehensive. Gregory is also concerned with farm income instability and its effect
on income inequality and a large section of his work concentrates on this aspect of
income distribution.
Brown (1989), in a recent study of the distributional aspects of CAP price support
policies, estimates and disaggregates benefits using Farm Accountancy Data Network
(FADN) data. The benefits are analysed by farm type, economic size group, income
class and region, to build a picture of the distributional effect of price support. Using
FADN data from 1984/5, estimates of the benefits for each commodity on a national
level are disaggregated among representative farms. Summation over all commodities
gives total benefits for each representative farm. A comparative static partial
equilibrium model is used to identify the long-run effects of the liberalisation of all CAP
commodity prices.
Bmwn makes a number of key assumptions. First, it is assumed that the distribution
of benefits from commodity supports is proportional to commodity output, or at least
that proportion of output eligible for support. Second, a similar supply response to
price changes was assumed for all groups. Third, adjustments in the commodity
composition of farms after liberalisation were not accounted for.
The benefits from price support in EC countries are estimated by Brown as 12,000
ECU per farm per annum. This represents a quarter of the farm value of agricultural
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No.of
Regions
22
1
20
1
6
Country
France
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
U.K
production and two thirds of farm net value added. Brown proceeds to illustrate the
distributional aspects of farm policies using the categories reproduced in Table 2.17.
Table 2.17 Distribution Categories used by Brown
Farm Type:	 Cereals	 Daiiying
General Cropping	 Drystock
Horticultural	 Pigs/Poultry
Vineyards	 Mixed
Fruit/Olives
Farm Sia: 2 to 4
4 to 6
6 to 8
8 to 12
l2to 16
16 to 40
4Oto 100
> 100
Income Classb <4
4 to 8
8 to 12
12 to 24
>24
Regions:-
Country	 No.of
Regions
Belgiumf
Luxembourg	 2
Denmark	 1
Germany	 7
Greece	 4
a) European Size Units, where 1 ESU equals 1,100 ECU of Standard Gross
Margin.
b) Farm Net Value Added divided by Annual Work Units ('000 ECU)
Source: Brown (1989)
Table 2.17 illustrates the comprehensive nature of the analysis. The choice of
categories appears to be determined by data availability. For example, the income
measure used is Farm Net Value Added (NVA) divided by Annual Work Units
(AWU). This classifies farms according to income per labour unit rather than absolute
farm income. Brown defends the use of this measure on the grounds that it facilitates a
more useful comparison between full and part-time farms and among farms with
different labour uses. Brown notes that ideally the distribution should be by total farm
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household income, thus allowing for off-farm and family income to be considered.
However, the only data available are for NVA. The proportion of benefits going to
farms ranked by NVA/AWIJ can be seen in Table 2.18. Brown does not quantify the
level of inequality associated with these distributions.
Table 2.18 The Distribution by Country of Farms and Support in the EC (1985)
NVA/AWU	 NVA/AWU
<4000	 >24,000
Country	 Percentage	 Percentage	 Percentage	 Percentage
of Farms	 of Support	 of Farms	 of Support
BLEU
	
4.0
	
1.5
	
23
	
41.0
Denmark
	
17.0
	
4.1
	
33
	
55.8
France	 18.0
	
8.3
	
11
	
22.9
Germany	 21.0
	
11.1
	
7.5
	
14.3
Greece	 44.0
	
25.7
	
0.4
	
1.4
Ireland
	
32.0
	
10.8
	
4.5
	
17.8
Italy	 43.0
	
17.6
	
2.9
	
12.6
Netherlands	 4.1
	
1.3
	
39
	
58.9
UK
	
16.0
	
5.7
	
15
	
29.8
EC	 31	 10	 7.6	 24
Source: Adapted from Brown (1989)
Table 2.18 indicates that, for the EC as a whole, farms with the largest agricultural
incomes (according to the definition of income used by Brown) receive proportionately
more in terms of benefits (24%) than their share of total number of farms (7.6%). The
reverse is true of the lowest income farms. These results, according to Brown,
highlight the bias of price supports towards high income farmers. A clear difference
can be seen in the relative distributions between EC countries, although these
differences are not quantified. Brown concludes that this variation is due to the
structure of farming, the commodities produced throughout the EC and the varying
levels of support per commodity.
Brown examines the distribution of support by region, farm type, size and income to
produce an overall picture of the effects of CAP supports. The results indicate a wide
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variation in the level of support to different regions in the EC. These differences,
because of the methods used for the research, can be attributed largely to farm size.
"Much of the regional variation of the CAP was associated with different farm sizes; the
small farms of the southern regions receiving considerably lower benefits than the rest
of the EC" (p 50).
His study then progresses to a discussion of the possible factors, other than welfare
considerations, that could justify continuation of price supports. Such factors include
the aim of increasing self-sufficiency in the EC. On this point he reasons that:
"Much of the justification for increasing supplies disappeared with the
emergence of the EC as a substantial net exporter of many commodities. The
continuation of price support, therefore has been based on social premises"
(p 49).
Brown argues therefore that, as other possible justifications have disappeared, the
continuation for price support must be on the grounds of social need. However,
Brown criticises the method of price support as a welfare policy, drawing examples
from his analysis which "... raises serious doubts as to the ability of the CAP to effect a
socially desirable transfer of income to the agricultural sector" (p 49). It is not clear that
Brown's analysis raises "serious doubts" about the transfer effects of price support.
The fact that total household income is not available means that welfare judgements are
made on the basis of agricultural incomes, which Brown recognises as a weakness.
"Agricultural income, ... may be a poor indicator of the welfare of farm households.
Off-farm income commonly supplements agricultural income, and it is farm household
income that is paramount in determining 'social need' "(pp 13-14). So even though
the conclusion reached is that "Benefits from the CAP are concentrated on the higher
agricultural income farms" (p 50), this does not necessarily prove the inadequacies of
price support as a welfare policy.
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The work of Brown is both thorough and comprehensive in its approach to analysing
the distribution of CAP price supports. However, the lack of detailed analysis of the
quantification of inequality detracts from the study. For example, Gini coefficients
would have quantified the degree of inequality present in the distributions analysed and
therefore enabled a quick, clear assessment as to the differences between countries.
The lack of detail on farm household incomes is a limitation of the available data set,
which reinforces the points made by Hill (1982).
Another recent study, Boilman (1989), examines the distributive nature of farm support
programmes in Canada. He notes that Canada, like many other countries, has
witnessed an escalation in the level of government payments to farmers. The problem,
according to Boliman, is that much work has been undertaken to estimate the aggregate
costs and benefits, but little on the distribution of these benefits. The author attempts to
redress the balance by simulating the removal of selected government support
programmes and illustrating the effects on farmers.
Two important questions are raised by Boilman. First, arguments about the need for
support are often interlinked with the question of low incomes for small producers and
the claim that larger producers are more efficient. Boliman argues that it is the medium
size farms that have the lowest income, because their size of operation is too large to
allow for off-farm work and too small to generate a large income from farming. He
also argues that there is no real evidence to suggest that larger farms are more efficient
in terms of returns on equity. These two factors enable Boilman to conclude that even
if the majority of support is received by the larger farms, it is not necessarily the
efficient and well off that benefit most
Boilman reviews a number of previous studies which show the rise in importance of
support payments in terms of their proportion of NFl, and the effects of land retirement
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programmes. He attempts to assign estimated benefits of selected farm programmes to
individual census farms. Boliman argues that this is necessary because no data are
available from census returns as to the actual value of support received by individual
farms. Data are obtained from two separate databases, and a simple algorithm used to
distribute the total payments for each programme across all census farms. The
estimated payments for each programme are summed to give a total payment received
by each farm. This figure is then cross-tabulated by size of farm and other variables to
provide a profile of who receives the payments. This approach differs to Brown's,
because Boilman is examining specific programmes as opposed to different
commodities. Therefore, the summation is across the benefits from support
programmes and not across all commodities.
Boilman analyses the distribution of farm household income without payments and
realises that this is not an exact 'free market' situation, but quotes Rosenfelds (1981)
who states that what is actually being examined is:
"...a reverse 'before-after' scenario. In other words, the 'with' programme
situation and the setting right after dropping the programmes are compared.
The problem is that the 'right aftef environment reflects the structure of the
'with' conditions rather than a free market structure".
In order to assess the 'with' or 'without' situation it is noted that the changes in input
and output prices and quantities would have to be considered along with the much more
complicated problem of the possible changes in structure (these points were made by
Schultze). Therefore, estimates of the rate of exit and entrance and the different
farming patterns occurring would be required.
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It is often assumed in American studies that NFl increases as size increases but at a
declining rate. Thus, NFl as a proportion of sales is smaller for larger farms.13
Boliman argues that, if the full cost of unpaid labour and capital resources were taken
into account, it may lead to a constant ratio of sales to NFl throughout size classes.
This issue, according to Bollman, is fundamental to the analysis of the effect of
government support on NFl. Many support payments are tied to the level of
production. Therefore, government programmes have a greater impact on the NFl of
larger farms if the ratio of sales to income declines with farm size; alternatively, the
impact is a constant proportion of net farm profits, if the ratio is constant across farm
sizes.
Boilman in his analysis of the effects of selected Canadian farm programmes, uses
three methods to estimate support, depending on the type of policy analysed. Direct
payments are measured simply as the total payments associated with the commodity
divided by the gross sales of the product. This method differs to that used by other
authors (Josling and Hamway, for example), who distributed benefits according to the
quantity produced and not the level of sales. The validity of Boliman's approach is
open to question for the following reason. If two farms produce the same quantity of a
given commodity, but one (through better marketing, etc.) proceeds to sell the product
for a higher price, then according to this method of applying the benefits, this producer
will be receiving a greater level of support.
Market price support programmes are estimated as the difference between domestic
price and the current 'world price' multiplied by the level of domestic consumption.
These estimates of support are, like direct payments, distributed by value of sales rather
than the quantity produced, so the same criticism can be levelled.
13 This is shown by the 'net income multiplier' used by Robinson (op. cit).
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Other calculations are made as to the effects of certain specjJIc programmes. Of interest
is the calculation of the effects of removing supply control programmes. It is envisaged
that the government would purchase all the quota. With the money they receive the
farmers would pay of their debts (thus interest payments would be reduced) and NFl
would rise. At the same time, output prices would fall, thus reducing income. The
contribution of the supply management programmes is estimated as the reverse of the
impact of removing them. Three possible scenarios are considered, which allow for
differences in the levels of price reduction for the commodities under consideration
(milk, poultry, eggs and tobacco) in a free market situation.
The author accepts that the results have to be treated with a degree of caution, due to
two factors. First, they are sensitive to the methods used to assign the benefits on a per
farm basis. Second, the programmes considered are selected ones. The policies
considered are largely grain support programmes. In Canada, grain farms tend to be
'medium' sized farms, therefore support payments will appear to be concentrated in this
size class.
Boliman presents his results in an imaginative fashion. Initially it is shown that,
contrary to other studies, the distribution does not show a concentration of benefits
within the highest size classes. The top 1% of farms account for 15% of gross sales
but only 3% of net benefits. The distribution of benefits is found to vary with the
programme under consideration. For example, the top 1% of farms receive 17% of the
benefits from the Agricultural Stabilisation Act but only 2% from the Grain
Transportation Act. The latter finding relates to the point made earlier concerning the
concentration of grain farms in the medium rather than large size class. The results
show that the gross and net incomes are more concentrated on larger farms than are the
net benefits, but again this could be a result of the choice of programmes analysed.
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Unlike Schultze (op. cit) who concluded that support was more concentrated than NFl,
on large farms, Bollman concludes that "Our results are contrary [to Schultze ... and]
indicate that gross and net farm income are more concentrated among larger farms than
are the net 'benefits' of the selected government programmes included in this study"
(J)p 355-366). The results indicate that half of the farms have an income of under
$27,000. These account for 20% of aggregate income and 45% of the benefits.
Boilman argues this occurs, because the level of gross sales does not appear to vary
across the farm household income distribution. When the net benefits are subtracted
from household income, a new income distribution arises. In this case, the bottom half
have only 10% of income but 58% of the benefits.
Like Blandford, Boilman extends the analysis to examine the question of whether the
benefits extend to those who are financially stable. This is examined by calculating
Farm Financial Stability Classes (FFSC). FFSC is defined in terms of the combination
of the Debt to Asset Ratio (DAR) as an indication of vulnerability, and the Debt to
Service Ratio (DSR) as a measure of the funds available to service the debt. Four
categories of financial stability are used and the distribution of benefits and income to
each group is examined. The results indicate that the 3% of farms classified as having a
low level of financial stability, accounted for 4% of sales and 4% of benefits. The 80%
of farms classified as having a high level of financial stability accounted for 74% of
sales and received 74% of the net benefits. Thus, it appears that there is a close
correlation between financial stability and benefits.
Boilman also tried to examine whether those farms that are deemed efficient are
benefiting the most from agricultural support. To this end, a measure of the rate of
return is calculated as NFl as a percentage of Net Farm Worth. Those with a high
return (over 10%) accounted for 18% of the farms, 35% of the sales and 31% of the net
benefits. Thus, those farms deemed 'efficient' by the measure used, were receiving
less in benefits than their share of saleS, but more than their proportion of farms.
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Boilman, like Josling and Hamway, does not attempt to make value judgements about
whether the distribution of benefits is 'good' or 'bad', but to illustrate the distributions
by size class, by family income, by different levels of efficiency and stability.
Boilman's study suffers from a lack of quantification of the degree of inequality. It
also suffers, by its own admission, because the policies chosen are selected ones.
Therefore the conclusions about the distributional effects have to be questioned. The
majority of grain is grown on medium size farms therefore the concentration of grain
payments wifi also be on these farms. The largest farms will receive less in support
from these particular programmes than their total farm sales. Therefore to state that the
top 15% of farms receive only 3% of support from these selected policies is fairly
meaningless. Of more relevance, is how the grain payments are distributed by grain
farms. Given the nature of the paper, the distributional implications are important in
relation to the finding that it is the 'middle' sized farms that have the lowest incomes,
but that it is the middle size farms that receive the most benefits.
2.3 Summary, Discussion and Conclusions
A number of studies covering a twenty-five year period have been assessed. In the
introduction it was stated that the work would be reviewed with specific attention to the
income defmition used, the support programmes analysed, how the level of support
was estimated, and how the support was disaggregated and distributed between farms.
Tables 2.19, 2.20 and 2.21, summarise in a simplified manner, the methods used as a
prelude to discussion.
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Table 2.19 Income Concept
Author(s)	 Income Measure
Boyne	 Off and On farm
Robinson	 n/a
Bonnen (1968)	 n/a
Bonnen (1969)
	 Off and On farm
Schultze	 Off and On farm
Josling	 NFl
Bell	 NFI/ANFI
Aheam et al	 Off and On Farm and in kind
Blandford	 Off and On Farm
Brown	 NVA/AWU
Gregory	 NFl (and adjustments to NFl)
Boilman	 Off and on Farm
Note n/a = not applicable
Table 2.20 Policies Analysed
Author(s)	 Policies Analysed
Boyne
Robinson
Bonnen (1968)
Bonnen (1969)
Schultze
Josling
Bell
Aheam et al
Blandford
Brown
Gregory
Bolhnan
Note n/a = not S
n/a
Price Support, Set aside, Direct Payments
Cotton Price Supports
Price Support
Price Support, Direct Payments
Deficiency Payments, Variable Import Levy, Price Support
Deficiency Payments
Direct Payments
Direct Payments
Price Support
n/a
Quota, Price Support, Direct Payments
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Table 2.21 Method of Disaggregation of Support/Income
Author(s)	 Distribution of Support/Income	 Gmi1
Boyne
Robinson
Bonnen (1968)
Bonnen (1969)
Schultze
Josling
Bell
Blandford
Ahearn et a!
Brown
Gregory
Bollman
Total Income
n/a
Sales Class, Region
Farm size, Farm Type
Economic class
Standard Man Days, Farm Type
NFl/ANN
Sales Class, Financial Stability, Region
Total Income
NVA, Region, Size, Farm Type
NFl, Farm Type
Total Income, Financial Stability, Fann Type
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Note lOr any other summary inequality measure
n/a = not applicable
From Table 2.19, it is clear that a split emerges between the different sides of the
Atlantic. The more comprehensive income defmitions (those incorporating income
other than that from farming) are almost exclusively found in the work undertaken in
America. Hill (1982) acknowledged that there were simply no data available on other
sources of income received by farmers in the EC for the researcher to analyse. This
explains the widespread use of NFl, ANFI and NVA by UK and EC analysts. It is
clear that off-farm income has a considerable influence on farmers incomes. The
inclusion of off-farm income in those works reviewed has consistently shown two
main effects. First, it reduces the ratio between support payments and income for all
farms. Second, as would be expected, it is more important to small farmers. These
two factors suggest that using NFl underestimates the wealth of farmers, and that the
corresponding distribution is more unequal than if off-farm income is considered. The
importance of accounting for off-farm income depends upon the goals of the research.
if the aim is to analyse the welfare effects of farm support, then it is clear that all
sources of income should be examined. However, if the purpose is to assess the
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distribution of support in relation to farming income, then an income definition
restricted to that from farming is sufficient.
A variety of agricultural policies have been analysed by the authors (Table 2.20). The
methods of measuring the level of support vary with the policy or commodity under
consideration. Brown and Schultze attempt the complicated procedure of modelling the
potential changes in agricultural production and incomes in the 'free market' situation.
Others, (Josling and Hamway, Bonnen, Boliman) calculate the 'free market'
distribution simply as the income of the farmers minus the estimated supports, with no
allowance made for possible changes in the level of production. It is evident that there
are advantages and disadvantages with both methods. The modelling of changes in
supply and demand, as already mentioned, is a time consuming exercise and requires
conjecture as to what would happen without support. The static approach is more
appealing, because of the ease of estimation, but does not accurately reflect long-run
effects.
The methods by which the estimated levels of support and income are disaggregated
between farms are as varied as the studies themselves (Table 2.21). Much of the
American work uses published data, which involves grouping farms into sales classes.
The possible weaknessess of this method have already been discussed in the text.
Here, it is suffice to conclude that grouping farms by sales class does not allow for an
accurate representation of whether it is the high or low income farmers that receive the
benefits. The use of SMD's as a method of grouping farms, or in fact any measure that
relates to farm size, is likely to lead to similar problems to those associated with sales
classes. Farm size, although shown to be correlated to a certain extent with income,
does not necessarily accurately reflect the distribution of income. If some assessment
of the effect of support policies on income distribution is required then farms should be
analysed in terms of income classes and not farm size.
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The presentation of the results, and the use of measures to indicate the level of
inequality associated with the disiribution of support, raises a number of questions.
The inequality measure used has been exclusively the Gini coefficient, with (in most
cases) no justification for choosing this measure over any of the other possible
inequality measures. Gregory (and to a lesser extent Josling and Hamway) at least
discusses the use of the Gini coefficient and concludes that it is the best measure for the
purpose of his research. Others, either do not attempt to quantify the degree of
inequality (for example Brown, Boliman), or use the Gini with no explanation of the
methodology (Bonnen, Boyne). Despite the work by Benson highlighting the possible
problems, only Bell and Gregory appear to have taken heed.
One of the most strildng aspects of the review is that little appears to have been learnt
from previous work on the subject. In a large number of cases the early work is not
even referenced. There is no general development and refinement over time. The later
work, that of Blandford, Brown, and Boliman, does not progress further than earlier
studies. In fact, some of the methods used in the 1970s by Josling and Hamway and
Schultze could, arguably, be described as superior, in terms of gaining an overall
impression of the distributional aspects of agricultural policy. Of course, it is possible
to conclude, like Boyne, that the methods are dictated by data availability. However,
even allowing for this limitation, there are other shortcomings with many of the studies.
The work examined relates to different aspects of inequality within agriculture. For this
reason no one piece of work can be considered wholly comprehensive. Bell analysed
data for just one region. Brown and B oilman ignored inequality measures. Ahearn et
a! used a comprehensive income definition but pushed agricultural support distribution
into the background. Blandford (and others) assessed policies by sales class rather
than income. Gregory and Boyne measured income distribution, but ignored the
distribution of support. Robinson's analysis was subjective and intuitive. Bonnen
used acreage classes in one study and a specific commodity in the other. Schultze
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produced the most comprehensive study, but the work is now twenty years old and
relates to agricultural policy in America rather than in the EC. The work of Josling and
Hamway was also comprehensive and, despite the criticisms concerning their use of the
Gini coefficient, would appear to be a valid basis from which to begin.
The review, particularly of the articles concerning the UK or the EC, clearly suggests
that there is a need for quantification of the distribution of support and income over a
period of time. It would appear that with the UK in particular, the movement from
national to European policies presents an ideal opportunity for an ex-post assessment of
this kind.
The review highlights three main areas where the studies diverge; the definition of
income, the grouping of farms and the use of inequality measures. The effect on
measured inequality of altering any, or all, of the above has not been adequately
addressed in previous studies and therefore gives scope for the present study. It is
clear that any analysis should begin by addressing the problems of previous work. To
this end, the next chapter will concentrate on the measurement of inequality, whilst
Chapter 4 will consider other issues arising from this review.
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Chapter 3 The Measurement of Inequality
3.1 Introduction
Economic inequality has long been the subject of much debate and a number of
methods for measuring the degree of inequality have been proposed. The previous
chapter whilst reviewing studies on the subject of income distribution, highlighted that
all of those using inequality measures, opted for the Gini coefficient. It was also noted
that Gregory (1986) had conducted a review of other possible measures. This chapter
adopts the same approach as Gregory and examines a number of possible measures of
inequality and looks critically at their relevance to the problem of assessing changes in
the distributions under examination in this study.
In order to assess the validity of a measure, it is necessary to have some criteria upon
which to judge it. A problem arises because "... there are no universal criteria that a
desirable inequality measure should satisfy and therefore no universally acceptable
summary measure." (Gregory, op. cit., p 49). If all measures gave similar results inthe
ranking of distributions both cardinally and ordinally, then choice of measure would be
simple. However, as Atkinson (1975) notes, different measures often yield conflicting
results. Using results of Ranadive (1965) he shows that income in India is more
unequally distributed than West Germany according to the coefficient of variation, less
unequally distributed on the basis of the standard deviation of the logarithms of income,
and ranks equally according to the Gird coefficient. This difference inevitably leads to
the question as to which of the measures is to be accepted. It becomes clear, early in
the study of inequality, that there are no right or wrong measures, only those that
appear more relevant or useful to the particular study in question.
Dalton (1920) reasoned that accepting any measure, or citing criteria which it should
satisfy, implies a certain form of Social Welfare Function (SWF). Atkinson puts
forward a persuasive argument, that the analysis should be primarily concerned with
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the form of the SWF. If the SWF is defined, then a measure is given which eliminates
the need for a given set of criteria that the measure should satisfy. The concept of
social welfare and inequality will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.
At this point it is only necessary to indicate that there is enough controversy
surrounding the concept to make further analysis of inequality desirable.14
The procedure for this chapter will be to examine both the pictorial representation and
summary measurement of inequality. Analysis of the summary measures will involve a
brief description of the criteria that relevant measures should satisfy, a description of
the measures themselves and finally an analysis of the criticisms levelled against
specific measures.
3.2 Pictorial Representation of Income Distribution
A number of possible pictorial representations of the distribution of income have been
devised. Four will be studied here, partly for general interest and partly because they
introduce ideas which will be referred to later. Pen (1971) introduced a pictorial
representation which he entitled 'The Parade of Dwarfs (and a few Giants)' whereby
the population are given heights in proportion to their income, and the reader is asked to
imagine watching them parade-by during a given time period. Figure 3.1. illustrates
the resulting distribution. Line OC represents the length (in time) of the whole parade.
The majority of the distribution consists of people with low height, representing low
income. OB represents the point when the people of average height (income) go past.
OA is therefore the mean level of income for the population. It is evident that average
income is not reached until a relatively large proportion of the population have paraded
by.
14Sen(1976) and Cowell (1977) both have reservations about the SWF approach, and these will be
analysed in section 3.4.3.2.
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Figure 3.1 The Parade of Dwarfs (and a few Giants)
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Source: Cowell (1977, after Pen, 1971)
The last few people to pass by are those of giant proportion, representing the wealthiest
in society. This method of drawing the distribution illustrates the great differences in
the extremes of income. It does not, however, give a clear picture of the middle of the
distribution. Pen notes that this method of representing the distribution is not often
found in economic or statistical textbooks.
The second pictorial representation, however, is widely used. The frequency
distribution is used in many aspects of statistics and can be related to the distribution of
income (Figure 3.2). It is obtained by plotting horizontally income classes, and
vertically the number of income recipients falling into each class. This approach of
charting inequality enables the middle of the distribution to be analysed in some detail
(unlike Pen's Parade).
The major problem with the frequency distribution is the scaling along the horizontal
axis. Either the right hand tail has to be ignored, or a scale that loses information on the
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middle incomes must be used. A frequency distribution on a log scale has been
proposed as a solution to this problem. In a log form, equal distances along the OY
axis represent equal proportionate differences in income. This makes it easier to
analyse the right hand tail of the distribution. However, Cowell (1977) feels that this
benefit is outweighed by the loss in ease of interpretation of the curve.
Figure 3.2 The Frequency Distribution
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Perhaps the best way of pictorially representing the distribution of income was devised
by Lorenz (1905) and, not surprisingly, is now known as the Lorenz curve (Figure
3.3). On the horizontal axis the cumulative proportion of income recipients (ranked by
their level of income) is plotted. The vertical axis shows the proportion of total income
which goes to a given proportion of the population. It is therefore possible to examine
the proportion of total income that, for example, the bottom 25% of the population
receive. if everyone receives the same income then the Lorenz curve will simply be the
leading diagonal, known as the line of complete equality. The further the curve is away
from the leading diagonal, the more unequal the distribution. The Lorenz curve gives a
good pictorial representation of inequality but, as with the other diagrams mentioned, it
does not quantify the level of inequality. However, as will be shown in section 3.4, a
measure that does quantify inequality can be derived directly from the Lorenz curve.
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The need for more information about the degree of inequality takes the analysis past the
simple diagrammatic approach and onto procedures for measuring the degree of
inequality.
3.3 Criteria for Identifying Suitable Inequality Measures
In the introduction to this chapter it was suggested that there were no universal criteria
upon which to base the choice of inequality measure. However, a way around this
problem is to set out the criteria which appear to have a wide range of support and use
these to judge the suitability of different measures. This section therefore brings
together the analysis of Champemowne (1974), who put forward seven criteria that a
measure should satisfy, with Cowell (op cit.) and Atkinson (op cit.) who put forward
their own criteria. Each have slightly varying ideas as to what properties are really
important for a measure to possess. However, they basically agree on four major
criteria which will now be outlined.
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1) Income Scale Independence (invariance with respect to proportional additions to
income)
Measured inequality should not depend on the size of the cake. If everyone's income
changes by the same proportion then it can be argued that there has been no essential
alteration in the income distribution, thus inequality is the same. This criteria is not
universally accepted. For example, Atkinson proposes that it may be desirable for a
measure to indicate Increasing Relative Inequality Aversion (TRIA). This is based on
the following line of reasoning. As incomes rise, society can afford to be more
concerned with inequality and therefore the measure chosen should show an increase in
inequality. Gregory (op. cit.,p 70) argues "...that unless one is concerned with
making value judgements there is no reason to take other than a neutral view, i.e. that
proportionate changes in all incomes does not alter inequality". He also argues that if a
measure does not satisfy this criterion then it is likely to be dependent upon the units of
measurement used (for example, if income was measured in pounds, then a different
level of inequality may be obtained than if it was measured in pence) which would in
turn lead to other problems when comparing the distribution between countries.
2) Principles of Population (invariance with respect to the number of individuals
receiving income).
An inequality measure should not be affected when the total number of persons is
increased, if the proportional distribution of persons along the income scale remains
unaffected. If two identical distributions are merged into one, measured inequality
should not be altered. This is also known as 'Dalton's Principle of Proportional
Additions of Persons'.
3) Principle of Transfers.
The principle of transfers refers to the argument that, within a specified distribution, if a
transfer of income is made from a richer person to a poorer one, such that the richer one
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is still better off, then the level of measured inequality should be reduced. Coweil splits
this up into two parts the weak and the strong principle of transfers. A measure
satisfies the weak principle of transfers if a transfer of the above nature reduces
inequality. The strong principle argues the change should vary with the distance
between the incomes concerned (Atkinson showed that any measure that satisfies this
principle will rank in the same order any two distributions whose Lorenz curves do not
intersect).
4) Impartiality between persons.
This assumption allows the measure of inequality to be calculated simpiy from the
frequency distributions of income (one such distribution is illustrated in Figure 3.2)
without requiring information about other characteristics by which individuals are
ranked within a distribution. Champernowne (op.cit) feels that this could be
disadvantageous because the relationships between income, wealth, race, health etc.
(factors which Sen defines as those which influence a person's social state) are
ignored. However, as it is the level of income with which we are primarily concerned,
then equal weighting between persons would appear valid.
In addition to the above four criteria, Champernowne argues that a measure should be
defined between 0 and 1 to simplify the interpretation of results. Cowell disagrees for
three reasons. First, a finite maximum value of inequality is not necessarily desirable.
Second, many of the ways of transforming a measure, so that it ranges from 0 to 1,
lead to an alteration of its cardinal properties. Third, it is possible for virtually all
measures to be normalised because they have a finite level. Therefore, division through
by the maximum value wifi result in a normalised measure without loss of cardinal
powers.
Having examined a number of criteria that a measure of inequality should satisfy it is
now possible to describe various measures and assess their validity.
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3.4 Possible Measures of Inequality
In this section a number of measures will be described briefly and their fulfilment of the
criteria mentioned above will be evaluated. Those that do not satisfy the criteria will be
rejected. However, even those measures that fulfil the basic criteria may be rejected on
other grounds. Sen (op.cit.) splits the available measures up into two distinct groups,
which he describes as "positive measures which make no explicit use of any concept of
social welfare, and normative measures which are based on an explicit formulation of
social welfare and the loss incurred from unequal distribution" (p 24). This section will
follow the same reasoning with the positive measures analysed first. The approach will
be initially to describe the measures, and then analyse the criticisms of theim
3.4.1 Positive Measures of Inequality
The following notation is used throughout this section.
= mean level of income.
Yl the level of income of the ith person.
n = number of individuals in the population.
1) Range (R)
R=max - y1m111	 where y11 is the highest income in the distribution
and y1flllll is the lowest.
This is probably the simplest measure of inequality and is the distance between the
lowest and highest incomes in a distribu4on. This distance between extremes of the
population is the only information given by the nnge.
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2) Relative Mean Deviation (RMD)
RMD=	 1y1-j.tI IflJ.L
The RMD is obtained by measuring differences between each person's income and the
mean; these differences are then summed and this sum is expressed as a proportion of
total income. In relation to the Lorenz curve, this is equal to the maximum discrepancy
between a population's Lorenz curve and the line of equality. A graphical illustration of
the RMD is given in Figure 3.4, where B is the point of maximum discrepancy between
the Lorenz curve and the line of total equality (the point where a line parallel to the line
of equality is tangential to the Lorenz curve). Point A represents the cumulative
proportion of the population at this point. The RMD can be defined as 2(OA-AB). The
RMI) is clearly an improvement over R, because it examines the whole distribution and
not just the extremes.
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Figure 3.4 Graphical Illustration of the Relative Mean Deviation
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Source: Gregory (1986, adapted from Atkinson, 1975, p56)
3) The Variance (V) and the Coefficient of Variation (CV)
V= (y-p.) /n
The use of the Variance and the Coefficient of Variation highlight the relationship
between statistical measures of dispersion and the measurement of inequality. V is
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obtained by measuring the distance between the individuals income and the mean,
squaring this, and then finding the average for the population. As V is not defined
relative to the mean then, if all incomes were to double, the measure of inequality given
would quadruple. It is possible to overcome this problem by calculating the CV,
which is simpiy the square root of V divided by the mean income level.
cv=/V71i
The CV is thus independent of the mean income level.
4) The Variance of Logarithms (VL) and the Standard Deviation of Logarithms (S DL)
VL= (log y-log )2/ i
SDL=/Vf
These measures exhibit similar properties and are therefore dealt with together. They
are considered useful as inequality measures, because taking the logarithm of the
income value removes the arbitrariness of the units used and therefore of absolute levels
(unlike V). Sen (op.cit.) points out that the SDL has frequently been used as a measure
of inequality. However, there is a difference between the standard statistical literature
and the income distribution literature. In the former the deviation is taken from the
geometric mean whilst in the latter it is taken from the arithmetic mean. Taking
logarithms tends to reduce the level of inequality because it reduces the deviation
around the mean.
5) The Gini Coefficient (G)
The Gini coefficient is attributed to Gini (1912) and has been widely used and
developed since (for example, see Yitzhaki, 1983). G can be viewed in terms of the
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Lorenz curve. If Figure 3.4 is examined, G is simply the ratio of the area between the
line of complete equality and the Lorenz curve, to the total area under the line of
equality (A/[A+B]). If income was perfectly equally distributed then G would equal
zero. If income was perfectly unequally distributed, i.e. one individual had all the
income, then G would equal 1. Sen shows that 0 is equal to half the relative mean
difference (not to be confused with the RMD), which is the arithmetic average of
differences between all pairs of incomes (Yj and Yj).
G	 'YjYj'
i1j=1
=1-(	 Min(yy)
i=1 j=1
=l+()-() [y1+2y2+...4-ny}
fory1^y2^...y
The G has the advantage that it avoids relying on differences between the level of
income of the individual and the mean level of income. Unlike the CV or the SDL, it
does not rely on the arbitrary squaring of the figures, nor does it rely on the units of
measurement.
6) Theils Entropy (1').
This measure has its roots in information theory. The Entropy of Income Share ftl(y)]
is defined as the weighted average (by income shares) of the logarithms of the
reciprocals of each income share and can be defined in the following way:
H(y)= pjlog()
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where p.=fraction of total income earned by the 'i'th individual in population size n.
It can be shown the FI(y) ranges from zero, when income is perfectly unequally
distributed, to log (n) when income is perfectly equally distributed. Theil's index is
thus defined as:
T=log n - H(y)
=plog flj
The index ranges from 0, when income is equally distributed, to log (n), when income
is perfectly unequally distributed. Theil's Entropy satisfies two of the four criteria
examined earlier, it is impartial between persons and invariant to equal proportional
increases in income.
3.4.2 Criticisms of the Positive Measures
This section outlines the criticisms that have been m&Ie against the measures already
mentioned and highlights why some economists prefer the use of normative measures.
The Range takes no account of the distribution between the two extremes. Therefore, it
is possible for two distributions to have the same value for R, where one has the rest of
the population distributed evenly between the two points and the other has them all at
the bottom end of the distribution. Obviously these distributions are very different and
to call them 'equal' would be illogical.
The RMD, although examining the whole population, does not satisfy criterion 3 (the
principle of transfers). A redistribution between two individuals on the same side of
the mean has no effect on the RMD. Figure 3.5 illustrates this point. A redistribution
which shifts the bottom part of the Lorenz curve inwards from C to D should indicate a
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reduction in the level of inequality. However, the value of the RMD has not changed,
and thus it is difficult to accept the RMD as a valid measure of inequality.
Figure 3.5 The Relative Mean Deviation and the Principle of Transfers
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Cumulative
proportion of
income
RMD =2 (OA-AB)	 recipients
Source: Gregory (1986, adapted from Atkinson, 1975, p56)
The Variance, as already mentioned, has the property that a doubling of the values leads
to a quadrupling of the measured level of inequality. This results in V not satisfying
criterion 1 (invariance to proportional additions to income). The measure is influenced
by the units of measurement and indicates that a scaled-up version of a distribution is
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more unequal than the original distribution. It can be concluded that V is not likely to
be widely accepted as a useful measure.
Theil's Entropy lacks intuitive appeal and some authors criticise the measure because it
has no economic rationale, see Sen (op.cit). Champernowne found it to be the least
sensitive to transfers at the lowest end of the distribution, which infers that the implicit
assumptions about social welfare involved in the measure are not appealing. It also
does not satisfy criterion 2 (principles of population). If two identical distributions are
combined the resulting distribution ifiustrates less inequality than did the distributions
separately.
The other 3 measures, G, SDL, CV, all satisfy the four criteria, but Atkinson argues
against blind acceptance on the grounds of their underlying concept of social welfare.
It is true that they are all sensitive to transfers between individuals and that they will all
show a reduction in inequality in accordance with criterion (3). However, it is their
relative sensitivity to transfers that is questioned. Atkinson illustrates this point by
examining two Lorenz curves (A and B) deriving from the same total level of income
(see Figure 3.6). The curves intersect once, and it is clear that distribution A is more
equal at the lower levels of income and that distribution B is more equal at the higher
income levels. It is possible to redistribute income in A so that the distribution is the
same as in B. This could be achieved by taking income from the poor and the rich and
giving it to the middle income earners. Atkinson shows mathematically the relative
sensitivity of the different measures, when the transfers of income become
infinitesimal.
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Figure 3.6 Intersecting Lorenz Curves
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Atkinson shows that the CV gives equal weight to transfers anywhere in the
distribution and is good at measuring changes in the high end of the distribution. The
SDL is more sensitive to transfers at the low end of the distribution, and G gives more
weight to transfers in the middle of the distribution. A transfer between a person with
£10,000 to one with £9,000 will, according to G, reduce inequality more than the same
transfer from a person with £600 to one with no money. It would seem reasonable to
argue that the latter transfer would do more to reduce inequality. The SDL would show
the latter transfer to reduce inequality to a larger extent (and therefore can be considered
68
preferable to 0), but would not be sensitive to transfers at high levels of incomes.
According to Cowell, if a transfer occurs to an individual with an income of over 2.72
times the mean level from an individual on a higher income, measured inequality will
actually rise. This occurs because the log of the higher income falls less than the log of
the lower income rises, leading to an increase in the mean. As all the observations are
defined relative to the mean, the increase in the difference for those incomes under the
mean will be greater than the fall of those above the mean, which will lead to an
increase in measured inequality. For this reason, and despite Gregory's decision that it
is valid to use the SDL because it is only in extreme cases that it fails the Principle of
Transfers, the SDL is discarded here as a valid measure.
The CV would give equal weight to a transfer of a £1 between a person with £60,000
to one with £50,000 as to one between a person with £1,000 and one with £900. Sen,
Cowell and Atkinson all question whether this is a desirable quality. On these grounds,
and because it involves the arbitrary squaring of the figures and is therefore not really
as 'direct' a measure as the Gini, it is not considered acceptable to use this measure of
inequality.
It has been shown that all the positive measures have potential weaknesses and can be
criticised on these grounds. It may therefore be reasonable to assume that the measure
chosen should be normative. However, as will be seen in the next section, normative
measures, although overcoming some of the problems of the positive ones, are
themselves open to criticism.
3.4.3 Normative Measures of Inequality
In section 3.1 it was noted that sqme economists felt that the analysis of inequality
should be concerned with social welfare and that it was impossible to measure
inequality without first specifying the underlying Social Welfare Function (SWF). For
this reason, a brief definition and description of SWFs will be given. This will
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facilitate the understanding of the underlying properties which a SWF incorporates.
That is, it is a symmetric, additively separable, strictly concave function of individual's
welfare.
3.4.3.1 Social Welfare Functions and Their Applicability to Measuring
Inequality
As can be imagined, the study of social welfare is a far from straightforward exercise.
It is possible to simplify the analysis, to a certain extent, in that it is inequality with
which we are primarily concerned. This makes it necessary only to relate those
concepts of social welfare that are useful for the derivation of inequality measures.
Cowell (op.cit.) gives a simplified description of the properties of SWFs and it is valid
to use his work to aid understanding of the derivation of the normative measures under
consideration.
A SWF ranks all possible states of a society in order of that society's preferences. In
its simplest form, a SWF orders states unambiguously: If state A is preferable to state B
then the SWF will be higher for state A than for B. States could be a function of a
number of items, such as personal income, wealth, the number of cars and so on.
What is socially desirable can be decided by unions, dictators, academics etc. Of more
importance are the characteristics used to define a state. These need to be specified in
advance which makes it possible to examine their individual merits.
Cowell suggests five qualities that it is desirable for a SWF to have.
1) The SWF is individualistic and non-decreasing.
For any state A: WA=(y 1A,y2A, ... yEA)
then, if y1B ^ yA it follows that WJ3^WA.
where WA and WB are total welfare in State A and B respectively.
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This infers that welfare (W) in state B is at least as good as that in A. The assumption
of individuality infers that welfare values are related to the income of individuals. If
one person's income rises ceterus paribus then the total level of welfare cannot fall. It
is assumed that every one has the same needs and deserts. This allows the
straightforward comparison of individual levels of welfare and the differences between
these levels.
2) The SWF is symmetric.
This assumes that the value of W does not depend on the particular assignment of labels
to the population, that is:
W(y1,y2,...y)=W(y2,y1,...y)=W(y...,y2,y1). Thispropertyfollows
from (1), because if we assume everyone is equal (in terms of standing) there is no
reason for welfare to change if two individuals simply swapped incomes.
3) The SWF is additive
This occurs if
W(y 1 ,y2, ... y) =	 1J1(y)) = U1 (y1 )+U2(y2) ... +U(y)
Where U is a function for y alone.
From qualities 1,2 and 3 it is possible to define the welfare index (W) as
W=U(y1)-i-U(y2)... +U(y)
where U is the same function for each individual and U(y 1) is the welfare index for the
ith individual. It is also possible to show that the rate of change in the welfare index is
U'(y1) = aU(y1) / y1. This can be defined as the welfare weight for the ith individual.
This assumption is quite strong, inferring that if the difference in welfare for state B
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over state A is examined, where the only change is an increase in one person's income
in A from say £1000 to £2000, then the effect of the change is independent of the levels
of income in the rest of state A.
4) The SWF is strictly concave.
This is satisfied if the welfare weights always decrease as income increases. The
welfare index is not a strict utility function, it represents the valuation given by society
to an individual's income. Cowell defines the social utility function (which is the
concept corresponding to social marginal utility) as the quantity U'(y). This is the
welfare weight attached to each person's level of income. Cowell defines it as the
welfare weight for the following reason. If a government programme brings about a
small change in everyone's income (Ay 1+iy2...+Ay) the change in welfare is
= U'(y 1 ).Ay 1
 + U'(y2).Ay2 ... + U'(y)Ay. The U's, therefore, are a system
of weights which measure the effect of a change in income on the whole population.
These weights are fixed by strict concavity, so as income rises the social weight will
fall. This gives the SWF the 'attractive' property that if income is redistributed from a
richer to a poorer person then that society's welfare will increase.
5) Constant elasticity or constant relative inequality aversion.
U (y) =	 y1 (1 - e)
1-c
If the U function is restricted in this way then it is possible to tell by how much a
redistribution will effect welfare. If a person's income rises by 1% from say £100 to
£101 or from £10,000 to £10,100 then their welfare weight will decline by e%. The
higher e the faster the proportionl decline in the welfare weight to the proportional
increases in income. For this reason c is called the inequality aversion parameter. It
represents "...the strength of yearning for equality vis-a-vis higher incomes for all"
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(Cowell, p 45).15 It is useful to illustrate numerically how differing values of e reflect
different attitudes to inequality.
Take two people, R and P, with R having 5 times the total income of P. In this case e
measures the desire of society to reduce the inequality between these two individuals.
If society is at all averse to inequality, it would appear valid to take £1 from the richer
person (R) to give it to the poorer one (P). However society may take 5 off R to give
one pound to P. If e=O then it would be willing to take one pound from R to give to P.
If however, e=1/2, then society is willing to take £2.24 off R in order to give £1 to P
(the remainder of the £2.24 can be assumed to be the deadweight loss of the transfer).
If c increases to 1, then society will accept £5 being taken from R to give just £1 to P.
So as C increases society is willing to accept a greater reduction in total income in order
that inequality is reduced.
In the above analysis, the work of Cowell has been used to give a basic understanding
of the concepts underlying SWF and the assumptions made in order to construct them.
The next section illustrates how Dalton's (op.cit.) and Atkinson's (op.cit.) work relates
to them.
3.4.3.2 The Definition and Derivation of Dalton's and Atkinson's
Indicies
According to Atkinson, the traditional approach has been to adopt a summary statistic
of inequality with no explicit reason for choosing one over another. His approach is to
consider directly the type of SWF to be employed. Dalton (op.cit) suggested that the
SWF should be additively separable and a symmetric function of everybody's income.
The utility function should be strictly concave, ifiustrating diminishing marginal utility,
and every individual should have the same function. These assumptions (based on the
15 The £ function will appear later, in the derivation of Atkinson's Index.
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qualities outlined above) ensure maximisation of welfare if income is equally divided
between everyone. Dalton's Index (DI) can be defined as the ratio of the actual level of
social welfare to that which would arise if income was equally distributed.
DI= [U(Yi)}nU
Atkinson criticises Dalton's measure because it is not invariant to linear transformations
of the utility function, which means that it is dependent on the units of measurement
used. In addition, Cowell shows that in certain cases the addition of a constant to the
utility function will lead to a change in the level of inequality as measured by the index.
Sen defends Dalton's measure on the grounds that it is only in certain cases that the
measure is altered in this way.
Atkinson proposes his own normative measure which he describes as the equally
distributed level of income (YEDE)' or the level of income per head which, if distributed
equally, would give the same level of social welfare as the present distribution. It can
be defined as:
U(yE)f(y) dy =U(y) f(y) dy
where f(y) is the frequency distribution of what Atkinson terms, for convenience,
income, and where U(y) is such that welfare= 51.1(y) f(y) dy. Atkinson's Index (Al) is
therefore:
AI
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This is, unity minus the ratio of the equally distributed level of income to the mean of
the actual distribution of income. The measure has the benefits that it lies between 0
and 1 and that, in Atkinson's words, it is intuitively appealing. If, for example,
AI=O.3, then it is possible to infer that if income was equally distributed, only 70% of
the present total national income would be needed to achieve the same level of social
welfare (according to the function chosen). It is possible to state that a plan to
redistribute income would be equivalent to a percentage rise in YEDE• This measure
therefore facilitates the comparison of the gains from redistribution with the costs that
may be incurred. Gregory (op.cit.) notes that a possible way of deriving the index, if
the exact form of f(y) is not known but actual data are available, is as follows:
AI=1 -
	
(L)1e f(gj)]1/(1_s)
where	 g denotes the total number of those in the ith income range
m denotes the number of income ranges.
f denotes the proportion of the population with
incomes in the 'i' th range.
t denotes the mean income.
e is the inequality aversion parameter
The measure depends heavily on the value of c and it is this that leads to discussion as
to the validity of this approach. The problem is in assessing a value for c for a
particular society. If that society is inequality averse then a high value of e would be
required. If it was not worried about equality then a low value of e would be more
appropiate. To what extent a society is inequality averse is not easy to measure.
The concepts behind both Dalton's and Atkinson's measures are harder to grasp than
those associated with the positive measures. .However, Cowell presents these
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measures in a diagrammatic form which facilitates understanding. Figure 3.7 illustrates
a method by which the measures can be derived.
Quadrant 1 (Qi) shows a frequency distribution for income F(Y), of the type illustrated
in Figure 3.2. The cumulative frequency CF(Y) is also plotted, showing the proportion
of total income which the population up to that income class commands. A SWF with
an c value of 1/2 (this is the arbitrary part of the analysis) is plotted in quadrant 4 (Q4)
with the utility of income U(Y) measured on the vertical axis. Cowell chooses this
value of e, because it ensures that the function is bounded within the quadrant.
Quadrant 2 (Q2) is used simply to reflect quadrant 1 into quadrant 3 (Q3). Quadrant 3
is thus the frequency distribution of welfare associated with the distribution of income
and the SWF under analysis. It is derived in the following way. Take any level of
income along the OY axis, read off from CF(Y) in Qi the proportion of the population
that receives this income. Also read off from Q4 the level of social welfare associated
with this income. Reflect both these values into Q3 to produce a cumulative frequency
curve for social welfare CF(SW). If this is repeated for all values of income then it is
possible to plot the total cumulative frequency curve for social welfare, enabling a
frequency distribution for social welfare F(SW) to be derived.
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Figure 3.7 The SWF approach to measuring inequality.
G
i i	 F(Y)
Q2	 Qi
B A
Y
F(SW) BI--
uy1 12)
CF(SW)	 Q3	 Q4 AI=l-OB'
CA'
U(Y)	 DI =1-OB
CA
Source: Cowell (1977)
On the diagram it is possible to derive both Dalton's and Atkinson's indicies. Point B
on the OU(Y) axis represents the mean level of social utility associated with the
distribution in Q3 and point A' on the OY axis indicates the mean level of income for
the distribution in Qi. To derive Dalton's measure it is necessary to use Q4 to reflect
A' onto the OU axis (shown as point A). Point A can be defined as the level of social
utility corresponding to the mean level of income. The distance OA is therefore the
social utility of the distribution were income to be distributed equally (according to the
chosen SWF). Dalton's measure can be described as the amount actual social utility
(OB) falls below potential social utijity (OA) (if all incomes were distributed equally).
10BDI=i-ç
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Atkinson's index can be illustrated on the axis of the original distribution (OY). Using
Q4 again, but this time to reflect point B onto the OY axis (as point B'). B' is the level
of income corresponding to average social utility. The distance OB' represents the level
of income, which if received by each member of the community would result in the
same level of social welfare as the existing distribution yields. Necessarily OB' ^ OA'
because, as mentioned earlier, we can throw away some of the national income,
redistribute the remaining equally (according to the SWF chosen) and still have the
same level of social welfare. Atkinson's Index can therefore be defined as unity, minus
the ratio of the level of income which if distributed equally would generate the same
level of social welfare (OB'), to that of the average income of the distribution (OA').
OB'
10A'
A brief description of both Atkinson's and Dalton's Indicies has been given. What is
clear from the above analysis is that the degree of inequality measured depends heavily
on the SWF used. Sen criticises Atkinson's index on the following grounds. He notes
that Atkinson requires that the SWF be concave but not necessarily strictly concave. If
a U(y) function is chosen that is proportional to income, and a given level of income
(10) is distributed between two individuals either as (0,10) or (5,5), then according to
the index they will indicate the same level of inequality. This illustrates two points
about the weakness of the index. First, because it is based entirely on a normative
formulation, the measure of inequality has ceased to have the descriptive content that is
associated with its normal usage, and the idea of inequality has become dependent on
the form of welfare function. In the normal understanding of the concept of inequality,
it would appear nonsense to say that the distributions mentioned exhibit the same level
of inequality. Second, Sen criticises the assumption of individuality, because he claims
that changing one person's income will have an effect on others.
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Gregory (op.cit.,p 50) argues against the normative approach on the grounds that "...
once an explicit value judgement has been made then a measure will be of more limited
use and may not be acceptable to those that do not subscribe to the given SWF". This
is a weak argument, because if the SWF is formulated correctly then it is likely to
generate more support than many of the positive measures with implicit SWFs. Despite
the criticisms, Atkinson's approach is a valid way to overcome the problem that
implicit in the conventional measures is some form of assumption about inequality
aversion which might not necessarily be desirable. A possible way of viewing this
index is "You tell me how strong society's aversion to inequality is and I will tell you
the value of the inequality statistic" Cowell (p 54).
3.4.4 Conclusions on Measures of Inequality
A number of possible inequality measures have been defined and analysed. It has been
shown that no one measure can be unambiguously defined as being the right measure.
Each measure has some faults, some of which are serious enough to warrant the
exclusion of the measure from further analysis. Of the positive measures the Range
and the Variance are shown to have major shortcomings and therefore can be discarded.
The Relatve Mean Deviation fails only one of the criteria laid down, but it is a sufficient
weakness to justify excluding it from further analysis. It is possible to discard the
RMD because there are a number of other measures which, as well as being easily
understood, satisfy all the criteria. The choice between these other measures becomes
more subjective. They all satisfy the major criteria the majority of the time. The
Standard Deviation of the Logarithms of income can however be rejected on the
grounds of failing to satisfy the principle of transfers for redistributions that occur at
high income levels. It may be valid in some cases to use the SDL, as it has been shown
to be particularly sensitive to transfers at, the lower end of the distribution, enabling
analysis of inequality resulting from large numbers of low income recipients.
However, other measures are available that always satisfy the principle of transfers, so
use of the SDL becomes unnecessary. The choice between the Coefficient of Variation
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and the Gini comes down to choosing between two measures that satisfy all criteria all
of the time. However, it is still possible to choose between them on other grounds. 0
is a very direct measure and, unlike CV, does not rely on an arbitrary squaring of the
numbers, is easy to calculate and is not defined relative to the mean. On these grounds
G is preferable to CV and will be used in this study to measure inequality in preference
to the other measures considered.
There still remains the underlying concept of social welfare involved in accepting G. It
is reasonable therefore to advocate use of a normative measure for the analysis of
income distribution. The normative measures are shown to be conceptually more
difficult, but have the advantage of allowing the specification of the level of inequality
aversion in the particular society under examination. The choice is between Atkinson's
and Dalton's indicies. The fact that Dalton's measure is not invariant with respect to
some transformations of the utility function lessens its general acceptability. For this
reason Atkinson's measure will be used. It may have some valid criticisms levelled
against its use due to the arbitrary choice of e, but this can be overcome, to a certain
extent, by sensitivity analysis.
It is felt that in order to obtain a balanced view of the level of inequality within
distributions, both a normative and a positive measure should be used. For this reason
and because of their attractive properties, the Gini coefficient and Atkinson's Index are
considered suitable.
3.5 Functional Forms and Inequality
The preceding analysis has concentrated on the selection of suitable inequality measures
for the distribution of income. Co.well (op. cit.) notes that there are important special
cases where it is convenient or reasonable to make use of a mathematical formula which
approximates the distribution of interest. He suggests that the use of a specific
formulation may simplify the problem of comparing distributions in different
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populations, or of examining the evolution of a distribution over time. By making
assumptions about the actual form of the distribution under analysis the pmblems with
the choice of inequality measures are simplified. This part of the chapter will analyse
the theory behind, and the practical application of, functional forms to assess their
validity in the analysis of inequality.
The size distribution of income and wealth, and the distribution of size of firms (as
well as many items in the natural world) have been shown consistently to indicate a
skewed distribution. This has prompted social scientists to find a functional form that
encapsulates this skewness. There are numerous examples of different functional
forms that have been applied to actual data. In this analysis one is chosen for detailed
examination, the lognormal. The reason for the detailed examination of the lognormal
relates to the fact that it has been more widely used in the study of income distributions
than most other functional forms. Before examination of the lognormal is undertaken,
these other functional forms used for the analysis of income distribution will be briefly
examined.
Other than the lognormal, the most widely used functional form is that developed by
Pareto (1965). Pareto initiated the statistical study of income using data from a number
of countries, including England. He found a regularity which has become known as
Pareto's Law.' 6 If M is the number of incomes exceeding a given income level, K,
the relationship is given as:
M=AK-a
	Where A and a are constants
Pareto's Law has many of the advantages that can be found in the lognormal
(theoretical background, ease of interpretation, relationship with inequality measures).
'6 Cowell argues against the use of the term Law because it infers that the theory will fit all the data
all the time, whereas this can be refuted.
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However, it is not chosen for consideration in this study, for the simple reason that it
can only represent distributions above the modal level of income, whereas it is the total
distribution that is of interest. Pareto's Law also has the disadvantage that the
corresponding density function is monotonically declining, which does not collate with
the findings of income data. A major set-back is the fact that the variance only exists
for a a figure of greater than two. Nevertheless Cowell (op. cit.) argues that it is a
useful tool for the approximate description of the distribution of incomes among the
rich and the moderately rich, and in such a situation may be a better tool for analysis
than the lognormal.
Other functional forms that have been used to analyse income distribution include the
Sech-squared, the Gamma and the Beta which were promoted by Fisk (1961), Salem
and Mount (1974) and McDonald and Ransom (1979), respectively. Lawrence (1988)
argues against these forms on the basis that although they appear to fit certain data sets
well, they have no sound theoretical basis, unlike the lognormal.
3.6 The Lognormal Distribution
3.6.1 Definition
The lognormal is a skewed distribution which becomes normal when the variable is
transformed into logarithms. More formally, a positive random variable (X) is said to
be lognormally distributed with two parameters, p and cy2, if Y=(ln X) is normally
distributed with mean p. and variance a 2. The two-parameter lognormal distribution of
(X) is denoted by A(j.L,a2); the corresponding normal distribution of (Y) is denoted by
NQ.t,a2). The probability density function of X having A(p.,a 2) is given by:
i-	 1	 exp(4_(lnf.x}p.)2} ; O<x<oo
f(x) = xaI(2ir)	 2a2
Lo
-Co < x ^ 0
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In addition, a random variable X which can take any value exceeding a fixed value r is
said to be iognormally distributed with three parameters r, x, a 2, if Y = (mx - r) is
N(j.t, a2). The distribution is denoted by A(r, t, a2) and r is referred to as the threshold
parameter. It can be seen that the two parameter lognormal is a special case of the three
parameter case where r=O. However, different estimation procedures are required.
The formal definition given above does not really enlighten us as to the possible
usefulness of the lognormal to study the distribution of income. The reasons for
examining the lognormal in relation to this study are threefold. It has a number of
convenient properties that facilitate analysis of inequality; it has a sound theoretical
base; and it appears to be applicable to empirical data sets. Each of these points will
now be examined.
3.6.2 Convenient Properties of the Lognormal
Cowell (1977) lists five features of the lognormal which he refers to as attractions and
reasons for choosing it to analyse the distribution of income. These are as follows:
1) a simple relationship with the normal curve;
2) symmetrical Lorenz curves;
3) non-intersecting Lorenz curves;
4) easy interpretation of parameters;
5) preservation under log-linear transformations.
The first point relates to the fact that as the lognormal is related to the normal
distribution, a number of statistical tests that rely on the assumption of normality can be
applied to the logarithm of income, given the lognormal assumption. Aitchison and
Brown (1957) mention specifically z and F tests on a 2 and also t-tests on p.. It also
enables tests for normality, such as the chi-squared test, to be carried out on the
transformed variable. This, in effect is a test for the lognormality of the untransformed
variable.
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The second point relates the lognormal distribution to the Lorenz curves. Aitchison and
Brown show that, if a distribution is lognormal, the corresponding Lorenz curve will
be symmetrical around a point equivalent to the mean of the distribution (this is
equivalent to point P in Figure 3.8). Cowell concludes that if the plotted Lorenz curve
does not appear to be symmetrical around this point then it is unlikely that the
distribution under analysis is in fact lognomial.
Figure 3.8 Symmetrical Lorenz Curves
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The third point is of major importance to the study of inequality. Earlier in the chapter
it was mentioned that if the Lorenz curves do not intersect then the ranking of any two
distributions will be the same whichever mean-independent inequality measure is used.
The assumption of lognormaiity, by its very nature, ensures that the resulting Lorenz
curves will not intersect. As Coell explains "... given any two members of the
lognormal family, one will unambiguously exhibit greater inequality than the other" (p
83).
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The fourth point refers to the economic significance of the parameters of the lognormal.
It is possible to see that both p. and a2 can be interpreted in a meaningful way. By
definition p. is the mean of the logarithm of the variable under consideration.
Equivalently p. is the logarithm of the geometric mean of X, and is also the median of
the disiribution. The mode and arithmetric mean depend upon the dispersion parameter
(a2) as well as the mean, and are given as exp(p. - a2) and exp(p. + a2/2) respectively.
a2 is the variance of the logarithm of income (this is equivalent to the inequality
measure VL considered in Section 3.4.1). Cowell argues that "...since any Lorenz
curve is defined independently of the mean, it can be shown that the family of Lorenz
curves corresponding to the family of lognormal distributions is independent of the
parameter i.t. Thus each lognormal Lorenz curve is uniquely labelled by the parameter
a2" (pp 84-85). He therefore concludes that a2 or even a will be useful inequality
measures.
The above leads on to the other advantage of the interpretation of the parameters. It is
possible to estimate a number of inequality measures as functions of the variance. In
relation to the (3ini coefficient (G) and Atkinson's index (Al) the transformations are as
follows:
G =2 N(aI'12)-1	 where N is the standard normal distribution 	 (1)
Al = iexp h/22
 where E=inequality aversion measure	 (2)
The preceding discussion illustrates the point that, under the assumption of
lognormality, it is possible to obtain measures of inequality simply and unambiguously
(that is one measure will not contradict another in terms of ranking distributions) and
for the purpose of this study this property is of great use.
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The final point made by Cowell again stems from the relationship of the lognormal with
the normal distribution. The lognormal distribution is preserved under log-linear
transformations (this follows from a property of the normal distribution). For example,
with pre and post tax distributions of income, if pre tax income is lognormal and
taxation takes a specific form, then post tax income will also be lognormally
distributed.
Aitchison and Brown put forward ease of estimation as another major reason for
choosing the lognorrnal. There are in fact a number of methods of estimating the
parameters of the lognormal depending on the form of data and the need for accuracy.
3.6.3 The Theoretical Basis to the Lognormal
The first point that must be made about the theory behind the lognormal is that there is
no single theory. A number of possible explanations have been put forward as to the
existence of lognormal distributions in the real world. The purpose of this section is to
analyse the most relevant ones.
Aitchison and Brown (op. cit.) suggest it has been argued that if any frequency curve
represents actual data well, then this is justification for its use. They, however, argue
that a more fundamental basis is required for two reasons. First, by providing a basis
it may be possible to obtain a clearer insight of the underlying natural or sociological
processes, which in turn could lead to a wider application of the system. Second, a
knowledge of the elementary assumptions from which the law of frequency may be
derived, will enable easier modification of the law if new circumstances arise.
Kapteyn (1903) was one of the first to develop the theory of the lognormal. He built an
analogue machine, which showed that by a random process it was possible for a
lognormal distribution to occur. One of the most frequently quoted theories behind the
occurrence of lognormal distributions in economic variables is Gibrat's law of
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proportionate effect (Gibrat, 1931). He generated lognormal distributions working
with empirical data on income distribution and size distribution of firms.
Gibrat's law of proportionate effect is defmed by Aitchison and Brown (1957) but is
perhaps best described in laymen's terms by Cowell (1977). Aitchison and Brown, (p
22) state, "A variate subject to a process of change is said to obey the law of
proportionate effect if the change in the variate at any step of the process is a random
proportion of the previous value of the variate". Cowell (p 81) explains it as
changes in peoples incomes can be likened to a systematic process whereby, in each
moment of time, a person's income increases or decreases by a certain proportion, the
exact proportionate increase being determined by chance. If the distribution of these
proportionate increments or decrements follows the normal law, then in many cases the
overall distribution of income approaches lognormality". Pen (op.cit.) describes
Gibrats law of proportionate effect in the following way:
In economic terms the growth of a person's income is proportionate to that
income itself. This stretches the [frequency] curve to the right; the number of
people in the higher income brackets is stretched out over a wider distance on
the horizontal axis. To him that has shall be given, in accordance with a fixed
percentage ... However, the growth of income may not take place for every
individual in exact accordance with this pattern; if everyone's income increases
proportionately, a given curve reproduces itself on a bigger scale. There must
be a chance that a person's income grows proportionately, and these chances
are spread symmetrically. The exact condition is that individual incomes grow
in accordance with a factor (1+v), whereby v has been normally distributed.
The Gibrat distribution is thus the result of a stochastic process" (p 248).
Kalecki (1945) modified Gibrat's law, because the process by which the lognormal
was assumed to develop ensured that the variance would increase over time. This did
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not tally with actual data sets where the variance appeared to remain fairly constant.
His solution was to assume that the chance variable from Gibrat's law was subject to
limits. This ensures that the distribution is kept within certain bounds.
Another theory has been developed relating to the distribution of crushed stones, which
is known as the theory of breakage. The aim of the theory is to explain the occurrence
of two-parameter lognormal distributions in ores which have been crushed by natural or
artificial processes. Kolmogoroff (1941), quoted by Crow and Shimizu (op. cit.)
showed that by assuming a certain pattern for the crushing of stones it is theoretically
possible to derive a distribution that is asymptotically lognormal. His theory can be
shown to be the inverse of the law of proportionate effect.
Other theories have been put forward as to the reasons for the existence of lognormal
distributions by Roy (1950) and Tinbergen (1956). The point is made by Pen that
whilst it is good to have a number of theories for the phenomenon of the lognormal
distribution, so that the researcher can choose the one that best fits the line of
investigation, it is unsatisfactory that there is no single explanation.
Pen proceeds to argue that the majority of theories about the development of the
lognormal in income distribution suffer from the problem that they all assume just one
explanatory variable, chance and some other factor (such as the proportionate effect).
He argues that no allowance is made for systematic factors that could effect the laws of
probability. He offers the concentration of wealth, the power structure, and the whole
social system as such factors. He proceeds to argue that this is why in many cases the
lognormal fails to estimate satisfactorily the tails of the distribution.
It can be concluded that whilst no single explanation for lognormal distributions exists,
there is a sound theoretical basis (although lacking in some aspects) which explains the
processes by which the lognormal is generated. This ensures that if, in practice, a
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distribution is found to be lognormal, it can be regarded as a result of a natural process
and not just a one-off phenomenon.
3.6.4 The Application of the Lognormal Distribution
The previous sections presented the theoretical background to the lognormal as well as
explaining its usefulness in the examination of inequality. This section analyses
applications of the lognormal and tries to assess its usefulness in a practical rather than
a theoretical evaluation. As far as this study is concerned, it is the application of the
lognormal to the distribution of income that is of paramount importance. However, this
study also attempts to measure the distribution of support to farmers. It is likely that
support will be proportional to the size of the farms,17
 therefore it becomes important
that the lognormal can also be applied to the size distribution of firms. If it is shown
from previous studies that the lognormal does not regularly represent a good
approximation for actual data sets, it would give rise to doubt as to the applicability of
the lognormal to the current study.
In the introduction to a section on the practical application of the lognormal, Aitchison
and Brown (1957) argue that it is unlikely that the theoretical processes that lead to a
lognormal distribution (such as the breakage of stones or the theory of proportionate
effect) will be allowed to run their course. As an example they cite the effect of taxation
and the desire to avoid it as an interference in the natural progression of income
distribution. They also argue that even if the original distribution is lognormal,
published data may be smoothed or even partially estimated already, thus precluding
statistical testing. They conclude that "... it is unlikely that actual income distributions
will be as well described by any formulation which can be traced back to a simple
random process, as is the size distribution of small particles found in sedimentary
petrology" (p 116).
17 This is likely because the basic agricultural policies in the EC operate by price support, and
therefore the distribution of support will be similar to the distribution of output.
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In the next section a number of examples are drawn from Lawrence (1988) who
conducted a fairly comprehensive review of the literature. He begins, "There are
tantalising indications that the lognormal represents numerous aspects of economic life"
(p 229). The application of the lognormal to the size distribution of firms will be
reviewed initially, followed by the application to the size distribution of income.
3.6.4.1 The Size Distribution of Firms
It has already been noted that Gibrat (op. cit.) developed the theory of proportionate
effect using empirical data. He examined the size distribution of firms, which were
classified by the number of employees. Lawrence (1988) notes that the actual and
expected number of firms in each class indicates that, in a large number of cases, the
distributions appeared to be lognormal. Hart and Prais (1956) undertook a time series
examination of the size distribution of firms. In this analysis they chose the market
value of the firm to be the size variable. The results indicated that the two-parameter
lognormal gave a reasonable approximation for the distribution (Gibrat had used a three
parameter lognormal). Simon and Bonnini (1958), according to Lawrence used the
lognormal to examine the movement of firms through size classes over time.
Steindi (1965), (referred to by Lawrence, Cowell (op.cit) and Allanson,1990),
examined the size distribution of manufacturing industry in both the United States and
Austria and concluded that the lognormal gave a good fit. Steindl, like Gibrat, used the
number of employees as the size variable. Perhaps the most comprehensive study in
terms of comparing different functional forms was conducted by Quandt (1964). His
conclusions were based on study of the size of American firms that were worth one
million dollars or more in 1958 and 1960, and also on the sales figures of the 500
largest firms in 1955 and 1960. His results indicated that the lognormal and a type of
Pareto function appeared to best fit the data.
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Prais (1976), in his examination of the concentration of firms in British manufacturing
(both in individual industries and as a whole) found that the lognormal was a useful
approximation. Allanson (op. cit.) attempted to fit the lognormal to the size distribution
of agricultural holdings in the UK from 1939 to 1989. He concluded that the
lognormal gives a reasonable approximation to the size distribution, although holding
size tends to diverge from lognormality in the lower tail of the distribution.
3.6.4.2 Income Distribution
The literature on the application of the lognormal to the size distribution of income is
much more extensive than that relating to the size of firms. Kapteyn (1903), although
not an economist, was the first to apply the lognormal. Gibrat in the 1930s extended
the work with a study of income data for a number of countries over a period of years.
As with his work on the size of firms, the results indicated that there was little deviation
from lognormality. Gibrat argued that the work could be extended to cover income
related items such as wealth, rents, profits and dividends.
Aitchison and Brown (op. cit) studied data on the earnings of individuals related to
specific agricultural employment (stockmen, cowmen, horsemen, etc) for 1950. They
concluded that the data were well represented by the lognormal. This raises a point
made by Cowell, that the findings indicate that the lognormal is most appropriate for the
distribution of earnings in a fairly homogeneous section of society (eg. the wages of
stockmen). Cowell refers to the analysis of Weiss (1972) who found that the
lognormal was satisfactory for the study of graduate earnings in different sectors of
society.
Aitchison and Brown studied the distribution of all earnings in the US for specific years
in the 1940s. They found a systematic deviation from the lognormal, and concluded
that the upper tail appeared to be fitted better by a Pareto function. Cowell argues that
this divergence illustrates the problems associated with heterogenity within the sample
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and that the aggregation of distributions that are lognormal will not necessarily lead to a
composite lognormal distribution. This relates to the fact that a necessary restriction to
ensure lognormality of the final distribution is that the variances for all the individual
distributions must be the same. Cowell points out it is not necessarily true that the
earnings of herdsmen will be distributed the same as those of cowmen. Harrison
(1979) found that the distribution of earnings between different types of workers were
in fact different. Creedy (1985) also refers to the problem of aggregation and argues
that a lognormal distribution in each age group of a population will not necessarily lead
to a lognormal total distribution. This problem apart, many other studies have been
undertaken using the lognormal assumption.
Lydall (1968), in a study of income data from thirty countries, concluded that the
lognormal fitted the main body of the distribution better than other functional forms, but
was not a good fit for the bottom ten and the top twenty percent. He argued that the
Pareto function gave the best fit to the higher incomes. Thatcher (1968), working
from a sample of the earnings of 170,000 manual labourers, found that the lognormal
gave a good approximation. However, like Lydall and Aitchison and Brown, he found
that the lognormal failed in the upper tail and this was represented more adequately by a
Pareto function (in this case involving the top 10% of incomes).
Fase (1971) examined the income distributions of different age groups and concluded
that they were lognormaily distributed. Lawrence argues that the most comprehensive
study is by Airth (1985), who looks at the earnings of manual labourers over a period
of 100 years and finds that there was only systematic divergence from the lognormal in
the 1st and 2nd and above the 96th percentiles. This again supports an argument, put
forward by Cowell, that the lognormal is more likely to be a valid descriptive statistic if
it is the distribution of earnings (i.e. income from employment) that is under
examination rather than the distribution of income (i.e. income from all sources). The
problem is similar to that found when aggregating different types of income earners.
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He also argues that in analysis of the distribution of wealth the Pareto function is likely
to be a better fit due to the fact that wealth data are usually only reliably collected from
those with moderate wealth or higher.
Lawrence concludes from his review that "The most widely accepted result on the
distribution of income is paradoxical: the lognormal approximates incomes in the
middle range but fails in the upper tail, where the Pareto distribution is more
appropriate" (p 233).
At this stage it is necessary to include the work of Ransom and Cramer (1983). They
note that in a large number of cases the lognormal distribution fails the chi-squared test
for goodness of fit. Hoewever, they argue that the "... test is clearly too strict, because
it allows for sample variation only and thus tests the hypothesis that the income
distribution function under review holds exactly" (p 364). In their opinion income
distribution functions are, like econometric models, put forward as an approximate
descriptive device, and therefore are not meant to hold exactly. They conclude, "If this
view is accepted then the application of chi-square tests to specific income distributions
is a meaningless exercise since the null hypothesis is known to be much too strict and
the outcome is therefore not taken seriously" (p 364). Ransom and Cramer try to
overcome this problem by adding a normally distributed error term to the standard
distribution. It is shown that this improves the fit of the lognormal, although the new
distribution still fails the chi-squared test at the 5% leveL
The above illustrates that the lognormal has been used fairly widely for the
measurement of both size distribution of firms and of income. Lawrence states that
when firms are taken in aggregate tbe lognormal frequently fits their distribution by size
measured by the number of employees or asset value. He also argues that income is
lognormal at least for the main body of income earners.
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The lognormal has been applied to the size distribution of incomes in agriculture, but
only for the distribution of earnings of farm labourers and not for the income of the
farmers themselves. In the case of the distribution of the size of firms, the only
application to agriculture appears to be that of Allanson (op. cit.) and even this relates to
the acreage size of agricultural holdings and not to the distribution of output. It can be
concluded that although the lognormal has been applied to many income and firm size
distributions, it has not yet been demonstrated that it is a useful tool for the analysis of
the distribution of support and income between farms.
3.7 Summary and Concluding Comments
This chapter began by reviewing the possible measures of inequality that are available
to the researcher. The results of this review suggest that there is no single measure
available and that different measures may well give conflicting results. However, the
Gini and Atkinson's Index are selected as the most appropiate measures available. The
chapter then examined the possible use of a specific functional form as a method for
simplifying the problems associated with the inequality measures discussed. The
lognormal has been found to have a sound theoretical background, to have a number of
convenient properties and to fit actual data sets in a large number of cases.
The approach adopted for this research will be initially to use the two selected inequality
measures (G and Al) without specifying the form of the distribution. However, if no
firm conclusions about inequality levels can be reached using this method, the
assumption of lognormality offers a possible alternative. Of course, before
lognormality can be used, the specific data sets must be examined to ascertain whether
the assumption of lognormality is valid.
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Chapter 4 Income Inequality in Agriculture in North East England
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 concentrated on one aspect raised in the review of the literature, namely
choice of inequality measure. However, other issues were raised in the review, such as
choice of income measure and the most applicable method of grouping the farms into
size classes to enable inequality measures to be calculated. This chapter attempts to
fulfil a multiple role. The level of inequality associated with the distribution of income
between farms will be measured and assessed, using income data from farms in the
North East of England. Another aim is to use the data to illustrate how changing the
assumptions relating to the choice of inequality measure, income definition and the size
grouping of farms may affect these results. The distribution of income within
subgroups of the farm population is also of interest. Therefore, farms will be classified
according to 'type' (livestock, dairy, mixed, etc.) and the distributions within these
types will also be analysed and compared.
4.2 The Data
In order to conduct an examination of the distribution of income within the farming
sector it is necessary to have valid farm income data. To this end, the most appropriate
data available (despite the reservations of Hill (1982 and 1984) mentioned in the
previous chapter) are those collected for the Farm Business Survey (FBS). Some detail
of the FBS in general and of the Northern region in particular is given in the following
sections. An outline of the FBS is given for general interest. The Northern region
FBS is analysed in more detail to justify subsequent changes made to the classification
of the data.
4.2.1 The Farm Business Survey
The FBS (originally known as the Farm Management Survey) was set up in 1936 with
the object of systematically collecting, for the first time, information on the economic
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condition of farming in England and Wales. The PBS handbook stated that the original
objectives were:
To make available, year by year, such information as would provide a
statistical basis for the study of the economic problems of the industry. To
provide a useful indication of the level of income each year and over a series of
years, to indicate the general trend, thereby enabling more reliable judgments on
these matters to be formed" (PBS Handbook, 1990, p 2)
The PBS involves a study, each year, of approximately 2,800 farms in England and
Wales by nine universities and colleges of agriculture. Each centre is allocated a quota
of farm accounts (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 The Distribution of Accounts between
Collecting Centres (1989/90)
Centre	 Quota of Farms
Newcastle	 1 90
Askham Bryan
	 264
Manchester	 280
Nottingham	 240
Cambridge	 374
Wye	 200
Reading	 359
Exeter	 322
Abe rystwyth	 550
Eng'and and Wales	 2779
Source: FBS Handbook (1990)
The survey includes only farms specified as full time and of a certain size. The main
criterion for selection is that farms should be full time commercial holdings, defined as
over 4 British Size Units (BSU's), and provide enough work for at least one person.
In the case of specific types of farms (pigs, poultry and horticultural holdings) there is
an upper limit of 250 BSU's for inclusion in the survey. Part-time farms are excluded,
as are farmers who derive over 50% of their output from associated agricultural
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activities, such as contracting and wholesaling. The survey farms are chosen from a
classified random sample. The number of each type and size of farm in each university
sample is designed to minimise the percentage standard error of the year-on-year
change in net income. As the sample is intended to be random, it has recently been
decided that any one farm may stay in the sample for a maximum of 15 years.
4.2.2 Northern Region FBS
As can be seen from Table 4.1 the Northern region (Newcastle) has the smallest
number of farm accounts (190 in 1989/90). The region covers Cumbria, Durham,
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear. Northumberland has the greatest average farm
size, 163 hectares (ha) and also the highest percentage of rented farms, 58. The census
data confirm the essentially pastoral nature of the Northern region, with almost a
quarter of the national beef herd and sheep flock raised in this area. There are also
areas of arable in the East of the region and dairying in the West.
The farms in the Northern region are classified into 5 main 'types':
Group 1
	 Lowland Dairy Farms
(a) with less than 70 cows
(b) with 70 or more cows
These farms are classified according to two criteria first that at least
50% of the total standard labour requirements is attributable to the dairy
herd, and second on the basis of the number of cows. In 1989/90 Dairy
output averaged 67 and 63 per cent of total output for the two herd size
groups.
Group 2
	 Lowland Grazing/ Arable Farms
(a) Mainly grazing livestock
(b) Mainly arable
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Group 2 (a) consists of farms with at least 50 per cent of the total
standard labour requirements attributable to grazing livestock. On these
farms, grazing livestock and arable contributed, on average, 68 and 29
per cent, respectively, of total output. Group 2 (b) consists of farms
with at least 50 per cent of the total standard labour requirements
attributable to arable crops. For these farms grazing livestock and arable
contributed, on average, 21 and 76 per cent, respectively, of total
output.
Group 3
	 Mixed Farms
The farms in this group must have at least three enterprises, one of
which must be dairying and must account for between 15 and SO per
cent of the standard labour requirements. On average, dairying, other
cattle and sheep accounted for 42, 25 and 25 per cent, respectively, of
total output.
Group 4
	 Upland Daiiy Farms
(a) With fell grazing rights held in common
(b) without fell grazing rights held in common
This group refers mainly to farms in Cumbria, and the exercise of
common fell rights forms the basis of the classification. All farms
produce milk for sale and rear cattle and sheep. On average, 51 per cent
of output is accounted for by dairy in the first group and 67 per cent in
the second group.
Group 5	 Livestock Rearing Farms
(a) upland farms
(b) hill farms
All these farms depend on rearing cattle and sheep, which account for at
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least 96 per cent of total output. They are located in the Pennine,
Cheviot and Lakeland Hills. The classification into the two groups
occurs according to the following criteria:-
(a) The ratio of actual hectares of rough and common grazing to inbye is
at least 5:1.
b) Grazing Livestock Units in sheep is at least 50 per cent or more of
total grazing livestock units.
(c) Grazing livestock density is 2 or more hectares per grazing livestock
unit.
Farms satisfying two or more of the criteria are classified as hill farms,
the remaining as upland.
4.2.3 Problems with the FBS classification of Farms
The above classifications, whilst valid for the overall purposes of the FBS, are not
especially suited for the analysis of income inequality. This occurs because the FBS
make their selection on grounds of size and geography rather than specific farm types.
For example, there are separate classifications for Group 1 farms between small and
large herds, which is a distinction that is of no use when considering the distribution of
income between small and large farms. There is also a distinction between lowland and
upland dairy farms, whereas when looking at the distribution of income between dairy
farms, all should be included.
When considering the classifications undertaken by the FBS other difficulties are
evident. Although there are only five main groups there are nine different sub-groups.
This results in small numbers in certain groups, because the total sample is only
around 180 farms. For example, in 1988, the group 'mixed farms' consisted of only 6
farms (they were reclassified the following year). This small number increases the risk
of biased results. Also, that the mixed farms were reclassified meant that the sample
was not consistent throughout the time period under study.
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Due to the problems inherent to the classification of farms under the MAFF guide-
lines, an alternative method of grouping farms was sought. The aim was to obtain 3 or
4 groups of farms which were similar in terms of production but contained enough
farms to reduce the risk of bias.
4.3 Cluster Analysis
4.3.1 Definition and Methods
Initially an attempt was made to group the farms by using arbitrary 'cut-off points', in
terms of what proportion of their production came from various enterprises. In the
North of England, compared to say the South-East, farming would appear to be more
limited in terms of the number and range of enterprises per farm. The groups were
therefore based on the proportion of total output accounted for by dairy, sheep, cattle
and crops. In order to provide statistically valid groupings, cluster analysis was used.
This technique is defined by Hair eta! (1990, p 295):
"Cluster analysis is the name of a group of multivariate techniques whose
primary purpose is to identify similar entities from the characteristics they
possess. It identifies and classifies objects or variables so that each object is
very similar to others in its cluster with respect to some predetermined selection
criteria. The resulting clusters should then exhibit high internal (within-cluster)
homogeneity and high external (between-cluster) heterogeneity".
The data set is ideal for this process because the number of cases is reasonably small
and the same variables can be used throughout the time period. Cluster analysis groups
data according to the variables chosen, and as these are chosen by the operator it is clear
that the process is to a large extent subjective. Gebauer (1987, p 23) points out that
"there is no right or wrong answer with cluster analysis, only solutions that are useful
or useless are obtained" It is up to the user to decide whether the solution obtained is
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useful and this in itself will depend on a priori knowledge. The variables chosen
initially are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Variables used for Initial Cluster Analysis
Variable Name	 Description
Output:	 Proportion of total
output accounted for
by:
PPNCROT	 Arabie Crops
PPNSHEP	 Sheep Production
PPNCAT	 Cattle Production
PPNDAJR	 Dairy Production
Area:	 Proportion of UAA
down to:
PPNTEM	 Temporary Grass
PPNPER	 Permanent Grass
PPNRUF	 Rough Grazing
PPNCRP	 Arabic Crops
The choice of variables requires further explanation. The variables used included those
showing the proportion of total output of the farm made up from varying enterprises.
However, because farms that grow a high value crop on a small area of land may be
classified according to that crop and not the enterprise that occupies the majority of the
farm, variables representing the proportion of Utilisable Agricultural Area (UAA)
covered by grass, rough grazing and crops were also included.
The initial work was based on the 1988 results of the Northern region FBS. The
clustering was performed using SPSSX (a mainframe statistical package). Having
decided on appropriate variables, the problem becomes one of chosing the most
applicable method of clustering. Hair argues that there are three distinct questions that
need to be examined. First, how should inter-object similarity be measured? Second,
what procedure (algorithm) should be used to place similar objects into groups or
clusters? Third, how many clusters should be formed?
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The choice of the measurement of inter-object similarity reduces to two main types of
measure. These can be classed as measures of similarity and those of distance. Hair
notes that the most commonly used measures of similarity between objects are distance
measures. Of these measures the most frequently used is the Euclidean distance, which
Hair describes in the following manner. Suppose two points in two dimensions have
coordinates X1,Y1 and X2,Y2 (see Figure 4.1). The Euclidean distance between the
points is the length of the hypotenuse of a right angle triangle, as calculated by:
Distance = ./[(X2X1)2 + (Y2-Y1)2]	 (3)
This formula is applicable to the distance between two variables only, but the concept is
easily generalised to additional variables.
Figure 4.1 The Eudidian Distance
Y
(X1,Y1)
0
	
x
Other distance measures are available. On such measure is referred to as the City Block
approach, which involves the replacement of the squared differences in (3) by the sum
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of the absolute differences of the co-ordinates. This approach causes problems if the
variables are correlated. As this is likely to be the case with variables such as the
proportion of grassland and the proportion of sheep output, this method is not valid for
the present analysis. For this reason, the Eudidean method is chosen.
The second question involves the clustering of similar objects. There are a number of
methods by which clustering can be undertaken, five of which are analysed in Hair.
The single linkage procedure is based on minimum distance. It finds the two
individuals with the shortest distance and places them in the first cluster. Then the next
shortest distance is found, and either a third individual joins the first two to form a
cluster or a new two individual cluster is formed. The process continues until all
individuals are in one cluster. This procedure is also referred to as the nearest-
neighbour approach.
The distance between any two clusters is the shortest distance between any point in one
cluster and any point in another cluster. Two clusters are merged at any stage by the
single shortest or strongest link between them.
The complete linkage procedure is similar to single linkage except that the cluster
criterion is based on maximum distance. For this reason it is sometimes referred to as
the furthest-neighbour approach. The maximum distance between any two individuals
in a cluster represents the smallest (minimum diameter) sphere that can enclose the
cluster. This method is called complete linkage because all objects in a cluster are
linked to each other at some maximum distance or minimum similarity.
The average linkage begins as with the single linkage or complete linkage, but the
cluster criterion is the average distance from individuals in one cluster to individuals in
another. Such techniques do not use extreme values, as do single linkage or complete
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linkage, and partitioning is based on all members of the clusters rather than on a single
pair of extreme members.
In Ward's method the distance between two clusters is the sum of squares between the
two clusters summed over all variables. At each stage of the clustering procedure, the
within-cluster sum of squares is minimised over all partitions (the complete set of
disjoint or separate clusters) obtainable by joining two clusters from the previous stage.
In the centroid method the distance between two clusters is the distance (typically
Eucidean) between their centroids (means). With this method, every time individuals
are grouped a new centroid is computed. Cluster centroids migrate as cluster mergers
take place. In other words, there is a change in a cluster centroid every time a new
individual or group of individuals is added to an existing cluster.
Each method has certain disadvantages. The single linkage method, because it joins
only on the basis of the nearest neighbour, takes no account of the relationship between
other individuals in the group. This means that it is likely that the clusters will form
snake like chains with individuals at either end of the group being potentially very
dissimilar. A similar criticism can be made of the complete linkage method. If two
clusters on the whole are fairly similar but the distance between the furthest points is
large then this process will not join them. Ward's method tends to combine clusters
with a small number of observations and is also biased to the production of clusters
with approximately the same number of observations. The centroid method can
produce confusing results when the distance between the centroids of one pair may be
less than the distance between the ceniroids of another pair merged at an earlier time.
The centroid methods also requires the use of metric data and therefore may be severely
limited in terms of application to the social sciences.
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For the present analysis the method chosen was average linkage between groups. This
approach is arguably preferable to the others reviewed, because it enables the clusters
found to be placed into tighter groups.
The final question involves the number of clusters to be formed. Hair (op. cit.),
Johnson and Wichem (1988) and Everitt (1980) all note that no standard selection
criteria exist. An examination of the distance between clusters at successive steps may
serve as a useful guideline. They also accept that some intuitive feel for the data, or a
priori expectations, will enable the selection procedure to be more valid.
The decision made was to use Euclidean distance to measure interobject similarity, then
group these similar objects by the average linkage method. The data seem to suggest
four types of farming within the region, so initially four clusters were required.
4.3.2 Results of Cluster Analysis
Using the terminology of Gebauer (op.cit), the initial results appeared useful, with the
4 clusters containing farm groups of dairy, mixed, livestock with a large area of rough
grazing, and livestock with a small area of rough grazing. On comparison with the
FBS groupings it was clear that, the resulting groups were not that different (in
production terms). The 1988 results therefore seemed to justify the use of cluster
analysis as a means of grouping the farms. This was emphasised by use of earlier data
from 1987 and 1986. However, a major problem arose with the 1985 data. The
number of farms classified as 'mixed' fell to just two, corresponding with a rise in the
number of farms classified as livestock. If the farms taking part in the survey had
changed radically between these years, then the change in grouping may have appeared
more likely. However, at this time the turnover of farms in the survey was fairly low,
and therefore many of the farms classified as mixed in 1986 were present in 1985.
Because the aim of the exercise was to gain reasonably sized groups of similar farm
types, the results for 1985 appeared to be of little use. The literature, when assessing
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the subjective aspects of cluster analysis, suggests a number of alterations that can be
undertaken. These involve alteration of the number of clusters required, variation in the
chosen variables and manipulation of the units of measurement of the variables. In
order to overcome the problems with the 1985 data, variations were made to the
subjective parts of the analysis.
The numbers of clusters required was altered, but one of the new clusters formed still
comprised of only two farms. A more fundamental change was then used. Analysis of
the results for 1988, 1987 and 1986 showed that the distinction between the two types
of livestock farms was not based on whether they raised sheep or cows, but on the
amount of rough grazing. As there appeared no need for two separate variables for
livestock, they were combined to produce one variable representing the proportion of
total output accounted for by sheep and cows. It also became clear that the distinction
between livestock farms on the basis of the amount of rough grazing was
unsupportable. For this reason the different types of grassland and rough grazing were
combined into one variable representing the proportion of total UAA accounted for by
grassland. Combining the livestock variables meant that three distinct farm types were
likely to arise, and indeed the number of required clusters was reduced from four to
three. Table 4.3 lists the variables used for re-clustering.
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Table 4.3 Variables used for Final Cluster Analysis
Variable Name	 Description
Output:
PPNCROT
SHECAT
PPNDAIR
Aia:
PPNGRAS
Proportion of total
output accounted for
by:
Arable Crops
Sheep + Cattle
Dairy
Proportion of UAA
down to:
Temporary +
Permanent Grass ^
Rough Grazing
PPNCRP	 Arable Crops
At this point a slightly different clustering programme (quick cluster) was used,
because it allowed for the solutions from one year to be used as the starting base of the
clusters for the next year. This helped overcome the problem that farms were
seemingly moving between clusters with only minute changes in their farming pattern.
The programme has the disadvantage of being based on the single linkage method, but
the results appeared reasonable and more useful.
The alterations produced reasonable results for 1985 and, in fact, for all years under
consideration. Therefore, cluster analysis enabled farms to be grouped according to
their production, thus allowing income distribution analysis to be undertaken as a
comparison between farm types as well as between years. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate
the numbers of farms in the three clusters, and the percentage of production and area
accounted for by the various enterprises.
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Table 4.4 Number of Farms in Each Cluster Group 1982 to 1988
Year	 Livestock	 Dany	 Mixed	 Total
1982	 82	 59	 31	 172
1983	 80	 57	 33	 170
1984	 89	 60	 32	 181
1985	 104	 56	 30	 190
1986	 100	 49	 39	 188
1987	 114	 51	 25	 190
1988	 112	 42	 35	 189
Table 4.5 Composition of Farm Types grouped by Cluster Analysis
ear
comprising:
	
1982	 5	 1	 55	 36	 5	 94
	
1983	 4	 1	 55	 38	 4	 95
	
1984	 5	 1	 54	 36	 5	 94
	
1985	 6	 2	 51	 36	 6	 93
	
1986	 5	 1	 53
	
35
	 6	 93
	
1987	 9
	 0	 52	 33	 10	 89
	
1988	 5
	
0
	
53
	
36	 7	 92
	
Average 82-8 8	 5	 1	 53	 36	 6	 93
airy
	
1982	 5	 60	 9	 23	 11	 88
	
1983	 6	 62	 10	 21	 11	 88
	
1984	 5
	 61	 10	 21	 11	 88
	
1985	 7	 57	 9
	
23	 11	 88
	
1986
	
4
	
59
	
10	 23	 10	 89
	
1987	 5	 61	 10	 20	 10	 89
	
1988	 3
	 62	 10	 21	 7	 92
	
Average 82-88	 5	 60	 9	 22	 10	 89
ixed
	
1982	 60	 2	 8	 20	 62	 36
	
1983	 63	 2	 9
	
20	 62	 36
	
1984	 64	 2	 8
	
14	 64	 34
	
1985	 71	 1	 7	 13	 66	 33
	
1986	 60
	
2
	
13	 18	 60	 39
	
1987	 73
	
0	 7
	
11
	
70
	
29
	
1988	 56
	
0	 16	 21	 63	 36
Average 82-88
	
64
	
1
	
10	 17	 64	 35
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The two tables highlight the success of using cluster analysis to group the farms. Table
4.4 indicates that each classification consists of sufficient observations to enable a
statistically valid analysis. Table 4.5 illustrates the consistency, in terms of the output
from, and utilisation of, the land, for each of the groups. There is little variation from
year to year in the average production levels for each farm type. It therefore seems
reasonable to use the clusters as a basis for analysis of the income distribution aspects
of farming in the North of England. Before this, data on levels of income by farm type
and on average farm size are produced for general information.
4.4 Average Farm Income and Size Data
This section will analyse the classification of farms by average income and by farm
size. At this stage Net Farm Income (NFl) is the measure of income used for the
analysis and UAA is the measurement for farm size. Table 4.6 gives average NFl and
UAA figures for the whole sample during the period under examination.
Table 4.6 Average NFL and UAA of sample
Year	 NFl	 UAA
	
£'OOO	 ha
1982	 24.9	 232
1983	 18.7	 241
1984	 14.0	 237
1985	 15.9	 227
1986	 11.8	 226
1987	 13.2	 217
1988	 17.2	 208
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On examination it can be seen that NFl has varied considerably during the 7 years
under review, whilst the average size of farm has declined slightly. Table 4.7 shows
the average farm size and NFL for the individual farm types as classified in the previous
section. The figures indicate large differences between the three farm types. The
livestock farms have by far the largest UAA. However, mixed and daiiy farms have on
average a higher level of income.
Table 4.7 Average UAA and NFL by Farm Type 1982 to 1988
Livestock	 Mixed	 Daiiy
Year	 UAA	 NFl	 UAA	 NFl UAA NFl
	
Ha	 £000	 Ha	 £000	 Ha £'OOO
1982	 359	 24.3	 167	 25.0	 89	 25.5
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
379	 16.0
366	 13.6
319	 13.5
319	 12.4
279	 11.0
167	 21.1
159	 16.4
163	 27.1
163	 8.9
170	 23.2
	
88	 21.1
	
89	 13.3
	
91	 14.4
	
87	 13.0
	
100	 13.3
1988	 264	 16.0	 181	 10.3	 80	 26.2
Table 4.8 represents the average NFl figures in real terms (i.e. allowing for the effects
of inflation). The deflator used is the Retail Price Index (RPI). The figures illustrate
different patterns for the farm types. Overall, between 1982 and 1988, there is a
downward trend in the level of real NFL This trend is reflected by the largest group
(livestock). In contrast, mixed farms highlight a fluctuating pattern with high and low
income years, and dairy farmers show relatively high average income during the early
part of the period and a lower income during the latter stages.
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Table 4.8 Deflated NFL by Farm Type (1977 prices)
1982	 14.1	 13.9	 14.3	 14.5
1983	 10.2
	
8.7
	
11.4
	
11.5
1984	 7.2	 7.0
	
8.5
	 6.9
1985
	
7.8
	 6.6	 13.2	 7.0
1986	 5.6	 5.8
	 4.2	 6.1
1987	 6.1	 5.1	 10.8	 6.2
1988	 7.6	 7.1
	
4.6	 11.6
Although the inequality measures used subsequently do not take account of the levels of
income received by the groups, it should be borne in mind that a low level of inequality
(which may be seen as 'good') may be associated with a low level of average income
(which is likely to be considered as 'bad'), and that high levels of inequality (which
may be 'bad') may be associated with high average income (which may be 'good').
4.5 Dealing With Negative NFl
This section analyses the aspect of negative farm incomes within the FBS sample. The
work of Gregory (op.cit) involves one of the few attempts at analysing the effect of
negative farm income on the calculation of the level of income inequality. Analysis of
the FBS data used in this study indicates a significant number of farms that report
negative NFl (Table 4.9).
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Table 4.9 The Number and Percentage of Farms with Negative NFl by Farm Type
Year	 No. % No. %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
1982	 3	 2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 3	 10
1983	 7	 4	 1	 2	 3	 4	 3	 9
1984	 16	 9	 5	 8	 3	 3	 8	 25
1985	 7	 4	 2	 4	 4	 4	 1	 3
1986	 26	 14	 3	 6	 13	 13	 10	 26
1987	 18	 9	 3	 6	 13	 11	 2	 8
1988	 16	 8	 1	 2	 8	 7	 7	 20
Whilst it is possible to calculate Gini coefficients from distributions with negative
incomes, there is a major drawback. With positive incomes the range of the Gini, as
already mentioned, is between 0 and 1. However, if there are a large number of
negative incomes it is theoretically possible to obtain a Gini of greater than 1. This
results in difficulties in interpretation of results. In the absence of negative incomes, it
is possible to state that a figure of 0.5 is halfway between complete equality and
complete inequality. With negative incomes this is no longer the case and it becomes
difficult to assess the absolute level of inequality associated with the distribution.
At this point it is necessary to reflect on previous work to ascertain possible methods
for dealing with this problem. In Chapter 2, whilst reviewing the work of Ahearn et al
(op. cit.), it was noted that the method used to deal with negative farm incomes was to
truncate their value to zero. This is criticised by Kinsey (op. cit.) who illustrates that
this will lead to a reduction in observed inequality. Gregory (op. cit.) noted a number
of methods of dealing with negative incomes, of which the method adopted by Aheam
was only one. The question is a difficult one. If two distributions are compared, one
of which has a large number of negative results, the other none, then the raising of the
negative values to zero will ensure that the difference in the level of inequality between
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the two distributions is understated. This may lead to false conclusions about the
relative levels of inequality.
Another possible solution is to ensure that the first cell 18 has enough observations for
the total income for farms in that cell to be positive. This method has problems which
relate to Benson's (1970) work on the effects of inter- and intra-cell bias. If there are a
large number of negative observations then the first cell is likely to contain a large
pmportion of the total observations, thus leading to the possibility of intra-cell bias. On
the other hand, the advantages of this approach are first, it reduces the under-estimation
of the level of inequality compared to the truncation approach, and second, from the
second cell onwards the curve reflects the true distribution.
The decision taken with the FBS data when there were negative incomes was to ensure
the first cell consisted of enough observations to become positive, after this point nine
other cells were constructed with equal number of farms in each. Whilst
acknowledging that this may cause problems with cell bias, previous work appears to
justify use of this method. The consequences of this decision will be analysed further
in the results section. Where there were few or no negative incomes in the sample the
approach was similar to that of Bell (op. cit.). Farms were grouped into deciles (cells)
based on level of income and the proportion of income accruing to eath dedile was
recorded to enable calculation of Gini coefficients.
4.6 Income Inequality the North East England
In Chapter 3, after analysis of the various inequality measures available, the Gini
coefficient and Atkinson's index were chosen as appropriate measures of the
distribution of income and support within agriculture. The chapter also highlighted that
the two measures may give conflicting results in terms of the ordinal ranking of
18 t will be remembered that in conventional Gini analysis farms (either in total or by type),are ranked
according to income and grouped into cells. The size and number of cell varies between studies. The
Gini coefficients art calculated on the basis of differences between these cells.
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distributions. The purpose of this section is to analyse the distribution of farm income
in North East England using both measures, compare the findings and then draw
conclusions about the two measures. Previous sections have explained how the data
were organised for the calculation of the Gini coefficient and this is the same for
Atkinson's Indicies.
4.6.1 Gini Coefficients
Gini coefficients were calculated for each of the seven years and for each of the farm
type groupings. It will be recalled that the Gini can range from zero to one, with zero
showing that the distribution is perfectly equal and one that it is perfectly unequal.
Thus the higher the value of the Gini, the more unequal is the distribution of income.
Table 4.10 and Figure 4.2 show the Gini coefficients for NFL.
Table 4.10 Gini Coefficients for NFL for all Farms and by Farm Type
Year	 All Farms	 Daiiy	 Livestock	 Mixed
1982
	 0.34	 0.32	 0.30	 0.46
1983
	
0.41
	
0.37
	 0.38	 0.48
1984	 0.47
	 0.42	 0.48	 0.42
1985	 0.57	 0.41
	 0.60	 0.66
1986	 0.58
	 0.42	 0.57	 0.72
1987	 0.44	 0.43	 0.48	 0.37
1988	 0.44
	
0.35
	 0.41	 0.60
Average 82-88	 0.46	 0.39	 0.46	 0.53
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Figure 4.2 Gini Coefficients for NFl for all Farms and by Farm Type, 1982 to 1988
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The results for the whole sample during the period show that the Gini varies between
0.34 and 0.58, indicating considerable variation in the level of inequality from year to
year, but with no consistent trend. The values for the Gini indicate that inequality
within the farming sector is generally greater than that for the population as a whole (the
Gini for the UK was 0.40 in 1984/5'9).
Of the three farm types, dairy shows the most consistency from year to year. The
average of 0.39 is low in relation to the other farm types, indicating a more even
distribution of income. The variability from year to year and the range of the Gini
(from 0.32 to 0.43) are both lower than the other groups.
Livestock farms exhibit greater variability between years and also a greater range in the
level (0.30 to 0.60). The level of inequality rises steadily between 1982 and 1985 and
thereafter falls. Mixed farms generally indicate the highest level of inequality with a
minimum level of 0.37, a maximum of 0.72 and an average of 0.53. Figure 4.2
illustrates that the movement between years is more dramatic for mixed farms than for
19This Gini coefficient i1ates to the pre-tax income distribution and is obtained from Economic Trends
(1988).
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dairy farms. However, this could be related to the greater variability from one year to
the next in the number of mixed farms with negative incomes.
Following the above methods for dealing with negative incomes, and using the Gini
coefficient, the results appear to present a fairly clear picture of the levels of inequality
associated with farm incomes in the North of England.
4.6.2 Atkinson's Indicies
This section takes the second of the chosen measures (Atkinson's Index) and calculates
inequality coefficients for the same distributions as above. The most important
question is, 'Can the same conclusions be drawn about the relative levels of inequality
from the results of Atkinson's Index as were drawn from the Gini coefficients?'
As already mentioned, use of Atkinson's index involves a choice, by the user, of a
value (e) which reflects society's aversion to inequality. This, of course, is
problematical. Initially, a low value for c of 0.5 is chosen (recall that e can vary from
zero to infmity), reflecting little aversion to inequality. The results are shown in Table
4.11 and Figure 4.3.
Table 4.11 Atkinson's Index for NFL for all Farms and by Farm Type with E=0.5
Year	 All Farms	 Dairy	 Livestock	 Mixed
1982	 0.11
	
0.09
	 0.07	 0.21
1983	 0.16	 0.12	 0.15	 0.23
1984	 0.27	 0.19
	
0.31	 0.15
1985
	
0.39
	 0.18	 0.43	 0.46
1986
	
0.40
	 0.19	 0.38
	
0.53
1987	 0.27	 0.19	 0.31	 0.15
1988	 0.25	 0.11	 0.18	 0.40
Average 82-88	 0.26	 0.15	 0.26	 0.30
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The results indicate a much lower level of inequality than that found with the Gini
(recall that Atkinson's Index, like the Gini, can range from zero to one). However, the
pattern of inequality appears to be remarkably similar (see Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.2),
with dairy farms consistently having a more equal distribution of NFl and mixed farms
showing the greatest variability.
Figure 4.3 Atkinson's Index for NFl for all Farms and by Farm Type with e=O.5
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The results of an analysis of the ordinal qualities of the Gini coefficient and the
Atkinson's index with c=O.5 (Table 4.12) show that despite the differences in the
absolute level of inequality, the ranldng of farm types within each year are remarkably
similar.20 In only one case do the different measures rank the distributions differently.
It is reasonable to conclude that the two measures give a broadly similar picture in terms
of the measurement of inequality, and that it is possible to assess the relative levels of
inequality between distributions using either measure.
20 Witl'.jn each year, the groups were ranked according to the level of inequality, with the most equal
group ranked 1 and the most unequal ranked 4. This was undertaken using both the Gini and Atkinson
indicies. Comparison can therefore be made between the ordinal qualities of the two indicies.
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Table 4.12 The Ranking of Types of Farms by Gini and Atkinson (e=O.5)
Year	 All Farms	 Daily	 Livestock	 Mixed
	
Al Gini	 AT Gini	 Al Gini	 Al Gini
1982	 3	 3	 2	 2	 1	 1	 4	 4
1983	 3	 3	 1	 1	 2	 2	 4	 4
1984	 3	 3	 2	 =1	 4	 4	 1	 =1
1985	 2	 2	 1	 1	 3	 3	 4	 4
1986	 3	 3	 1	 1	 2	 2	 4	 4
1987	 3	 3	 2	 2	 4	 4	 1	 1
1988	 3	 3	 1	 1	 2	 2	 4	 4
The e value chosen was purely arbitrary and no real justification for using this level
rather than any other was given. Figure 4.4 highlights the effect of changing the value
of e. More detailed results are given in Appendix 4.L
Figure 4.4 Measured Inequality with Different e values for All Farms
It is clear that as the value of e increases (reflecting society's higher aversion to
inequality) then the level of measured inequality increases. From an examination of
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Figure 4.4 it may be reasoned that although the level of inequality is different in
absolute terms the relative relationship between years remains the same and therefore
distributions will be ranked similarly.
The results in Figure 4.4 are for e values up to 1.5. A somewhat different picture
emerges if an e value as high as 3 is chosen. If the ranking of the distributions are
compared with those for the Gini (as was undertaken for an e value of 0.5) the measure
ranks the distributions differently. In the case of the low c value (0.5) Atkinson's
index and the Gini coefficient coincided on 27 out of 28 possible rankings. For the
high e value of 3, Atkinson's Index and the Gini coefficient only ranked 16 out of the
28 the same ('Fable 4.13). Therefore, higher e values lead to differences between the
two measures as to the relative levels of inequality exhibited by the distributions.
Table 4.13 The Ranking of Farm Types within Years by Gini and Atkinson (c=3)
Year	 All Farms	 Daiiy	 Livestock	 Mixed
	
Al Gini	 Al Gini	 Al Gini	 AT Gini
1982	 3
	
3
	
2	 2
	
1
	
1
	
4
	
4
1983	 3
	 3	 1	 1	 4	 2	 2	 4
1984	 3
	
3
	
2	 =1
	
4
	 4	 1	 =1
1985	 4	 2	 2	 1	 3	 3	 1	 4
1986	 2	 3	 1	 1	 4	 2	 3	 4
1987	 3	 3	 2	 2	 4	 4	 1	 1
1988	 4	 3
	
1
	
1
	 3	 2	 2	 4
What becomes clear is that choice of a value for e can alter the ordinal as well as the
cardinal ranking of distributions. Previous work, by using only the Gini coefficient,
has ignored the fact that inequality measures exist which could have produced different
results (and thereby possibly altering the conclusions).
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4.6.3 Negative Farm Incomes - re-examined
The decision on how best to deal with the problem of negative farm incomes is now re-
examined in light of the above results. In theory, it appeared valid to ensure that the
first cell was large enough to have a positive total income. However, on closer
examination the validity of this approach can be questioned in specific incidences. The
best example of the problem relates to the calculation of Gini coefficients for mixed
farms in 1986. As Table 4.9 showed, 26% of the farms in the mixed group reported
negative incomes. Therefore, to ensure that the first cell of the distribution was
positive, over 50% of all observations were needed. Figure 4.5 highlights the effect on
the Lorenz curve of this occurrence. Benson (op.cit.) noted that the larger the number
of observations in one cell, the greater the likelihood of cell bias occurring. Given this
problem, it raises questions as to the validity of the results and thus the conclusions
drawn as to relative levels of inequality between distributions.
Figure 4.5 The Lorenz Curve for Mixed Farms 1986
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The above example highlights the fact that a given Gini coefficient can hide many
problems in the derivation of that figure. Benson claims that a simple Gini often is
published without resort to a detailed explanation of the methods used. What appears
to be a valid approach (making the first cell large enough to produce a positive total
income) can in practice lead to anomalies in the results.
The choice of inequality measure has already been shown to be subjective and therefore
conflicts in the results can, to a certain extent, be justified. However, the problems
with negative incomes affect the basic analysis and can undermine confidence in the
fmal results. The defmition of income was another choice made when calculating the
Gini coefficients. Effects of small changes in this definition are now examined.
4.6.4 An Alternative Income Definition
This section attempts to analyse the effects of changing the definition of income. Due
to data limitations, the change in definition is small and does not encompass the off-
farm income or total family income concepts found in the American studies reviewed in
Chapter 2. However, the new definition does have the advantage of enabling the
effects of a small change to be assessed.
The adjustment involves adding back to NFl the imputed rent calculated for owner-
occupiers and also the value of unpaid labour. This Adjusted Net Farm Income figure
(ANFI) is similar to the adjustment made by Bell (op.cit.) and briefly discussed in
Chapter 2. Bell justifies this alteration on the grounds that it gives a better reflection of
the welfare position of the farms under examination, rather than a strict economic
measure (clearly it falls short on a welfare front because other sources of income are not
known). The effect of this alteration on average income for each farm type can be seen
in Tables 4.14 and 4.15. As the purpose of adjustment is illustrative, it is made only
for a selection of the years under examination.
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Table 4.14 ANFI by Farm Type 1985 to 88
ear
1985
	
11.6	 10.0	 17.9	 11.4
1986	 9.5
	
9.3	 8.5
	 10.7
1987	 10.2	 8.8
	 14.7	 11.0
1988	 11.3	 10.0	 9.5	 16.2
Table 4.15 Percentage difference between ANFI and NFl
ear	 All Farms
1985	 33	 34	 26	 38
1986	 41	 38	 51	 42
1987	 40	 43	 27	 44
1988	 33	 29	 52	 28
Mean Absolute	 37	 36	 39	 38
Difference
The average percentage change for each farm type over the period is very similar. The
alteration in the measure obviously makes a significant difference to average income
(the use of ANFI also reduces the number of farmz 'with et't cYcXt, tt'c cit
context of this study it is the effect on the distribution of income that is important. A
comparison of the levels of inequality obtained using the two different farm income
measures follows. The levels of inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient for the
distribution of income associated with the ANFI definition are shown in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16 Gini Coefficients for ANFI by Farm Type, 1985 to 1988
Year	 All Farms	 Livestock	 Mixed	 Dairy
1985	 0.44	 0.39	 0.41	 0.37
1986	 0.45	 0.44	 0.56	 0.36
1987	 0.38	 0.36	 0.39	 0.38
1988	 0.39	 0.36	 0.45	 0.33
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Comparison of Table 4.16 with Table 4.10 indicates that in all but one case the
distribution of income is consistently more equal for ANFI than for NFl (i.e. the Gini
coefficients are lower). A number of conclusions follow. First, it would appear that
the low NFL farms are more likely to be those that are owner-occupied and to use more
unpaid labour than the high NE! farms. Second, different measures of income exhibit
different levels of inequality, and this leads to problems in assessing the actual effects
of support payments on measured inequality.
Table 4.17 indicates that the difference in the level of inequality is not consistent
between farm types. Dairy farms have a much lower absolute change in inequality
compared to livestock and mixed farms, which indicate significant changes in observed
inequality. Figure 4.6 illustrates the Gini coefficients for all farms between 1985 and
1988.
Table 4.17 Difference in Gini Coefficients using ANFI rather than NFl
Year	 All Farms	 Livestock	 Mixed	 Dairy
1985	 -0.13	 -0.21	 -0.25	 -0.04
1986	 -0.13	 -0.13	 -0.16	 -0.06
1987	 -0.06	 -0.12	 0.02	 -0.05
1988	 -0.05	 -0.05	 -0.15	 -0.02
Average	 -0.09	 -0.13	 -0.14	 -0.04
Difference
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The measured levels of inequality can be compared with those found for NFl in terms
of both the cardinal (as shown above) and ordinal ranking. Figure 4.7, using livestock
farms as an example, highlights that changing the definition of income not only changes
the absolute value of the Gini coefficient, but also the ordinal qualities. Whereas for
NFl, 1988 indicated the most equal distribution, with ANFI it is 1987. This again
raises questions about problems caused by the assumptions made by researchers.
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4.6.5 The Size Grouping of Farms
The fmal consideration is the possible effect of changing the variable by which farms
are grouped into the cells from which Gini coefficients are calculated. This relates to
the studies reviewed in Chapter 2 that used either sales class (typically the American
studies) or income class as the means of grouping farms. This section will concentrate
on ifiustrating the effects of grouping farms by different variables. Three possible
groupings of farms - by income, by output and by hectares - are used. The output
variable, assuming a similar price for farm products, can be related to that of sales
class. The income grouping is that advocated by Schultze (op.cit.) and used by Bell
(op.cit.). The hectares class is used to assess the effect on the distribution of grouping
by farm area.
So far this chapter has dealt only with the distribution of income. Comparison with
support payments clearly requires some measure of the distribution of support to be
made. Due to the nature of the EC regime, calculation of the distribution of support is
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reasonably simple. For most products, support is by maintained prices. Therefore, the
price for each unit produced contains a proportion which can be attributed to support
payments. This suggests that the distribution of support will follow the distribution of
output. Thus to calculate the distribution (rather than the actual level) of support
requires only output data. As the examination is illustrative, only one farm type, dairy,
is chosen and the distributions are analysed for only one year, 1988.
The possible effects of changing the grouping variable on the level of inequality of
income is important in itself. However, of more importance is the effect on the
observed relationship between support payments and income distribution. Changes in
the grouping variable are made to assess the effects on the relationship between the
distribution of agricultural support payments and income. Farms were grouped into
size dediles by each of the three variables (income, output and hectares), and the
proportion of income and support received by each decile was used to calculate the Gini
coefficient. Results are shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8 Gini Coefficients for Support and Income with different Classification
Variables
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First, although the inequality associated with income does change (with a range from
0.27 to 0.35) depending on the groupings used, the variation is not substantial.
Second, the different methods of ranldng farms lead to different conclusions about the
relative distributions of support and income. Ranking farms by NFl, shows a higher
degree of inequality for income than support. This indicates that large farms (in terms
of NFl) receive relatively more income than they do support. On the other hand, if
farms are ranked in terms of their output, income is more equally distributed than
support, indicating that large farmers receive proportionally more support than income.
Finally, if farms are ranked by farm area (hectares) then the distribution of income is
similar to that of support. The findings highlight the fact that differences in the
methods used to construct the cells for the calculation of the Gim coefficient can lead to
conflicting conclusions as to the effect of support on farm incomes. With farms classed
by NFL it may be reasoned that as support is more equally distributed than income, then
removal of support will lead to a more unequal distribution. The opposite is true under
farms grouped by output (or sales class), whilst using farm area leads to the conclusion
that support is neutral and removal would lead to no change. Therefore, from the same
data set fundamental differences can arise as to the conclusions drawn.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter has raised a number of points. Initially the FBS data were shown to be
inappropriately classified for the analysis of income distribution. Reclassification
highlighted the usefulness of cluster analysis for grouping agricultural data. The
chapter then proceeded to evaluate the methods used to measure inequality in farm
income in the North East of England.
The results from this chapter raise a number of questions about the approach to, and the
validity of, measuring the distribution of both income and support. Initially it was
shown that the problem of negative NFl could be overcome by ensuring that the first
cell of the distributions consisted of enough observations to be positive. The results
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found by using the Gini coefficient and Atkinson's Index with a low e value appeared
promising. It was possible to conclude that, despite differences in the cardinal level of
inequality shown by the income distributions, the ordinal rankings were very similar.
At this point it could be argued that the analysis was producing acceptable results.
However, on further investigation, this appeared not to be the case.
First the use of differing e values led to contradictions in the ordinal rankings of
distributions. In particular, the ordinal ranking of distributions by the Gini coefficient
and Atkinson's index began to diverge as the e value increased. Second, because of the
occurrence of negative incomes, the likelihood of cell bias was high in certain
distributions. Third, by altering the definition of income the cardinal and ordinal
rankings changed, thus confusing the matter further. Fourth, changing the method by
which farms were classified into size groups led to conflicting results as to the
relationship between the distribution of farm support and that of income.
The findings are not necessarily unique to this study. Confidence placed by other
authors in their findings appears to be ill-founded. The above problems are
fundamental when measuring inequality of income or support, and it would appear that
in many cases they have not been adequately addressed.
Each of the problems listed can be dealt with, to varying degrees. The use of either the
Gini coefficient or Atkinson's Index can be justified depending on subjective
judgements. Presenting the results from one measure, of course, will not lead to
contradictory fmdings. However, this does not hide the fact that other measures are
available which would give different results.
Negative incomes may arise because the income measure used does not encompass off-
farm income and it may be the case that if other definitions of income are used then
income would always be positive. A more definitive measure of income would negate
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the need to decide between such measures as ANN and NFl, thus simplifying the work
of the researcher.
Finally, conflicts arising from different methods of grouping the farms into cells can be
overcome by careful consideration of the aim of the study. If the aim is to assess the
level of support received by high income compared to low income farmers, then
classification by income is valid, if it is considered more important to measure farm
support in relation to farm production then output is preferable.
The fact that most of the problems can be resolved does not remove the concern that
from one data set it is possible to arrive at a number of conflicting conclusions with
only minor alterations in the assumptions made. By altering the measure used, it is
possible to present farm incomes as equally distributed or unequally distributed. By
changing the grouping of farms is possible to show income to be either more or less
equally distributed than support. Therefore, the overall conclusion is that it is possible
to manipulate the process of measuring inequality to produce virtually any result that is
required, clearly reducing the reliability of such analysis.
One overall solution to the problems found may be the use of functional forms such as
those reviewed in the latter part of Chapter 3. The next chapter will assess the validity
of using the lognomial distribution in inequality analysis.
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Appendix 4.! Tables A4. 1 to A4.4
Table A4.1 Measured inequality using Atkinson's Index (with c=1)
Year	 All Farms	 Daiiy	 Livestock	 Mixed
1982	 0.25
	 0.18	 0.14	 0.48
1983	 0.41
	
0.29
	
0.47	 0.55
1984	 0.68
	 0.46	 0.77	 0.37
1985
	
0.85
	 0.47	 0.83	 0.82
1986
	 0.84	 0.54
	 0.85	 0.85
1987	 0.68
	 0.46	 0.77	 0.37
1988	 0.76	 0.25	 0.51	 0.73
Table A4.2 Measured inequality using Atkinson's Index with (e=1.5)
Year	 All Farms	 Daiiy	 Livestock	 Mixed
1982	 0.44	 0.21	 0.21	 0.71
1983
	 0.74
	
0.51	 0.96	 0.82
1984
	
0.93	 0.77	 0.95	 0.63
1985
	
0.97	 0.8	 0.96	 0.93
1986	 0.97	 0.93
	
0.98	 0.9
1987	 0.93	 0.63	 0.77	 0.96
1988	 0.99	 0.42	 0.87	 0.87
Table A4.3 Measured inequality using Atkinson's Index with (c=2)
Year	 All Farms	 Dairy	 Livestock	 Mixed
1982	 0.66	 0.35	 0.27	 0.84
1983	 0.92	 0.74	 1	 0.92
1984	 0.97	 0.91	 0.98	 0.81
1985	 0.99	 0.94	 0.96	 0.93
1986	 0.98	 0.95	 0.99	 0.97
1987	 0.97	 0.91	 0.98	 0.81
1988	 1	 0.6	 0.96	 0.91
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Table A4.4 Measured inequality using Atkinson's Index with (e=3)
Year	 All Farms	 Dairy	 Livestock	 Mixed
1982	 0.87	 0.49	 0.37	 0.91
1983	 0.97	 0.91	 1	 0.96
1984	 0.99	 0.96	 0.99	 0.91
1985	 0.99	 0.98	 0.98	 0.97
1986	 0.99	 0.96	 1	 0.99
1987	 0.99	 0.96	 0.99	 0.91
1988	 1	 0.81	 0.99	 0.93
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Chapter 5 The Distribution of Income and Support of Dairy Farmers in
England and Wales 1972/3 to 1986/7
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 concentrated on an analysis of income distribution between farms within a
specific region of the country. It was shown, by various methods, that conflicting
results can arise if the definition of income, the inequality measure used, or the
grouping of farms is varied, and that confusion can arise from the use of standard
inequality measures. In Chapter 3, the possibility was raised of using functional forms
to encapsulate a particular distribution. This chapter will attempt to fit a functional form
(the lognormal) to national farm data. First, the variables for examination will be
selected. Second, the validity of assuming lognormality for the relevant data sets will
be assessed. Finally, this method will be used to analyse both national and regional
levels of inequality for England and Wales between 1972/3 and 198617.
This chapter is concerned with the level of income support and support as well as the
distribution, for two reasons. First, knowledge of the level of income and support
enables deeper insight into the situation of farmers, both in relation to society as a
whole, and in relation to each other. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, a low degree of
inequality may be associated with low levels of income, and therefore may not present
the whole story. Second, detail on the regional level of income and support will allow
analysis of the distributional effects of policy between regions of the country, rather
than just within regions.
5.2 Data
A national examination of inequality requires national data. Unfortunately, Farm
Business Survey (FBS) data sets for the national sample were not readily available.
However, national data were available for dairy farms from the milk costings surveys
undertaken by the Milk Marketing Board (MMB). These surveys were initially
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conducted every 5 years, then every three years from 1977/8, and (as a continuous
sample) every year from 1984/5 to 198617. The period considered for this analysis
runs from 1972/3 to 198617. Data for 1977/8 were not available and the selected years
examined are 1972/3, 1980/1, 1984/5, 1985/6 and 198617. The survey operates on a
random sampling method stratified according to herd size (details of the methods used
are included in Appendix 5.1).
Since 1980/1 the sample has been stratified on a provincial basis. This will facilitate
analysis of regional levels of inequality. The sample is actually split into five regions
and nine provinces. Provinces are used for the purpose of this analysis, because there
are enough to ensure that a wide range of farming areas are covered. There are also
few enough to ensure that the number of farms examined within each is sufficient to
minimise the risk of outliers biasing the results. Appendix 5.11 lists provinces and the
counties which constitute each province (hereafter the terms region and province will be
used interchangeably). The sample was stratified by province only after 1980 so the
analysis of regional levels of inequality will not include the 1972/3 results.
5.3 Assessing the Lognormality of Income and Support
It is clear that before an analysis of inequality, based on the assumption of
lognormality, is undertaken some form of assessment must be made as to the closeness
of fit of the actual distributions to the lognormal. The analysis of the applicability of the
lognormal to the given data sets is, therefore, twofold. First, the lognormal must be
shown as an adequate representation of the distribution of support. Second, it must
also confer an adequate representation of the distribution of income, If it aLlequately
represents the distribution of income this does not necessarily infer that it will represent
the distribution of support, and vice versa.
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5.3.1 Choice of Variables
In Chapter 4, the distribution of output was used as a proxy for the distribution of
support. Output can also represent the size of firm. It is this which produces a link
with the size distribution of firms reviewed in Chapter 3. The lognormal has been
applied to data sets on the size distribution of firms. As support is assumed to be
distributed similarly to output, then if the lognormal represents the size distribution of
farms (in terms of output) it will necessarily represent the distribution of support.
In the case of income, the link with the lognormal is more straightforward, in that the
functional form has been applied many times. However, problems arise because some
farms have negative levels of Management and Investment Income (MU) 2' and it is not
possible to take the logarithm of a negative number. (In 1984 nearly a quarter of farms
in the survey harm a negative Mu.)
It may be reasonable to argue that if a data set has negative numbers it cannot be
lognormal. However, this relates only to one measure of income, and a farm with
negative MI! may have a positive income when some other measure is considered. The
problem with negative farm income is twofold. First, it makes measurement of
inequality more difficult, and second, it is a difficult concept to grasp in terms of
distribution. For example, how many times 'better off is a person with £100 than a
person with -100? For these reasons, and also the desire to overcome the problems
associated with the ranking of distributions found in Chapter 4, it was decided that it
would be preferable to find some proxy for income that reflects the distribution of MIT,
but is in all cases positive.
21 The unit of income measurement given in the data is Mu and this differs from NFl because it does
not include the value of the manual labour of the farmer and spouse.
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A possible measure is one used by Brown (1989) in his work on the distribution of
price support in the EC. The measure he chose (due to data restrictions) for analysing
the distribution of income was Net Value Added (NVA).22 This can be defined as sales
revenue minus the costs of inputs involved in the production process. In the dairy
sector, this would include the costs of feed, seed, fertiliser, etc.
Using NVA instead of Mil results in a positive income figure for virtually the whole
sample.23 The relationship between MIT and NVA was analysed by means of simple
regressions for the years 1972/3, 1985/6 and 198617. The regression took the
following form:
Mll=a+f3NVA+u
The results are reproduced in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Regression Analysis of Mu on NVA
YEAR	 R2	 CL
1972/3	 0.94	 -665.36
	 0.64
(-8.68)	 (83.53)
1985/6	 0.75	 -4953.51
	 0.50
(-5.60)	 (31.89)
198617	 0.76	 -5572.52	 0.50
(-5.60)	 (31.00)
t-statistics in brackets
The regressions for each year indicate that there is a close relationship between MIT and
NVA; the R2 are high and the t-statistics are highly significant. The use of NVA would
22 actual measure used by Brown (as reported in Chapter 2) was NVA/Annual Work Units (AWU).
His arguments for dividing by AWLY relate to differences between farms that are part-time and full-time
and also between different types of fanning. As this study only relates to Dairy farms the division by
AWU is not required.
23Two farms in 1972, one in 1980 and four in 1984 still showed a negative income alter this
iransformation. They were excluded from the analysis of inequality.
135
seem to produce a good proxy for income which has the advantage of being positive,
and it was decided to use this proxy when analysing income distribution.
This section has considered the validity of using output and NVA as proxies for levels
of support and income, respectively.
5.3.2 Testing For Lognormality
It has been decided to use NVA and output as proxies for income and support,
respectively. This section therefore deals with the appropriateness of the assumption of
lognormality for these two variables. For output, the analysis examines whether the
distribution of herds by output classes is similar to that which would occur under a
lognormal distribution. For NVA the analysis examines whether the distribution of
herds by 'income' classes is similar.
5.3.2.1 Output
Due to the link between the lognormal and the normal distribution, assessment of the
closeness of the actual distribution of output to the lognormal is relatively simple.
Predicted distributions can be formed and tests of closeness undertaken with actual
distributions. The actual distribution of herds is split into size classes according to the
number of litres produced. The predicted number of herds, in each size class, is
obtained by using standard normal (z) tables on the assumption of lognormality. Once
the predicted and actual herd numbers in each size class are calculated (Table 5.2), a
chi-square test is used to formally test the 'goodness of fit' of the two distributions.
test using Gini coefficients was conducted. Farms were ranked by Mil and the Gini calculated for
both ME! and NVA. The results showed similar levels of inequality for both distributions.
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Table 5.2 Actual and Predicted Herd Numbers in Output Size Classes (1980)
Output	 Actual Number Predicted	 Percentage
(000 litres)	 of Herds	 Number of Herds Difference
0-100	 7,594	 6,608	 14.9
100-200	 10,252	 12,134	 -15.5
200-300	 8,437	 8,571	 -1.6
300-400	 5,906	 5,452	 8.3
400-500	 3,645	 3,398	 7.3
500-600	 2,628	 2,176	 20.8
600-700	 1,839	 1,522	 20.8
700-800	 1,162	 1,008	 15.3
>800	 2,152	 2,748	 -21.7
Gini	 0.416	 0.426	 2.40
The predicted distribution fails the chi-square test (that is the null hypothesis of no
difference between the distributions is rejected). However, as mentioned earlier,
Ransom and Cramer (op. cit.) argue that this is not sufficient grounds for rejecting the
assumption of lognormality. As with much of the literature on the subject, it is in the
lower-middle to middle size classes that the distribution is closest to the lognormal.
The tails indicate greater deviations from lognormality, with the predicted distribution
consisting of too few herds in the lowest size class and too many in the highest one.
Clearly, the above distribution is not perfectly lognormal. However, it is the effect of
the assumption of lognormality on the level of measured inequality that is of most
important to this study. Cowell (op.cit.) having noted the problems of goodness of fit
tests for large samples, argued that a possible test could be a comparison of the level of
inequality obtained assuming lognormality with that from the actual data.
Nine herd size classes have already been used for testing the predicted distribution
(Table 5.2). The only additional information needed to calculate Gini coefficients is
total output in each size class. Total output figures for the two distributions can be
obtained by multiplying the number of herds by the average output in that size class.
The average output is assumed the same for both distributions, and is taken from the
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data set. The difference in the Gini coefficients is therefore a result of differences in the
number of herds in each output class. The Gini coefficients (shown in Table 5.2) are
similar suggesting that assuming lognonnality does not effect the level of measured
inequality. The analysis was repeated for 1985, the results of which are shown in
Table 5.3. The predicted distribution for 1985 again failed the chi-square test for
goodness of fit. However, the Gini coefficients are, like 1980, very similar.
Table 5.3 Actual and Predicted Herd Numbers in Output Size Classes (1985)
Output	 Actual Number Predicted Number Percentage
(000 litres)	 of Herds	 of Herds	 Difference
0-100	 5,327	 4,424	 20
100-200	 8,488	 9,825	 -14
200-300	 6,840	 7,714	 -11
300-400	 5,428	 5,151	 5
400-500	 4,012	 3,402	 18
500-600	 2,835	 2,187	 30
600-700	 2,037	 1,603	 27
700-800	 806	 1,026	 -21
>800	 2,666	 3,106	 -14
Gini	 0.418	 0.428	 2.39
The conclusion arising from the assessment of lognormality of the distribution of
output is that although the assumption seems to lead to over- and under-estimation of
the number of herds in various size classes, the overall distribution, as measured by the
Gini coefficient, seems little altered. The assumption of lognormality does not appear
to bias the measure of inequality.
5.3.2.2 NVA
To test whether the assumption of lognormality is valid with respect to the distribution
of NVA the above procedure was repeated, but with size classes calculated in terms of
income (as measured by NVA). The actual and predicted number of farms in each
income group are shown in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4 Actual and Predicted Herd Numbers in Income Size Classes (1972).
Income	 Actual Number Predicted	 Percentage
£('OOO)	 of Herds	 Number of Herds Difference
0-1	 7,350	 6,607	 -10
1-2	 12,975	 13,739	 6
2-3	 10,018	 11,603	 16
3-4	 8,034	 8,647	 8
4-5	 7,141	 6,354	 -11
5-6	 4,623	 4,573	 -1
6-8	 5,310	 6,067	 14
8-10	 5,200	 3,576	 -31
>10	 7,621	 7,084	 -7
Gini	 0.420	 0.424	 0.95
The results for NVA indicate similar findings to previous work on the lognormality of
income, and to the results for output. The lognonnal appears to estimate the body of
the distribution fairly well, but is not as good a fit in the tails. Overall, the fit for NVA
is better than that for output. However, as with output, the more important test is
whether the Gini coefficients from the actual and predicted distributions are similar.
The Gini coefficients for NVA are calculated in a similar manner to those for output,
with the number of herds in each size group multiplied by average income rather than
output. It is clear, that like output, differences in actual and predicted distributions do
not significantly alter the level of measured inequality (Table 5.4).
The above analysis was repeated using the 1980 survey results. The difference in the
Gini coefficients was slightly greater (0.48 compared 0.46) but still suggested that the
assumption of lognomiality made little difference to the measured level of inequality.
The results for NVA are very similar to those for output. The predicted and actual
number of herds in each income class vary, but the overall level of inequality is very
similar. The conclusion can be drawn that in both cases the assumption of lognormality
will not significantly bias the results. For this reason, analysis of national levels of
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output (support) and NVA will be conducted assuming that both distributions are
lognormal.
Cowell (op. cit.) notes that combining variables that are lognormally distributed does
not ensure that the final distribution wifi be lognormal. If this is the case, then the
reverse may also be true. A lognormal total distribution does not ensure that the
individual items are lognormally distributed. In the context of this study, this implies
that although the variables are regarded lognormally distributed at the national level, the
distribution within regions may not be. As regional analysis of inequality is a
necessary part of this study, the lognormality of the regional distribution requires
assessment.
Table 5.5 presents the Gini coefficients for output for the nine regions as measured
under the lognormal assumption and those calculated from actual distributions, for
1984/5. In general, it would appear that the assumption of lognormality leads to a
slight overestimation of inequality at the regional level, although the Mean Absolute
percentage Difference (MAD) does not appear to be unduly large.25 In conclusion,
although the distributions appear to vary more on a regional than a national basis, the
assumption of lognormality does not significantly alter the level of observed inequality.
Similar fmdings were found with an examination for Gini cefficients for actual and predicted NVA
at the regional leveL
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Table 5.5 Gini Coefficients for Actual and Predicted Output by Region 1984/5
Province	 Actual Predicted Percentage
Gini	 Gini Difference
Wales	 (W)	 0.40	 0.41	 3.6
Northern	 (N)	 0.45	 0.47	 5.3
North Eastern (NE)	 0.35	 0.37	 7.1
North Western (NW)
	 0.41	 0.47	 15.9
East Midlands	 (EM)	 0.37	 0.39	 5.8
Eastern	 (E)	 0.40	 0.42	 4.0
South Eastern (SE)	 0.44	 0.48	 9.6
Southern	 (S)	 0.39	 0.42	 7.5
South Western (SW)
	
0.41	 0.43	 3.9
MAD=7.0
5.4 Estimation of the Level of Support and the Parameters of the
Lognormal
The purpose of this section is to analyse the methods by which the total level of support
received by dairy farmers and the parameters of the lognormal (p. and a 2) are estimated.
5.4.1 Estimation of the Level of Support
Although it was earlier stated that the distribution of output was a valid proxy for the
distribution of support, it is clear that some direct estimation of the level of support
received by farmers is useful when analysing distributions. The level of support in this
study has been estimated as the difference between the EC support (intervention) price
and the world price, multiplied by the level of production. Figure 5.1 illustrates the
process by which total support was estimated. Pw is the world price, P 5
 is the EC
support price and Q is the level of production. The total level of support can therefore
be approximated by the rectangle P 5ABPw. This is an overestimation of the area of
gain in producers surplus (by the triangle ABC) because it does not allow for changes
in the level of supply. However, in a static analysis it is a reasonable approximation,
because it reflects the immediate loss to the the farmer should support be removed. For
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the purpose of explaining relative changes over time, and also between regions, it is
considered a sufficient approximation.
Figure 5.1 Estimation of Level of Support Received by Dairy Farmers
Milk
Pxicc
0 Q	 Qurttity
For all years other than 1972/3, support is estimated using world price levels from the
Newcastle CAP model data base.26 For 1972/3 (prior to UK membership of the EC), a
different source is used. It has been assumed that there was some level of support due
to the operation of the MMB. This was calculated as the difference between the price
received by UK farmers and the comparable New Zealand price of milk.
5.4.2 Estimating the Parameters of the Lognormal
There are a number of methods available for estimating jt and a2, including the method
of moments and maximum likelihood. As the data were in ungrouped form the latter
method was chosen. The sample is stratified and therefore each observation has to be
weighted. Thus jt and a2 are estimated for both output (or income) as:
26 The Newcastle CAP model was built at Newcastle University with the aim of estimating the long-
run effects of the CAP. To this end, data on actual world prices for agricultural commodities were
collected over a number of years. it is these data which are useful to this study. For further
information on the Newcastle CAP model, see Buckwell Ct al (1982).
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=	
(lnXj.wj)
and
a2 =
	
[(lnX -
where X = output (or income)
w = weight (based on the MMB's own raising factor)
I = farm
One of the advantages of the lognormal, referenced in Chapter 3, is that it ensures non-
intersecting Lorenz curves, which means that both the Gini coefficient and Atkinson's
index will rank distributions identically. Use of the lognormal assumption does not
ensure the same cardinal levels of inequality from different measures, but does ensure
that measures give the same ordinal rarildng. This removes the need for two inequality
measures. The Gini coefficient is preferred because, although it has weaknesses, it is
conceptually easier to grasp and, more importantly, does not require estimation of
society's level of inequality aversion. For each year, t and a 2, were estimated and the
corresponding Gini coefficients calculated.27 Estimation of inequality on a regional
basis involves similar calculations as for the national data, but with provincial raising
factors.
Although it is the Gini coefficients over the period that are of most interest to this study,
the level of total and average income and support are also reported. The relative
'position' of each region, in terms of level of support, income, size (in terms of output)
and number of farms, will be compared. This will facilitate a more thorough analysis
of the regional income distribution effects of agricultural policy.
27 ft will be remembered that in Chapter 3 the formula for calculating the Gini coefficient (G) was
given as: G =2 N(a/'12)-lwhere N is the standard normal distribution.
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Methods for estimating the level of support and the levels of inequality have been
outlined. The next section will report national results for the years under consideration,
indicating distributional aspects and levels of support and income. The regional
distributions will then be analysed. As milk quotas came into operation in 1984,
attention will be given to studying what effect, if any, they have had on the distribution
of income and support.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Introduction
This section presents an analysis of the level and distribution of income and support
over the fifteen year period under examination. The analysis, as mentioned earlier, is
undertaken at both national and regional level. National results are reported first.
5.5.2 National Results 1972/3 to 1986/7
Table 5.6 presents the total industry level of NVA and estimates of total industry
support of dairy farmers in England and Wales for each of the years under
consideration.
Table 5.6 Total level of Support and NVA
1972/3 to 198617 (1977 prices)
Year	 Support	 NVA
1972/3	 202	 824
1980/1	 878	 517
1984/5	 562	 552
1985/6	 540	 585
198617	 1,061	 639
In real terms the total level of support quadrupled between 1972/3 and 1980/8 1, but
NVA fell. After 1980/1 NVA began to rise, whilst support fell until 1986/7 when it
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rose dramatically. The estimates of the level of support highlight the importance of
changes in world prices. In 1986/7 world price for milk was very low and the
estimated support was much higher, despite relatively small changes in production
patterns. The use of annual world prices leads to anomalies in particular years. Large
changes in world prices lead to large changes in the estimated levels of support.
However, it will be remembered that the method by which support is distributed
between fanns means that the estimated distribution of support will not be altered by
these fluctuations. The figures for total support and total NVA make no allowances for
changes in the number of producers. In Table 5.7, per farm levels of support and NVA
are reported.
Table 5.7 Mean Level of Support and NVA per Farm
1972/3 to 198617 (1977 prices)
ear
1972/3	 3,009	 12,299	 24
1980/1	 21,490	 13,383	 161
1984/5	 13,153	 14,749	 89
1985/6	 15,380	 16,239	 95
198617	 30,411	 18,716	 162
Immediately clear is that the previously reported fall in total NVA between 1972/3 and
1980/1 is not reflected on a per farm basis, whilst the increase in support is
exaggerated. This is because the number of herds declined from over 65,000 to around
46,000 during this period. This decline continued after 1980/1, thus the proportionate
increases in NVA are greater on a per farm basis than on a national level. The average
level of NVA has shown a steady rise during the period from around £12,000 per farm
up to nearly £19,000. Table 5.7 also highlights the importance of support to farms as a
percentage of NVA. In 1972/3 support accounted for 24% of NVA, but by 1980/1 it
was over one and a half times greater than the level of income. Although the percentage
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was lower for 1984/5 and 1985/6, it still showed a large increase on 1972/3. In 198617
support was again over one and a half times greater than income.
The number of herds, as already mentioned, has declined. At the same time, yields and
average herd sizes have increased, resulting in little change in total production. Table
5.8 shows the average herd size and output between 1972/3 and 198617. Herd sizes
have increased by 75%, output per herd has risen by over 100%, whilst NVA has
increased by only 50%. The figures suggest that the dairy sector (like much of
agriculture) has been undergoing a cost-price squeeze.
Table 5.8 Average Herd Size and Output 1972/3 to 198617
Year	 Herd Size	 Output
cows	 litres
1972/3	 41	 206,900
1980/1	 62	 338,854
1984/5	 69	 375,666
1985/6	 69	 388,276
1986/7	 72	 426,920
%Change	 75	 106
1972/3to 198617
As is evident from Table 5.7, the level of support and NVA vary considerably over
time. Of more interest to this study is how these changes are reflected in terms of
inequality. This is reported in two ways. First, the percentage of total support and
NVA going to farms ranked by income quintiles is calculated. Second, inequality is
quantified by the use of Gini coefficients. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of support
between quintiles.
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Figure 5.2 Percentage of Support Received by Farms Ranked by Income Quintiles
1972	 1980	 1984	 1985	 1986
YEAR
The distribution of support (in terms of percentage received by quintile) varies little
over the time period. For example, the lowest quintile's share of the total ranges from
7 to 10%, and that for the top quintile from 44 and 48%. The implication is that despite
changes in policy, total level of support and structure of herds, the distribution of
support has remained fairly constant.
A similar pattern is found in Figure 5.3, illustrating the percentage of total NVA
accruing to farms grouped by income quintiles. The top quin tile continually have
around 50%, of the NVA whilst the bottom quintile have around 5%.
Figure 5.3 Percentage of NVA Received by Farms Ranked by Income Quintiles
100	
..........•.;..:.	 ........	
..•	 •.•	 _________
1972	 1980	 1984	 1985	 1996
YEAR
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Quintile analysis gives some idea as to the pattern of the distribution but does not offer
a quantification. Gini coefficients for NVA are given in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9 Gini Coefficients for NVA
Year	 Gini
Coefficient
1972/73	 0.48
1980/81	 0.52
1984/85	 0.55
19 85/8 6
	
0.54
19 86/87
	 0.52
NVA appears to be fairly unequally distributed (the Gini coefficient for the UK as a
whole varied between 0.34 and 0.40 during this period). There is relatively little
change over the period in the level of inequality (the Gini ranging from 0.48 to 0.55),
indicating a fairly stable distribution of NVA. Since the introduction of quotas in 1984
there has been a slight reduction in the measured level of inequality (0.55 to 0.52).
Table 5.10 reproduces the Gini coefficients for support in the corresponding years.
Support appears to be more evenly distributed. There is also less variation over time,
with inequality ranging from 0.42 to 0.45. There is no discernible trend in inequality,
despite the introduction of quotas.
Table 5.10 Gini Coefficients for Support
Year	 Gnu
Coefficient
1972/7 3	 0.45
1980/81
	 0.42
1984/85	 0.44
1985/86
	
0.42
19 86/87
	 0.44
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Figure 5.4, charting the levels of inequality reported in Tables 5.9 and 5.10, highlights
two points. First, the changes in measured inequality for both NVA and support are
small. Second, support is consistently more evenly distributed than NVA. Although
the changes are small there does appear to be a some evidence of an increasing
divergence in the two distributions between 1972/3 and 1985/6.
Figure 5.4 Gini Coefficients for Support and NVA 1972/3 to 198617
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Since the Gini for support is lower than that of income (indicating that support is more
evenly distributed than income), it can be argued that the removal of support would lead
to a more unequal distribution of income (if production levels were maintained). These
results contrast with the overall findings of Josling and Hamway (op cit., p 58) who
argue that, "Programmes which tend to distribute benefits unequally tend to be those
price support schemes which operate through the price guarantee system", and who
found that total support was more unevenly distributed than farm income. However, it
is difficult to compare their findings for dairy farming with those estimated here, both
prior to and after EC entry. In their analysis of the distribution of support prior to EC
entry, Josling and Hamway made no allowance for the likely price-raising effect of the
MMB. When assessing the likely effect of the CAP, they only reported Gini
coefficients for total farm support and not for individual farm programmes.
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If figures for the distribution of income for the population of the UK as a whole are
examined, then the level of inequality is markedly less than that exhibited from dairy
farming. Agricultural policy appears to have done little to improve the relative position
of the smaller farms. The average real level of NVA may have risen but the farmers on
the lowest incomes are still in a relatively poor position.
The stable levels of inequality for both NVA and support (Figure 5.4) are rather
surprising, because the time period incorporates three major changes in policy and also
significant changes in the structure of the industry. The move from pre-CAP policies
through the price support policies of the CAP to quotas have (for the years chosen) had
little effect on observed levels of inequality. It may be the case that the actual effect of
agricultural support policies has been to keep the distribution of income and support
similar. Robinson (op. cit.) argued that, as a result of price support policies, small
producers are kept in production, preventing a fall in the level of observed inequality.
The decline in the number of herds throughout the period, and the increase in average
herd size, have not led to a decrease in levels of inequality. It can be reasoned therefore
that both exit from dairying and increases in herd size have been proportionate to the
initial distribution of 1972. That is, large herds have not grown proportionately faster
than small herds, and also it has not been only the smaller farms that have left the
industry.
Fianally, the national results presented highlight a possible omission as a result of using
inequality measures. In terms of equity, a policy may be deemed 'fair' if it reaches
large numbers of producers. In dairy farming in the UK, support is going to fewer and
fewer recipients. In 1972/3 over 65,000 farmers received average support estimated at
£3,000 (in real 1977 prices). By 198617 fewer than 38,000 producers received, on
average, support of around £30,000. More support has been obtained by fewer
recipients, but no change in inequality has been noted. To take this argument to its
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extreme, if support was distributed between two producers, then providing they
received similar levels, the distribution would be classed as perfectly equal. But a
policy that gave vast sums to only two recipients could hardly be deemed 'fair' within
the wider context of society.
5.5.3 Regional Results 1980/1 to 1986/72 8
The results of the national examination of inequality present a fairly neutral picture in
terms of the effects of agricultural policies. The change in methods of support have led
to only small changes in observed levels of inequality for both NVA and support. This
section will analyse whether these neutral impacts are reproduced at the regional level.
The regional analysis involves use of Gini coefficients to estimate the levels of
inequality within regions. Also, the percentage of income and support going to each
region will be compared to enable discussion as to the effects of policy on the
distribution between regions. First, the levels of support and NVA will be analysed
and then the distributional aspects will be considered.
5.5.3.1 Level of NVA and Support by Region
Figure 5.5 charts the estimated level of total NVA received by each of the nine regions
for the years 1980/1 to 198617. The levels of NVA within each region reflect closely
the traditional pattern of dairying in England and Wales, with those provinces in the
West and South of England and also Wales having the largest total NVA. Total NVA
has, in the majority of cases, shown an upward trend during the period (a noticeable
exception is the South East) indicating that the national trend is replicated in most
regions.
28 t will be remembered that 1972f3 data were unavailable at the regional level.
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Total levels of support in each region are shown in Figure 5.6. Like the distribution of
NVA, it is the traditional dairy regions that receive the majority of support, with the
South West receiving the most. There are fluctuations in the level of support going to
each region between years, but as with the national results, this is mainly a result of
changes in the world price levels from which support is measured. If the two extreme
years are examined, the conclusion may be drawn that support is trending upwards, but
if all years are examined no discernible trend can be identified.
Figure 5.5 Total NVA by Region 1980/1 to 198617
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Figure 5.6 Total Support Accruing to Each Region 1980/1 to 198617
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Examination of total income and support in each region does not take account of the
number of producers within these regions. Figures 5.7 and 5.8, present NVA and
support, respectively, on a per farm basis.
Figure 5.7 Average NVA by Region 1980 to 1987
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There are large regional differences in the average level of NVA per farm. In 1980/1
the range was from £7,500 in Wales to £23,400 in the South East. By 198617, this
range had increased to over £20,000. The Eastern and South Eastern regions, although
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having low total NVA, have high average incomes, while the Welsh have a very low
average income per farm despite a large total income.29
The upward trend in levels of total NVA is more noticeable on a per farm basis (as it
was at the national level), because of the decline in the number of producers throughout
the period. The South East and East highlight the differences between total and average
NVA. Average NVA in the Eastern region virtually doubles over the 7 years, whilst
the decline in average NVA in the South East is proportionately much smaller than the
decline in total income.
Figure 5.8 Average Support by Region 1980 to 1987
Pegion
As with NVA, those regions that receive the greatest total levels of support do not
necessarily receive the largest amount per farm. In 1980/1, each Welsh farm received
an average of £13,500 whilst in the South East farms received an average of £31,500.
In 1986/7 the difference between the lowest and highest had increased to over £30,000.
Welsh farmers continually received the lowest support per farm, whilst the highest
went to the East and South East.
29 Fig'res for Production per Herd, Number of Herds, Average Herd Size, Yield per Cow, and Gross
Margin per Cow for all regions can be found in Appendix 5.ffl, Tables A5. 1 to A5.5
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A possible method for examining the effects of agricultural policy on the distribution of
income and support between regions is to examine the relative shares of support and
income received by each region. The percentage share of each region in terms of
support and NVA are reported for 1980/1). The results are highlighted in Figures 5.9
and 5.10. In 1980/8 1 the largest share of total income (25%) went to the South West,
followed by the South with 19%. The East and South East accounted for only 5 and
6% respectively.
Figure 5.9 Percentage of NVA accruing to Each Region 1980/1
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Figure 5.10 Percentage of Support accruing to Each Region 1980/1
A similar pattern emerges for the distribution of support in 1980/1, with total support
being distributed unequally between regions. The South and South West together
accounting for 39% of support, whilst the East and South East together received only
10%. There are, however, noticeable differences in the two distributions. For
example, the North West receives 19% of support but only has 11% of total income.
The corresponding distributions for the year 198617 indicate that for the majority of
regions the percentage share of NVA and support remains virtually unchanged.
Notable exceptions include the North West, where NVA increases from 11 to 19%, and
the South East, which suffers a decline from 6 to 2%. That the distribution of NVA
changes more than that of support could be a result of the effect of good and bad
climatic conditions in specific regions and also of managerial ability.
The analysis of the percentage of support and NVA accruing to each region over the
seven years, has shown that the shares of the majority of regions have remained
essentially unchanged. This finding indicates that agricultural policy has not led to a
transfer of support between regions.
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5.5.3.2 Gini Coefficients
Regional results thus far have highlighted large differences in the level of both support
and income between regions. The focus now switches to an analysis of inequality
within regions. Table 5.11 presents for each region the estimated Gini coefficients for
associated with the distribution of support between 1980/1 and 198617.
Table 5.11 Gini Coefficients by Region for the Distribution of Support
PROVINCE	 1980/1	 1984/5	 1985/6	 1986/7
Wales	 0.42	 0.41	 0.40	 0.40
Northern	 0.36	 0.47	 0.45	 0.49
North East	 0.45	 0.37	 0.32	 0.34
North West	 0.37	 0.47	 0.41	 0.44
East Midland
	
0.39
	
0.39
	
0.38
	 0.34
Eastern	 0.42	 0.42	 0.46	 0.47
South East	 0.31
	
0.48	 0.38
	
0.39
Southern	 0.42	 0.42	 0.41	 0.41
South West	 0.41
	 0.43	 0.43
	 0.43
Range	 0.3 1-0.45	 0.37-0.48	 0.32-0.46	 0.34-0.49
The results do not indicate excessively high levels of inequality, with the highest Gini
coefficient being 0.49. Within years there are large differences in measured inequality.
For example, in 1980/8 1 the Gini ranged from 0.31 in the South East to 0.45 in the
North East. The initial impression when examining the regional results on the
distribution of support is that there is much more variation in level of inequality over
time than there is on the national scale. Figure 5.11 uses selected regions to illustrate
this variation.
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Three general conclusions can be drawn. First, as already mentioned, the Gini for
support within regions fluctuates over time much more than at the national level.
Second, the level of variation is greater in some regions than in others. Third, very few
regions show any clear trend in terms of a consistent decrease or increase in the level of
inequality (the North East and the North are the only regions to show clear trends).
The analysis of inequality within regions can now be extended to that associated with
the distribution of NVA (Table 5.12).
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Table 5.12 Gini Coefficients by Region for the Distribution of NVA
Province	 1980/1	 1984/5	 1985/6	 1986/7
Wales	 0.54
	
0.57
	 0.46	 0.45
Northern	 0.41	 0.53	 0.52	 0.57
North East	 0.74	 0.50	 0.38	 0.41
North West	 0.45	 0.60	 0.73	 0.62
East Midland	 0.59	 0.56	 0.65	 0.34
Eastern	 0.45	 0.55	 0.54	 0.52
South East	 0.34	 0.54	 0.38	 0.36
Southern	 0.49	 0.49	 0.45	 0.45
South West	 0.46	 0.52	 0.46	 0.47
Range	 0.34-0.74	 0.49-0.60	 0.38-0.73	 0.34 -0.62
The largest Gini coefficient associated with NVA is 0.74, indicating a very unequal
distribution. The range is much greater than that associated with the distribution of
support. For example, in 1980/1, the Gini ranged between 0.34 in the South East and
0.74 in the North East. Figure 5.12 highlights selected regions that show large
variations over the period. In the North East, inequality falls from 0.74 in 1980/8 1 to
0.41 in 1984/5. However, in the North West inequality rises from 0.45 to over 0.60.
Figure 5.12 Gini Coefficients for NVA (Selected Regions 1980 to 1987)
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Comparison of the Gini coefficients for NVA and support indicate that, in the majority
of cases, the distribution of support is more even than the distribution of income (the
only exception is the South East where, in 1985/6, the Gini coefficients are identical
and, in 1986/7, the distribution of income is more even than that of support). The
results suggest that removal of support would lead to greater inequality of income
distribution within regions (assuming production patterns remain unchanged).
5.5.3.3 Ranking of Regions by Inequality
In Figure 5.13 regions are ranked according to the level of inequality associated with
the distribution of support for each year under consideration (the region ranked 1 is the
most equal, that ranked 9 the most unequal). This is undertaken to enable an
assessment of the relative levels of inequality within England and Wales. The results
indicate that, in general, it is difficult to assess the relative position of each region in the
'league' of inequality. There is much alteration in the relative positions over years.
The main variation (understandably) is over the longer time period from 1980 to 1984.
However, even after 1984/5 there are significant changes in the rankings. It is possible
to conclude that, after 1984, the North East region shows consistently the most equal
distribution, followed by the East Midlands, but few other generalisations can be made
because of the degree of variability.
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Figure 5.13 Ranking of Regions by Level of Inequality of Support
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Figure 5.14 shows the regions ranked by the level of inequality arising from the
distribution of NVA. The ranking of regions by the level of inequality associated with
the distribution of NVA indicates large variation in the relative position between years.
Again, the greatest changes occur between 1980/1 and 1984/5. However, even after
1984/5, (with the exception of the North-West and East) no region retains the same
ranking between years.
Figure 5.14 Ranldng of Regions by Level of Inequality of NVA
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Figures 5.13 and 5.14 suggest similarities in the ranldngs of the regions by support and
NVA. This relationship is confirmed by the result of a Spearman's coefficient of rank
correlation, which analyses whether there is a relationship between the rank order of
two variables. The rank correlation figure can range from 0, indicating no correlation,
to 1, confirming perfect correlation. The figures for 1980/1 produce a correlation
coefficient of 0.70, and those for 1986/7 one of 0.90. Therefore it can be concluded
that, for these two years, there is a positive correlation between the two sets of Gini
coefficients. However, if the figures for 1984 are analysed a different picture emerges.
There is little relationship (Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.15) between the two
rankings, indicating that the relationship between the Gini for support and for income
breaks down. However, a problem with the ranking method is that the Gini
coefficients for support in 1984/5 are very similar and therefore a difference of just
0.03 in the Gini can lead to a region being ranked 6th rather than 3rd. This has a
significant effect on the level of Spearman's rank coefficient.
5.5.3.4 Discussion on Regional Inequality
The results of the analysis of the levels of inequality of income within regions over the
period indicate large variations but with few discernible trends emerging. Regions such
as the East Midlands appear to exhibit a decrease in observed inequality whilst others,
such as the North West, indicate an upward trend. It may be concluded that, between
years, large variations occur, but no significant move to either a more or less equal
distribution within all regions can be identified.
It is not suffice to state that there are large variations in the level of inequality from year-
to-year and between regions without examining possible causes. Dairy farming,
perhaps more than any other type of farming, is heavily dependent on managerial
ability. The choice of breeding stock, feeding regimes, etc. are vital to production
capabilities. Possible explanations as to the year t6 year variations can be related to
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managerial competence. First, in a relatively good year, with the right weather
conditions (for grass growth and good forage making), the management requirements
are not so demanding and all farms perform relatively well. However, in a bad year it
is possible that the more astute managers, those that time forage making better (or who
are luckier!) and those who buy in food at the right time, do considerably better than
those who are less skilled. This would lead to lower input costs for the more skilled
managers and therefore higher income. Coupled with the decline in income of the less
skilled, greater inequality will result. Climatic variations may explain why the changes
from year to year are dissimilar between regions.
Second, it can be argued that smaller farms are able to cope with, for example, climatic
difficulties better than larger farms, due to the fact that they are not so 'stretched' and
can pay more attention to detail. This argument suggests that in a bad year the smaller
farmers may do better than the larger farmers, the result of which could be a reduction
in measured inequality.
The analysis of the regional levels of inequality highlights variations within and over
years which examination of the national data obscures. It appears that even though the
national Gini remains fairly stable, inequality is constantly changing on a regional
basis. In other words regional variations cancel each other out to produce a fairly
smooth national picture.
5.5.3.5 A Comparison of Shares
As a prelude to the next chapter, in which an alternative policy will be considered, the
final part of the regional analysis concentrates on a comparison of the overall position
of each region. Figure 5.15 compares the share of herds, cows, support, and NVA
for each region in 1980/1.
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Figure 5.15 Percentage of Herds, Cows, Support and NVA, 1980/1
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Examination of the distribution of the share of herds, cows, support and NVA
highlights a number of points concerning 'equality'. In all cases support is distributed
very closely to the number of cows (indicating similarity in yield per cow). The very
nature of price support ensures that the distribution of support will follow that of
production. For this reason it can be seen as a 'fair' method of support. Every
producer receives a level of support in proportion to production. However 'fairness'
can be judged by other criteria. It may be fair that each producer should be valued
equally, irrespective of their actual level of production. If support was fairly distributed
according to this defmition of 'equality', then each region should receive the same
proportion as it has dairy farmers. The results show that this is clearly not the case.
Wales, for example, has 18% of all dairy herds yet, because these herds are on average
small compared to other regions, they have 13% of cows and only 11% of total
support. In contrast, the Southern region has only 12% of herds, yet receives 18% of
support. Price support ensures that support does not go to the regions necessarily with
the most producers, but disproportionately to those with the largest producers. Of
course, other policies (such as LFA and SDA payments) that favour areas such as
Wales, may partly redress the imbalance occurring under the price support regime.
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To assess whether the 1980/1 relationship holds, similar comparisons are made for
1986/7 (Figure 5.16). It is clear that very little change has occurred, suggesting that the
findings reported for 1980/1 are consistent with the general picture. How this situation
may change under an alternative policy measure is examined in the following chapter.
Figure 5.16 Percentage Shares of Herds, Cows, Support and NVA, 1986/7
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5.6 Conclusions
This chapter set out to examine inequality in income and support in dairy farming in
England and Wales over a fifteen year period. Due to problems with the traditional
approach to measuring inequality (and the apparent advantages, discussed in Chapter 3
of the lognormal), it was decided to use the assumption of lognormality to facilitate the
research. The two variables used (output and NVA) were found to be acceptable in
terms of lognormality.
The results on a national level showed little change in the distribution of both support
and income over the period, considering the changes in policy that had occurred.
However, the regional analysis highlighted that the national results obscured variations
between regions. The regional analysis also showed that there was little change in the
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relative positions of the regions over the years, in terms of their share of support and
income.
The analysis (both at the national and regional level) highlighted that support was
continually more evenly distributed than income, suggesting that removal of support
may actually increase income inequality. The national results (and those for the
majority of the regions) indicated no general increase or decrease in the level of
inequality. It was argued that this 'stability' in inequality might be a result of the effects
of agricultural policy. Of course, this premise is difficult to substantiate, because it is
not known how the structure would have changed in the absence of agricultural
support.
Some regions received a substantially greater share of support than their share of herds,
whilst others received notably less. The average support received per farm, in different
regions, varied by up to £30,000 in any one year. The next chapter considers an
alternative policy measure, which, inter alia, can be used to target support more at
producers than level of production.
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Appendix 5.! (Extract from MMB Cost Survey)
Sample Selection (1984/5 Survev30
A Random Sample of 1,640 herds with ten or more dairy cows, stratified according to
herd size, was selected from the June 1983 census. The sample was designed to reflect
the provincial distribution of dairy herds and was subdivided into two samples, a main
sample of 410 herds and three reserve samples of 410 herds. The latter samples were
to ensure that adequate replacements were available for non-respondents.
If the owner of a herd in the main sample did not co-operate or was ineligible, a
replacement from the corresponding cells in the first reserve sample was approached.
If the replacement did not co-operate or was ineligible a further replacement was taken
from the same cell in the second reserve sample, etc.
The sampling fractions for each herd size were chosen with the intention of minimising
the expected sampling error of gross costs per cow.
If it was considered doubtful that a co-operator would continue for the full year, a
replacement from the reserve sample was also costed, and the results for the reserve
herd were included in the final sample whetehr the original co-operator dropped
dropped out or not.
Raising Procedure
Because the sample was disproportionately stratified by herd size, the results have to be
raised in order to accurately reflect the population. The raising factors represent the
ratio of herds in the population in the June census of the year in question to herds in the
sample within each herd size group.
30 Similar selection procedures were followed for each of the years under consideration
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Appendix 5.H Definition of Provinces
Province	 Counties
Northern	 Cumbria, Durham, Tyne and Wear, Northumberland
North Eastern Cleveland, South Yorkshire, North Yorkshire, West Yorkshire,
Humberside
North Western Cheshire, Lancashire, Merseyside, Salop, Staffordshire,
Greater Manchester
East Midland	 Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincoinshire, Northamptonshire,
Nottinghamshire
Eastern	 Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essesx, Hertfordshire,
Greater London (East) Norfolk, Suffolk
South Eastern Kent, Surrey, East Sussex, West Sussex
Southern	 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Wiltshire,
Hereford and Worcester, West Midlands, Oxford shire, Avon,
Isle of Wight,Warwickshire,
South Western Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Scilly Isles
Wales	 Powys, Gwynedd, Dyfed, Ciwyd, South Glamorgan,
Mid Glamorgan, West Glamorgan, Gwent
Appendix S.ffl Tables AS.! to A5.5
Table A5. 1 Average Production Per Farm by Region
(000 litres)
Province
1980/1	 19 84/5
	
19 85/6
	
198617
Wales	 213
	
238
	
253	 262
Northern	 291	 292	 279	 326
North Eastern	 23!	 304
	
360	 359
North Western	 333
	
379
	 385	 402
East Midland	 306
	
381
	 321	 366
Eastern	 383
	 543	 609	 687
South Eastern	 496	 442	 451	 543
Southern	 470
	
454	 460	 501
South Western	 328
	 348	 375	 396
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Table A5.2 Number of Herds by Region
(herds)
Province	 1980/1	 1984/5	 1985/6	 198617
Wales	 7,742	 7,264	 6,990	 6,847
Northern	 3,019	 3,577	 3,860	 3,426
North Eastern	 4,487	 3,137	 2,579	 2,865
North Western	 7,769	 7,458	 7,187	 7,021
East Midland	 3,057	 2,540	 2,615	 2,507
Eastern	 1,601	 955	 1,153	 1,090
South Eastern	 1,360	 1,167	 808	 787
Southern	 5,337	 5,089	 4,874	 4,731
South Western	 9,246	 8,711	 8,371	 8,154
Table A5.3 Average Herd Size by Region
(cows)
Province	 1980/1	 1984/5	 1985/6	 1986/7
Wales	 44	 51	 52	 54
Northern	 59
	
60	 56	 61
North Eastern	 48	 61	 70	 68
North Western	 66
	
69
	 69	 71
East Midland	 61	 72	 64	 66
Eastern	 70
	 96
	
96	 109
South Eastern	 95
	
92
	 94	 108
Southern	 83
	
87	 88	 92
South Western	 63	 71	 71	 76
Table A5.4 Average Yield per Cow by Region
(litres)
Province	 1980/1	 1984/5	 1985/6	 1986/7
Wales	 4432	 4438	 4612	 4610
Northern	 4725	 4321	 4005	 4644
North Eastern	 4457	 4658	 5665	 5121
North Western	 4823	 4804	 4985	 5068
East Midland	 4991	 4993	 4850	 5410
Eastern	 5193	 5379	 4456	 5663
South Eastern	 5362	 4356	 6292	 4971
Southern	 5133	 4829	 5041	 5194
South Western	 4810	 4607	 4794	 4930
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Table A5.5 Average Gross Margin per Cow by Region
(f/year)
1980/1	 1984/5	 1985/6	 1986/7
Wales	 331	 389	 405	 460
Northern	 338	 421	 390	 482
North Eastern	 305	 429	 522	 544
North Western	 323	 420	 436	 486
East Midland	 344	 420	 408	 536
Eastern	 374	 377	 312	 490
South Eastern	 396	 383	 553	 475
Southern	 384	 410	 428	 507
South Western	 386	 407	 423	 515
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Chapter 6 Inequality and the Producer Entitlement Guarantee (PEG)
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 examined the distribution of income and support for years in which different
agricultural policies were in operation. Over the period, little change occurred in levels
of measured inequality. This chapter considers an alternative scenario and assesses the
effects on levels and distribution of support and income. The basic premise revolves
around the assumption that reduction of income inequality within agriculture becomes
part of the political agenda. On the evidence of the previous chapter, deficiency
payments, market price support, and quotas have little effect on inequality levels.
Therefore, if income distribution is of concern it would seem that a different policy will
need to be instigated. One such policy is the Producer Entitlement Guarantee (PEG),
which has been around (in various guises) for a number of years. 31 Advantages of the
PEG in other areas of concern, for example, transfer efficiency and trade distortion,
have been assessed (Harvey and Hall, 1989). However, it also appears to have
significant inequality-reducing potential, and this is the main concern here.
6.2 Definition
The PEG operates to limit the quantity of production eligible for support per farm.
Harvey (1990, p 18) describes one possible implementation of this sort of policy:
Under PEG farmers get a support payment, paid by the Exchequer..., as
the difference between a PEG price and a free market price for a fixed
quantity of production. Any quantity over and above this PEGged quantity
per farm is sold on the unsupported open market".
31 For examples, see Hubbard and Harvey (1988), Castle (1988), Harvey (1989,1990)
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A ceiling is placed on the amount of support any one farm can receive. All production
is sold at the world price, but production up to the PEG level receives the support
payment.
Harvey argues that the PEG can be used to support the small 'family' farm rather than
large scale 'industrial' agriculture. "The distribution of PEG limits can be used to direct
public support towards people rather than products and benefit smaller farmers
proportionately more than large farms" (p 18). The validity of this claim can be
assessed by examination of the proportion of support and income which the smaller
producers receive, with and without the PEG, in relation to the bigger producers. The
very nature of the PEG indicates that implementation would lead to reductions in
inequality associated with support, by setting an upper limit to the amount of support
per farm. The purpose here is to quantify this reduction.
6.3 Methods
Harvey argues that the quantities eligible for support should relate to the levels
demanded under multilateral free trade. It is not in the remit of this study to model EC
or world agricultural supply and demand so as to estimate these levels. The analysis is
therefore restricted to a particular year (1985/6) and the production patterns that existed
in that year. The comparison is between the distribution of support as it was in 1985/6
with what it would have been if a PEG had been applied. No allowance is made for
possible production and structural changes, the only alteration is that support is
distributed under a PEG policy rather than through price support and quotas.
In the preceding chapter, the total level of support received by dairy farmers in England
and Wales during 1985/6 was estimated at £955m, which corresponds to around 8
pence per litre of milk produced. A policy such as the PEG can be implemented in
various guises. This study will consider two. One method (PEG 1) will examine the
implementation of a PEG coupled with a decline in total support to dairy farmers. This
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Sis achieved by maintaining the support per litre current in 1985/6, but limiting the
number of litres eligible for support. The second method (PEG2) is where total
support is maintained at the estimated level of £955m, but eligible production is
reduced.
Simplified diagrams (Figures 6.1 and 6.2) illustrate the difference between PEG1 and
PEG2 for individual farms. In Figure 6.1, P indicates the world price for the product
under consideration, Ps is the price the producer receives and Q' is the level of
production (at price P5) of the farm. With no restriction on the level of production
eligible for support, total support can be approximated as a+b+c.
If the PEG is now implementated at the quantity of Q (assuming no change in the level
of supply from this farm, that is the supply curve for this farm is Q'S) and the support
price per unit is not altered, then the support to the farm will fall to a+b (the amount
produced over Q would be sold at P, with no support payment attached). Any dairy
farm which produced quantity Q or less would have no reduction in the support it
received. For example, a producer at Qi would not suffer a reduction in support.
Figure 6.1 Effect of PEG1 on an Individual Farm
Price
PSI____________________
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Qi	 Q	 Q•	 Qi.j.aittity
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In Figure 6.2, support is again equal to a+b+c. However, when the PEG is applied at
Q, assuming the total support to the industry remains constant, the support price rises
to Pp. A farmer producing at Q' loses c, but gains d and e. Any farmer producing
quantity Q or less would enjoy a clear increase in support. For example, a farm
producing Qi would increase support by area d, raising total support from a to a+d.
Figure 6.2 Effect of PEG2 on an Individual Farm
Price
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Under PEG1, a farmer whose level of production is greater than the amount eligible for
support will suffer a reduction in support. There is no change in the amount of support
received by a farmer who produces less than or equal to the eligible quantity. With
PEG2, a farmer whose production is greater than the set PEG suffers a less severe
reduction in support, and might in fact gain, if production is only a certain amount
above the PEG, whilst any producer whose total quantity is below the PEG level
enjoys an unambiguous increase in support.
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The two different methods allow either total support to vary with support per litre
constant (PEG1), or for support per litre to vary with total support held constant
(PEG2). Under PEG1 the total cost of support is determined as the eligible quantity
multiplied by £0.08 (estimated support per litre). Under PEG2, total cost is fixed with
support per litre calculated as £955 million (total support) divided by eligible quantity.
For purposes of illustration the eligible quantity per farm is set at four different levels -
500, 400, 300 and 200 thousand litres - under both PEG1 and PEG2. The analysis
therefore involves examination of two different methods at four possible levels. The
distribution of support and NVA will be analysed at each level. The percentage of
farms whose total production is less than or equal to the eligible quantity, and the
percentage of total production covered (including those farms not fully covered), at the
four different levels are reported in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Quantities of Production covered by a PEG
Eligible production	 200	 300	 400	 500	 All
per farm ('000 litres)
Coverage:
-Farms (%)	 36	 54	 68	 78	 100
-Production(%)	 48	 63	 74	 82	 100
In examining the level of inequaiity associated with the PEG, a change in the method of
calculating the Gini is necessary. A maximum level of output on which support is
available will necessarily truncate the distribution of support. In other words, the
distribution of support will no longer follow that of output and therefore may no longer
be lognormaL The Gini will be calculated on the basis of the share of support received
by each decile of the population, ranked by output rather than under the assumption of
lognormality.
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6.4 Results
As in Chapter 5, the analysis is undertaken at both a national and regional level. The
analysis is also concerned with the effect of the PEG on the level of support and income
as well as the distributional effects of the PEG.
6.4.1 National Results
6.4.1.1 Level of NVA and Support under PEG
This section will focus on the effects of the different PEG methods on the level of
support and NVA. Support in total and per litre, for the two methods, is given in
Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Total Support and Support per litre under the PEG
PEG Level	 PEG1	 PEG2
(000 litres)	 Total Support Support per 	 Total Support Support per
litre	 litre
£m	 pence	 £m	 pence
No Restriction 955	 8.00	 955	 8.00
500	 783	 8.00	 955	 9.00
400	 710	 8.00	 955	 10.00
300	 603	 8.00	 955	 11.00
200	 457	 8.00	 955	 12.00
Note:Support per litre refers only to that level of production up to PEG level
Under PEG1 total support declines from £955 to £457 million, with the support per
litre maintained at 8 pence. With PEG2, total support is maintained at £955 million,
and as the PEG becomes more restrictive so the support per litre rises from 8 to 12
pence. The method used under PEG1 results in a fall in NVA corresponding to the fall
in support whilst under PEG2 there is no change in the total level of income in the
industry (Table 6.3).
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Figure 6.3 Total Support to Farms Ranked by Quintiles under PEG1
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Table 6.3 Total NVA for the Industry under PEG1 and
PEG2
PEG	 PEG1	 PEG2
('000 litres)	 Total NVA	 Total NVA
£m
No Restriction 1,044	 1,044
500	 872	 1,044
400	 799	 1,044
300	 692	 1,044
200	 546	 1,044
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 highlight the changes in absolute levels of support and NVA
associated with the PEG. It is evident that the two methods of implementing the PEG
have varying effects on the level of support. To analyse the distributional implications
of these differences, quintile analysis is a useful first step. Farms are ranked into
quintiles according to their level of income. Results under PEG1 for various eligible
quantities, are reproduced in Figure 6.3. Each quintile suffers a reduction in the total
level of support at any of the four possible eligible quantities. However, the reduction
to the lowest quintile is small in comparison to the fall in support to the highest quintile.
This can be highlighted by examining the total change in support between no restriction
and a restriction of 200,000 litres (Figure 6.4).
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177
Figure 6.4 Change in Total Support per Quintile, PEG1
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a) Between no restriction and a PEG set at 200,000 litres
The top 20% of farms would lose over £300m (of a total reduction of around £500m)
in support, whilst the bottom 20% would lose only £1 im. The results are very
different with the PEG2 scenario (Figure 6.5). The lowest three quintiles enjoy an
increase in total support at all four levels of the PEG. The more restrictive the PEG the
more these quintiles gain. The opposite is true for the highest quintile. The fourth
quintile gains most if the PEG is set at 500,000 litres. However, even at 300,000 litres
they benefit more than under no PEG.
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Figure 6.6 Difference in Level of Support to Quintiles PEG2
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Figure 6.5 Total Support to Farms Ranked by Quintiles under PEG2
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Examination of the change to each quintile from a position of no PEG to one set at the
200,000 litre level (Figure 6.6) is useful. There is an increase of around £50m to each
of the bottom three quintiles, with the second quintile benefiting marginally more than
the first or third. The fourth quintile suffers a loss of only £1 m, while the fifth quintile
suffers a reduction of over £150m.
Qith1
a) Between no restriction and a PEG set at 200,000 litres
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The change in the level of support received by each quintile highlights significant
differences between the two methods of hnplementation. Turning to the effect on levels
of income, it is necessary to re-emphasise that the only changes in income will arise
from changes in support. Therefore each quintile's total income will fall (rise) by the
same amount as support falls (rises). The similarity ensures that under PEG1 every
quintile faces a reduction in income as the PEG is implemented. In the case of PEG2,
the bottom 60% face an increase in their total levels of income at any PEG level
considered. The increase in support received by the lowest income quintile results in a
doubling of total income. The highest income farmers show a reduction from just
under £500 million, with no restriction, to £314 million with a PEG set at 200,000
litres.
Analysis of the average level of support received by farms in each quintile (Figures 6.7
and 6.8) reiterates the differences in total support. With PEG 1, the highest income
farmers face reductions in support from over £50,000 to around £15,000 per farm.
Under PEG2, support to the highest income earners would still decline, but not as
severely (to around £25,000). With PEG1, the low income quintiles face much less
severe reductions than the high income quintiles, whilst with PEG2 they have a
considerable increase in support (from £9,000 to £15,000). Under both methods, the
overall picture indicates an equalisation of the level of support received by farms at
different income quintiles.
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Figure 6.7 Support per Farm Ranked By Quintiles under PEG1
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Figure 6.8 Support per Farm Ranked By Quintiles under PEG2
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As already mentioned the analysis ensures that the changes in the level of NVA are
identical to the changes in support. However, because NVA started at a different level,
the PEG does not bring such an equalisation between quintiles as it does with
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support. 32 For example, under PEG1 at the 200,000 litre level, there is still a
difference of £20,000 between the average income of the lowest and highest quintiles.
With PEG2, (at the 200,000 litre level) the average level of NVA for a farm in the
lowest quintile is £14,000, whilst in the top quintile the average is £40,000, which is a
difference of £26,000.
6.4.1.2 Distribution of NVA and Support under PEG
The absolute changes in support and NVA arising from adoption of either of the two
proposed methods have been examined. The relative changes in each quintile's
position at each PEG level will now be considered. Under PEG1 support to each
quintile declines, with the high income earners losing the most. With no PEG, the
lowest quintile receives around 8% of support. As the PEG becomes more binding the
percentage share of the lowest quintile rises, so although they lose absolutely under
PEG1 they gain relative to the high income producers. At the most extreme PEG level
considered, the top 20% receive under 30% of support compared to over 40% with no
restriction (Figure 6.9). The share of support received by each quintile is identical
under PEG1 and PEG2 at the same level of restriction. For example, at the 400,000
litre limit the relative share of each quintile will be the same whether support is 8ppl
(under PEG 1) or lOppi (under PEG2).
32 As the change in NVA is identical to the change in support. The itsults for PEG! and PEG2 are
included as Figures A6.! and A6.2 in Appendix 6.!.
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Figure 6.9 Percentage of Support Received by Quintiles under PEG
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The effect of the PEG on the distribution of support is the same whichever of the two
methods is implemented. However, the distribution of NVA is different and for this
reason the quintile shares are analysed separately. With PEG 1 the share of total income
received by each quintile changes by smaller amounts than their share of support
(Figure 6.10). For example, the fifth quintile would still have 40% of total income
even with an eligible quantity of 200,000 litres. The percentage shares of income under
PEG2 (Figure 6.11) alter significantly more than under PEG 1, but not to the same
degree as support.
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Figure 6.10 Percentage of NVA by Quintile under PEG 1
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Figure 6.11 Percentage of NVA by Quintile under PEG2
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As in other parts of this study, quintile figures are used to illustrate distributions.
However, inequality measures are needed to quantify these changes. Gini coefficients
for support and NVA, under the two methods are presented in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4 Gmi Coefficients for Support and NVA under PEG
PEG	 Support	 PEG1	 PEG2
(000 litres)
No Restriction 0.42 	 0.54	 0.54
500	 0.30	 0.52	 0.45
400	 0.26	 0.50	 0.41
300	 0.20	 0.47	 0.35
200	 0.12	 0.47	 0.28
The Gini coefficients for support and NVA quantify the distributional effects of
restrictions on the amount of production eligible for support. With no restriction, the
Gini for support is 0.42. If a restriction is implemented at 500,000 litres (still above
the mean production of 360,000 litres) there is a marked fall in the inequality of support
payments to 0.30. As the PEG becomes more binding so the greater the rate in the
reduction of inequality. With only the first 200,000 litres of milk eligible for support,
the Gini is 0.12, indicating a much more equal distribution.
For NVA, under PEG1, there is a steady decline in levels of inequality as the PEG is
made more restrictive, but this fall is relatively small. In contrast, inequality falls by a
much larger amount under PEG2. In terms of reducing inequality and maintaining
overall industry income levels, PEG2 is a more favourable policy than PEG1 (Figures
6.12 and 6.13).
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Figure 6.12 Change in Inequality and Industry NVA under PEG1
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Figure 6.13 Change in Inequality and Industry NVA under PEG2
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These two figures highlight that whatever the level of (a binding) PEG, total industry
income is higher and inequality lower if the PEG is applied keeping total support at the
same level. Therefore, in terms of the distributional impact, PEG2 is unequivocally
preferable to PEG1. However, there are costs to be considered. Figure 6.14 presents
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the extra cost of implementing PEG2 at each level, compared to PEG 1, and also
highlights the greater reduction in inequality. The extra costs of PEG2 and the
reduction in inequality suggests a trade off. By implementing PEG2 rather than PEG 1,
with a 200,000 litre limit, for example, the Gini coefficient is reduced by 0.19 but costs
are greater by over £490m Assuming a linear relationship, each 0.01 extra reduction in
inequality therefore costs around £26m.
Figure 6.14 Extra Cost and Reduction in Inequality with PEG2 compared to PEG1
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As with the earlier examination of distribution of support and income, the national
aspect is only one part of the overall picture. The PEG will also have an effect on the
level of inequality within and between regions.
6.4.2 Regional Results
The examination of the PEG on a regional basis will concentrate on those aspects
studied at the national level, namely income and support inequality. The two possible
methods will be analysed in terms of the distribution of support and income between
regions as well as their effect on inequality within regions. The large number of
regions involved, coupled with variation in the methods of implementation of the PEG,
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Figure 6.15 Change In Level of Support per Region PEG1
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lead to a large number of results. For this reason, detailed results will be reproduced in
the Appendix, while the text will concentrate on highlighting regional differences.
6.4.2.1 Regional levels of Support and Income under PEG
Initially, the effects of the PEG on the level of support received by each region is
reported. First, assuming the PEG1 method, the overall change from a situation of no
PEG to one of 200,000 litres is shown Figure 6.15.
Region
Under PEG1 all regions suffer a decline in total support. However, the extent of the
decline varies. The regions of greatest production suffer the brunt of the fall in
support. For example, the South loses nearly £lOOm of support, whilst the South East
loses only £20m. (Table A6. 1 in Appendix 6.11 shows the fall in total support on a
regional basis at various eligible quantities).
There are noticeable differences in the effects of the PEG as it becomes more binding.
Taking Wales and the North West as examples, if the PEG was set at 500,000 litres
then the decline in support would be £5m for Wales and around £25m for the North
West. As the PEG becomes more restrictive the North West suffers large reductions in
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Figure 6.16 Change in Level of Support per Region PEG2
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total support. With no PEG, the difference in the amount of support received by the
North West and Wales is around £60m. This would be reduced to under £20m with
the PEG set 200,000 litres. Of course, examination of total support does not take
account of the number of producers within regions. (Table A6.3 in Appendix 6.11
shows the perfarm changes at the four PEG levels considered). The regions that suffer
the greatest loss in total support are not necessarily those that lose the most on a per
farm basis. An average farm in the Eastern region would suffer a reduction of £30,000
if the PEG was restricted to 200,000 litres, whilst at the other extreme a farm in Wales
would lose around £7,000.
Turning to the effects on the levels of support under PEG2, Figure 6.16 highlights, for
each region, the change in total support received with no PEG and a PEG set at
200,000 litres.
Region
With PEG2, the large reduction in total support received by the North West and South
West under PEG1 is not evident. In fact, even with the most restrictive eligible
quantity, both regions show an increase in support compared to no restriction. This
occurs because, the gains enjoyed by the small producers in these regions outweigh the
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losses of the large producers. The South would still suffer a drop in support, the East
and South East are the only other regions that suffer a reduction in support. In
contrast, Wales would receive an increase in support of around £36m. Instigation of
PEG2 leads to a redistribution of support from the South, South-East and East to the
other 6 regions. At an eligible quantity of 200,000 litres the total redistribution
amounts to some £64m, of which £36m goes to Wales. Examining the level of total
support at varying levels of PEG (Appendix 6.11, Table A6.2) it is clear that the
majority of those regions which benefit under PEG2 at 500,000 litres, increase their
benefit as the PEG becomes more restrictive.
The per farm changes in support which occur as the eligible quantity is reduced under
PEG2, are shown in Appendix 6.11, Table A6.4. The South East (even with PEG level
as high as 500,000 litres) suffers a large decline in support. Successively stricter PEG
levels lead to less support for this region. For Wales, support increases at each stricter
PEG level. The North West, as with the total levels of support, would benefit most per
farm if the eligible quantity was set at 500,000 litres. With a PEG set at 200,000 litres,
farms in the East lose the most (on average £19,500). Farms in the East Midlands, the
North and Wales have marked increases in the average level of support, whilst the
North East, North West and South West show only marginal increases in average
support.
Under PEG2, every region enjoys greater total support than under PEG 1, at each level
of restriction considered. Even those regions who still lose under PEG2, lose less.
The regional results have shown that the effects of the PEG on total support (and thus
income received) by region differs greatly between PEG1 and PEG2. As the Welsh
have already been shown to have the lowest NVA, it can be interpreted as a
redistribution of income from the richer to the poorer regions. 33
 With PEG2, the
As the changes in NVA are similar to those of support the results for NVA are considered repetitive.
Tables A6.5 to A6.8 in Appendix 6.11! present the regional levels of NVA under the two PEG options.
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regions with the lowest average farm income gain relative to the other regions. For
example, farms in Wales would enjoy, on average, a 31% increase in the level of NVA,
whilst farms in the East would suffer a 32% drop (with an eligible quantity of 200,000
litres).
Another method of examining the distribution between regions involves assessment of
the change in each region's percentage share of total support (Appendix 6.IV Figure
A6.3). With a PEG set at 200,000 litres, Wales gains nearly 4 percentage points whilst
the South loses an almost equal amount. Other regions show less marked changes in
their relative positions.
6.4.2.2 Regional Gini Coefficients
The introduction of a PEG, by whichever method, leads to a redistribution of support
and, consequently, income between the regions. Within regions, the PEG will also
have a distributive impact. To assess the extent of this impact, Gini coefficients will be
reported for support (Table 6.5) and NVA.
Table 6.5 Regional Gini Coefficients for Support under Varying PEG Restrictions
Region	 No PEG PEG 500 PEG 400 PEG 300 PEG 200
Wales	 0.40
	 0.34	 0.31	 0.26	 0.18
Northern	 0.45	 0.36	 0.33
	 0.27	 0.20
North Eastern	 0.32
	
0.32
	
0.27	 0.12
	
0.03
North Western	 0.41
	
0.28
	 0.16	 0.16	 0.09
East Midland
	 0.38	 0.29
	
0.25	 0.19	 0.10
Eastern	 0.46
	 0.19
	 0.16	 0.12	 0.08
South Eastern	 0.38
	 0.22
	 0.18	 0.13	 0.07
Southern	 0.41
	 0.24
	 0.19	 0.14	 0.08
South Western	 0.43
	 0.30
	
0.25
	 0.19	 0.12
Range	 0.32-	 0.19-	 0.16-	 0.12-	 0.03-
0.46	 0.36	 0.33	 0.27	 0.18
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The general pattern, as would be expected, is one of a reduction in the level of
inequality as the eligible quantity is reduced. The decline is not consistent between
regions. The East loses the most in support through the introduction of the PEG, but at
the same time it has the greatest reduction in inequality. This highlights an anomaly
with inequality. Farmers in the East have had a great reduction in mean income, but in
terms of inequality the distribution is now 'better', the Gini coefficient falling to 0.37.
Wales, who gain the most, also have the least reduction in inequality but still
considerable in absolute terms. Thus, they appear as one of the most unequal regions.
This is shown more clearly in Figure 6.17, where the level of inequality associated with
each PEG level is charted for selected regions.
Figure 6.17 Gini Coefficients for Support under PEG for Selected Regions
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The structure of farming within regions is responsible, to a large extent, for differences
in the impact of the PEG on levels of inequality of support. The percentage of farms
whose total production is covered by the PEG at the most restrictive level is shown in
Figure 6.18.
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Figure 6.18 Percentage of Farms Within Each Region Covered by PEG
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At the extreme restriction, there is a significant difference between the percentage of
farmers whose total production is below the eligible quantity. The North and Wales
still have between 45 and 50% of producers whose production is completely covered
by the PEG. At the other extreme, the Eastern Region has only 19% of producers
covered. Therefore, the number of farms facing a reduction in support is greater for the
East and consequently inequality is reduced by a greater amount.
Differences in the rate of decline in inequality will obviously effect the relative position
of regions. Using an ordinal approach, each regipn is ranked according to its level of
inequality at each PEG quantity (Figure 6.19). As in Chapter 5, the region with the
lowest Gini coefficient is ranked 1, whilst that with the highest is ranked 9.
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Figure 6.19 Ordinal Ranking of Regional Inequality For Support under PEG
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The system of ranking the regions illustrates the effects of the PEG. There are
significant changes in the ranldng of the regions. Using the East as an example, the
dramatic fall in the Gini results in a major change in the ranking of the region (from 9th
to 1st) In contrast, Wales becomes ranked more unequal, due to the fact that the PEG
has relatively less effect on the distribution of support within the region.
Whilst it has been observed that the level of inequality of support does not vary with the
actual method of implementing the PEG, the distribution of NVA does differ.
Therefore, the results in terms of income distribution need to be analysed for both
possible methods. Table 6.6 presents the Gini coefficients for NVA arising under
PEG!.
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Table 6.6 Regional Gini Coefficients for NVA under PEG1
Region	 No PEG PEG 500 PEG 400 PEG 300 PEG 200
Wales	 0.46	 0.45	 0.43	 0.40	 0.38
Northern	 0.52	 0.50	 0.48	 0.45	 0.41
North Eastern	 0.38
	
0.34	 0.31	 0.27	 0.23
North Western	 0.73	 0.71	 0.70	 0.68	 0.66
East Midland	 0.65	 0.63	 0.62	 0.61	 0.61
Eastern	 0.54
	
0.47	 0.44
	 0.41	 0.38
South Eastern	 0.38
	
0.33	 0.30
	
0.27	 0.27
Southern	 0.45
	
0.39	 0.38	 0.37	 0.36
South Western	 0.46	 0.41	 0.39	 0.35	 0.32
Range	 0.38-	 0.33-	 0.30-	 0.27-	 0.27-
0.73
	 0.71	 0.70
	 0.68	 0.66
There is a consistent decline in observed inequality in all regions as the eligible quantity
is reduced.. However, even at the most restrictive PEG, the reduction is not dramatic.
The results show that even with a PEG set at 200,000 litres there are still regions (the
North West and East Midlands) with high levels of inequality. This indicates that the
fall in income associated with PEG1 (declining total support) does not lead to great
changes in the levels of inequality. The variation in the level of decline between the
regions is less than that of support. Figure 6.20 highlights that separate regions show
similar falls in inequality levels as the PEG becomes stricter.
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This pattern is also reflected in the ranking of the regions by level of inequality (Figure
6.21). Unlike the distribution of support, the ranking of the regions does not alter
significantly as the eligible quantity is reduced.
Figure 6.21 Ranking of Regions by Level of Inequality under PEG1
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The Gini coefficients for income under PEG2 (Table 6.7) contrast markedly with those
examined for PEG1.
Table 6.7 Regional Gini Coefficients for NVA under PEG2
Region	 No PEG PEG 500 PEG 400 PEG 300 PEG 200
Wales	 0.47	 0.43
	
0.40	 0.36	 0.29
Northern	 0.52	 0.47	 0.45	 0.40	 0.32
North Eastern	 0.38	 0.32	 0.28	 0.22	 0.14
North Western	 0.73	 0.47	 0.42
	
0.35	 0.26
East Midland
	
0.65
	
0.54	 0.47	 0.38	 0.25
Eastern	 0.54
	 0.44	 0.40
	
0.35	 0.27
South Eastern	 0.38
	 0.34	 0.30	 0.26	 0.21
Southern	 0.45	 0.43	 0.38	 0.32
	 0.26
South Western	 0.46
	
0.40	 0.37
	 0.32	 0.25
Range	 0.38-	 0.32-	 0.28-	 0.22-	 0.14-
0.73	 0.54	 0.47	 0.40	 0.32
Under PEG2 all regions would have a noticeable fall in inequality, although differences
arise in the level of change. If the PEG was set at 200,000 litres, the Gini coefficient
for the North West would fall by nearly 0.5. The reduction in inequality for other
regions is not as marked, but is still significantly greater than under PEG 1.
The greater changes in absolute inequality of NVA within regions also effects the
relative position of each region. The ordinal ranking in Figure 6.22 highlight the
changes. The East Midlands is one of the most unequal regions at PEG levels of 500,
400 and 300,000 litres but at 200,000 it becomes one of the most equitable regions.
Wales tends to show greater inequality as the PEG becomes more restrictive.
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Figure 6.22 Ranking of Regions by Level of Inequality under PEG2
The examination of the Gini coefficients in both ordinal and cardinal form, shows
changes in the level of inequality. Also of interest is the proportion of support received
by farms in relation to their share of herds. The regions with the larest shares, the
North West and the South West tend to maintain a constant proportion of support
under the PEG. In contrast, Wales increases its share by nearly 4% and the East and
South East suffer a reduction in their share of total, support (Figure 6.23 highlights the
changes for selected regions).
Figure 6.23 Percentage of Herds and Support to Selected Regions
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On a regional basis the introduction of a PEG could work in a number of ways,
depending on the level of the PEG and the level of support. Any restriction on the level
of production eligible for support will lead to a relative reduction in income via a
reduction in support for those regions which have the largest dairy herds. The opposite
occurs to those regions which have smaller herd sizes. They either benefit in an
absolute sense, by an increase in support and therefore in income, or in a relative sense,
by having their income reduced less than the other regions. A number of regions,
including the two largest production areas, the North West and the South West, retain
their relative position (in terms of percentage share of support) whatever the level of
PEG. Within these regions there is likely to be a redistribution under the PEG2
method, but as a whole, they do not lose out.
With either method, the redistribution is away from the Southern and Eastern regions to
the North and Wales. As mentioned earlier, the tighter the PEG, and the higher the
support per litre, the more agricultural support becomes a form of income support
measure for the farm rather than a reward for increased production. If the aim is to
divorce support from the level of production, a low PEG limit and a high support
payment per litre may be the best method. If the aim is to not significantly effect the
level of production, then a high PEG would be a method of putting a ceiling on the cost
of the daiiy sector. A high PEG would reduce the total support to the largest of farmers
but leave the majority of others uneffected. This can be related to the Canadian system
of fixing a ceiling of $50,000 on the level of support a farm can receive (Boilman,
1989).
6.5 Implications and Conclusions
This chapter has focused on a possible policy alternative (PEG) and analysed it in
respect to levels and distribution of support and NVA. Two methods of
implementation were considered. PEG1 considered a reduction in the total cost of
support, whilst PEG2 maintained the total level of support. It is clear that the
199
distribution of support becomes markedly more equitable as the restriction on the
amount of production eligible for support is tightened. Whichever way the policy is
implemented, the distribution of income also becomes more equal. However, under the
scenario of maintaining total support, the fall in inequality is substantially higher than
the alternative. As the cost of this policy is markedly greater than the other, it becomes
clear that there is a trade-off between the costs of the policy and the reduction in
inequality. Assuming a linear relationship, at a PEG level of 200,000 litres, each 0.01
reduction in the Gini coefficient under PEG2 costs £26m more than under PEG 1.
On a national basis PEG reduces the inequality associated with income distribution in
dairy farming. However, at the regional level, large differences become evident.
Those regions with smaller average herd sizes either do not suffer such a large
reduction in support (under PEG 1) or receive an increase in the amount of support
accruing to them (under PEG2). The regions with the most production and largest
herds suffered the greatest fall in support. Under PEG2, at the 200,000 litre
entitlement level, 6 of the 9 regions would gain in terms of support, with a
redistribution of income from the East, South East and South to the other regions
(Wales in particular).
The impact of the PEG on the level of inequality within regions was assessed using
Gini coefficients. The PEG led to large reductions for all regions in the level of
inequality associated with support, but with inequality in some regions reduced more
than in others. Analysis of the number of farms covered at each PEG level highlighted
that those regions which showed smaller changes were those that had the fewest farms
affected by the reduction in eligible support (Wales, North, etc). In regions with the
largest herds, inequality declined markedly (the East, for example).
Coupled with declining total support, the instigation of the PEG leads to a dramatic fall
in the distribution of support and the level of NVA, but only small effects on the
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distribution of NVA. PEG2 involves no change in total support levels and total NVA
but a large reduction in inequality of both support and income. The conclusion is that
with the same total cost as present policies, inequality in dairy farming could be
significantly reduced within a similar level of total income in the industry. With PEG1,
at reduced cost, inequality will be reduced marginally, but with large falls in income.
The level of production eligible for support has significant distributional implications.
The results indicate that the PEG can be set to fulfil specific goals. If the sole intention
is to reduce inequality then the most restrictive PEG is more appropriate. However,
this does have a significant effect on the incomes of larger farmers. if the aim is to
raise the incomes of the lowest quintiles then the results indicate the level of PEG and
the method of implementation necessary. If it was decided, as Harvey (1990)
suggests, to support people rather than products, the PEG set at 200,000 litres is
preferable. At this level each region receives virtually the same share of support as it
has producers.
If the existing cost is acceptable, PEG2 results in a greater reduction of inequality and
redistribution of income, because low income producers benefit both absolutely as well
as relatively. The more restrictive the PEG the more they benefit. However, perhaps
of more interest is the large percentage of producers who benefit. The three (four)
lowest quintiles all increase their share of support at a PEG of 200,000 litres (300,000
litres). Therefore, the PEG involves a significant transfer of support from farms in the
highest quintiles. It is questionable whether such a large transfer is possible without
significant long-term effects. It must be remembered, that NVA is considered, rather
than Net Farm Income, or even Management and Investment Income. Therefore,
although the PEG brings the quintiles to similar levels of NVA, because the larger
farms have greater wage bills and also more rent to pay, the top quintile will be
considerably worse off, if either of the two other income definitions are considered.
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The static analysis has a weakness, because it cannot predict the structural and therefore
the production effects of the PEG.
Opponents of the PEG could argue that instigation of such a policy would lead to
increased costs and lower incomes for the industry as a whole. It is claimed 34 that an
advantage of the PEG is that those who are most efficient can expand beyond the PEG
level (due to their lower unit costs). However, if even the most efficient make a loss at
the unsupported market price this wifi not be the case. If the larger farms are maldng a
loss on any litre produced over the PEG threshold, the logical step to maximise profit
would be to reduce production to the level of the PEG. If the PEG is so restrictive that
the larger producers make a loss and reduce production accordingly, and if this
production 'transfers' to small farms then average costs in the industry may rise.
Dawson and Hubbard (1987) indicated that the larger producers have lower unit costs,
therefore any reduction in their production will lead to higher average costs for the
industry as a whole. However, it may be the case that reduction in average costs to the
smaller producers (arising from increased production) will negate the increase in
average costs to those producers who reduce production. The exact effects would
depend on the position of individual farms on their cost curve.
The national results hide significant regional trends. The PEG affects regions very
differently, both in levels of income and the inequality associated with this income.
Results indicate a significant movement in each region's level of income. With a region
such as Wales, under PEG2, the lower the eligible quantity (the higher the payment per
litre) the more the region benefits. Therefore, as a lobby group it would be in the
interest of Welsh farmers, as a whole, to have the most restrictive PEG available. The
South East, as a whole, suffers more as the PEG becomes more restrictive, therefore it
might be expected to argue for as high a PEG as possible (and preferably PEG at all).
Again refeince is made to Harvey (1990)
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With regions such as the North West, the overall position varies little whatever the PEG
level. However, within the region (and in fact any region), smaller producers will push
for a restrictive PEG and larger ones for no PEG.
With PEG1 a different picture emerges. It will not be much comfort to a low income
producer to know that he/she is relatively better-off in that his/her income has fallen less
than that of a high income producer. A PEG coupled with declining total support
benefits no farmer absolutely, but some relatively. Even with the PEG set as high as
500,000 litres, the fall in income to the sector is £150m (or 14% of the total income).
One could expect strong opposition to such a policy. However, if the reduction in
support was unavoidable then the smaller producers would do well to push for PEG1
rather than a reduction in price support.
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Appendix 6.! Figures A6. 1 and A6.2.
Figure A6.1 NVA per Farm under PEO1
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Appendix 6.11 Tables A6.1 to A6.4
Table A6.1 Total Support by Region assuming PEG1
Wales	 122
	 112	 106	 94	 76
Northern	 77
	
66	 61	 53
	
41
North Eastern 71	 56	 51	 44	 34
North Western 182	 154	 138	 118	 89
East Midland	 57	 51	 47	 41	 31
Eastern	 53
	 32	 27	 21	 15
South Eastern 30	 19	 17	 14	 10
Southern	 162	 118	 105	 85	 61
South Western 200	 176	 158	 132	 100
Table A6.2 Total Support by Region assuming PEG2
Wales	 122
	
137	 142	 149
	
158
Northern	 77
	
80
	
83	 83
	
85
North Eastern 71
	
68	 68	 70	 71
North Western 182	 188	 185	 186	 186
East Midland	 57	 62	 63
	 64	 64
Eastern	 53
	
38
	
36	 33
	 31
South Eastern 30
	
24
	
23	 23
	
22
Southern	 162	 144	 141	 135	 128
South Western 200	 214
	
212
	
209	 210
Table A6.3 Support per farm by Region assuming PEG1
(ft)
Region	 All	 500	 400	 300	 200
Wales
Northern
North Eastern
North Western
East Midland
Eastern
South Eastern
Southern
South Western
17,690
19,550
25,229
26,923
22,488
42,648
31,595
32,233
26,258
16,066
16,993
21,648
21,387
19,509
27,347
23,947
24,165
20,967
15,146
15,917
19,717
19,136
17,948
23,048
21,566
21,527
18,876
13,504
13,661
17,167
16,363
15,577
18,136
17,838
17,503
15,810
10,834
10,528
13,252
12,372
11,681
12,708
12,759
12,600
11,974
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Table A6.4 Support per farm assuming PEG2
(ft)
Region	 All - 500	 400	 - 300 -	 200
Wales
Northern
North Eastern
North Western
East Midland
Eastern
South Eastern
Southern
South Western
17,690
19,550
25,229
26,923
22,488
42,648
31,595
32,233
26,258
19,835
20,341
24,223
27,646
24,325
30,001
23,659
28,464
27,981
20,592
21,007
24,314
27,274
24,647
27,614
23,428
27,915
27,770
21,582
21,207
24,952
27,421
25,150
25,306
22,642
26,651
27,394
22,874
21,608
25,504
27,405
24,931
23,187
21,102
25,308
27,420
Appendix 6.ffl Tables A6.5 to A6.8
Table A6.5 NVA by Region assuming PEG1
(fm)
Eligible Quantity (000 litres)
Region	 All	 500	 400	 300	 200
Wales	 124
	
112
	
106	 94	 76
Northern	 88
	
78
	
74
	
65
	
53
North Eastern 75
	 66
	 61	 54
	
44
North Western 193
	
153
	
137
	
117	 88
East Midland 63	 55	 51
	 45	 35
Eastern	 52
	 34	 29
	
23	 17
South Eastern 23
	
17
	 15	 12
	 8
Southern	 166	 127	 114
	
94
	
70
South Western 250	 205
	
188
	 162	 130
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Table A6.6 Total NVA by Region assuming PEG2
(fm)
Region	 All	 500	 400	 300	 200
Wales	 124
	
139	 144	 151	 160
Northern	 88
	
91	 94
	
95
	
96
North Eastern 75	 73	 73
	
74
	
76
North Western 193	 198	 195	 197	 196
East Midland	 63	 68	 69	 70
	
69
Eastern	 52
	
37
	
34
	
32	 29
South Eastern 23	 17	 17	 16	 15
Southern	 166	 148	 145	 139	 132
South Western 250	 264	 262	 259	 259
Table A6.7 NVA per Farm by Region assuming PEG 1
(L:)
Region	 All	 500	 400	 300	 200
Wales
Northern
North Eastern
North Western
East Midland
Eastern
South Eastern
Southern
South Western
17,704
22,843
29,150
26,850
24,119
44,882
28,812
34,069
29,838
16,081
20,285
25,569
21,314
21,139
29,581
21,164
26,001
24,546
15,161
19,209
23,639
19,063
19,579
25,282
18,783
23,363
22,455
13,518
16,954
21,089
16,290
17,208
20,370
15,055
19,339
19,390
10,849
13,820
17,174
12,299
13,311
14,941
9,976
14,436
15,553
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Table A6.8 NVA per Farm by Region assuming PEG2
Wales
Northern
North Eastern
North Western
East Midland
Eastern
South Eastern
Southern
South Western
17,704
22,843
29,150
26,850
24,119
44,882
28,812
34,069
29,838
19,850
23,634
28,145
27,573
25,956
32,235
20,876
30,300
31,560
20,607
24,299
28,236
27,200
26,278
29,848
20,645
29,751
31,350
21,597
24,500
28,874
27,348
26,781
27,540
19,859
28,487
30,973
22,888
24,901
29,426
27,331
26,561
25,420
18,319
27,145
30,999
Appendix 6.IV Figure A6.3
Figure A6.3 Change in Region's Share of Total Support with PEG of
200,000 Litres (percentage points)
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Chapter 7 The Estimation of the Consumer and Taxpayer Costs of
Agricultural Support 1972 to 1986
7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have been concerned with the level and distribution of agricultural
support. This chapter examines the effects of agricultural support on those that bear the
costs incurred by operation of supports - the taxpayers and the consumers of
agricultural products, namely households. Consumer cost arises if the prices of
agricultural products are set at a higher than world market levels. The taxpayer cost
arises if support is paid for out of Exchequer funds. Therefore it is clear that the
method by which support is paid for will determine which of the two groups bears the
major burden. In the case of the CAP both groups bear the costs; the consumer,
because the prices for many agricultural products under the CAP are set at higher than
world market levels; the taxpayer, because production of agricultural products in the
EC, in many cases, exceeds demand. Surpluses have to be removed from the domestic
market, and in order to dispose of them on the world market export restitutions have to
be paid. Figure 7.1, derived from Ritson (1991), indicates the costs described above.
The period under examination is similar to that analysed for the distribution of support.
In general, it is concerned with the switch from national to EC policies and the effect on
the level and distribution of the costs of support. Unlike Chapter 5 where, because of
data availability, the analysis was restricted to one agricultural commodity, the costs for
all major commodities will be considered. The taxpayer cost is estimated both pre and
post CAP, whilst consumer costs relate solely to the operation of the CAP.
This chapter will comprise a brief review of some of the previous work undertaken on
the distribution of the costs of agricultural support, followed by an examination of
methodology and some results for the distribution of the costs of agricultural support.
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In examining the distributions, the assumption of lognormality is not made for a
number of reasons. First, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the hetereogenity of the
population as a whole would mean that the lognormal is unlikely to represent the actual
distribution. Second, many of the problems arising with the data for faims are not
evident with household data (the definition of income is more comprehensive and the
households are ranked by income level). The Gini is again chosen in preference to
Atkinson's Index, because their are problems in interpretating the parameter (c) when
costs are considered rather than income.
Figure 7.1 Simplified Model for Estimating Consumer and Taxpayer Costs of the CAP
Price
Quantity
Source: Ritson (1991)
7.2 A Review
The most striking feature of a review about the consumer costs of the CAP is that the
literature is much scarcer than that associated with the distribution of the benefits of
support. A distinction can be made between those studies that attempt to estimate the
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total cost of the CAP to the consumer and taxpayer, of which there are many, 35 and
those that try to assess the distributional impacts of the costs. It is the latter type with
which this review is concerned.
Josling and Hamway (op. cit.), as well as examining the distribution of benefits of
agricultural policy, analysed the distribution of the costs. They concentrated on the
policy in existence at the time (Deficiency Payments, DP) and two possible alternatives,
Variable Import Levies (VIL) and the regime under the CAP36. In essence it was a
comparison between policies that operated through funding fmm the Exchequer (as was
the case with Deficiency Payments) and those that operated through higher food prices.
The first type are paid for exclusively by taxpayers, while the second should, in theory,
be paid for by consumers.
Josling and Hamway examined total costs to households in receipt of different levels of
income and also the proportion of final income used for agricultural support. Tables
7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 highlight some of the main findings of the work by Josling and
Hamway. Table 7.1 shows the distribution of the total costs between households
ranked into income quartiles. The results indicate that DP results in a more progressive
method of paying for agricultural support, than those policies that operate through
higher food prices. The percentage of total costs borne by the lowest 25% of income
earners is approximately one half of the VIL and the CAP alternatives (the figures for
the CAP and YJL were only estimates because neither policy was in operation at the
time). The figures also show that, under the DP policy, low income households are
paying proportionately less than their share of final income whilst the highest income
households are paying slightly more. This is not the case with the VIL and CAP
35For example, see Buckwell Ct al (1982), A.B.A.R.E (1984) and Brown (1989).
36 The difference between adoption of VIL and the CAP, in Josling and Hamway's work was that the
VIL maintained support at the same level as under DP, but transferred the cost from the Exchequer to
higher food prices. Adoption of the CAP was considered.likely to increase the level of support and
transfer the costs from the Exchequer to higher food prices.
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alternatives. Under both these scenarios, low income households' share of the costs of
agricultural support are greater than their share of total income. The reverse is true for
high income households.
Table 7.1 Distribution of Total Support Costs Under Different Policies and
of Household Incomes
Income	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th
Quartile	 Quartile Quartile	 Quartile Quartile
Policy:	 percentages
Deficiency Payments	 6.9	 18.5	 27.7	 46.9
Variable Import levy 	 12.2	 25.0	 30.7	 32.1
Common Agricultural	 12.9	 25.5	 29.6	 32.0
Policy
Income:
Original Income'	 5.7	 20.8	 25.8	 47.7
Finallncome2	11.0	 19.0	 27.4	 42.6
1) Original Income is income before Taxes are paid and before
State Benefits are received
2)Final Income is Original Income - Tax Payments + State Benefits
.. AA..A	 ....1	 I1t1\
Table 7.2 Gini Coefficients for Commodity Programmes
and for Household Income
Programme	 VIL	 CAP
Pork	 0.14	 0.14
Beef and Veal
	 0.19	 0.19
Cereal Programmes 	 0.21	 0.22
Total Costs	 0.17	 0.16
Original Income	 0.39
Final Income	 0.28
Source: Adapted from Josling and Hamway (1972)
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Table 7.3 Cost of Various Policies as Percentage of Final Income
Policy	 n- 816 1,196	 1,752	 2,566 3,770 5,502
DP	 0.52	 0.67	 0.81	 0.92	 0.85	 0.81
V1L	 0.87	 0.96	 0.98	 0.91	 0.83	 0.69
CAP	 4.60	 4.30	 3.60	 3.15	 2.40	 1.70
Note: Figures given are for households comprising of 2 adults and 2 children
Source: Adapted from Josling and Hamway (1972)
Table 7.2 examines the effects of individual commodity programmes on income
distribution. These results are calculated using expenditure on commodities by
households of different income levels included in the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES). Josling and Hamway describe the significance of the results in the following
way:
"It can be seen from the table [7.2] that under both support systems, costs are,
for all programmes, distributed with lower coefficients than is either final or
original income. In other words.., switching to a support scheme which is
financed...by higher food prices exaggerates income inequality" (p 73).
Table 7.3 compares the percentage of final income spent on agricultural support under
the different policies for households at different income levels. The household
composition shown is that of 2 adults and 2 children (this is only one of a number of
different household compositions analysed in the work). The table clearly shows the
effects of the various policies on households with different income levels, with the
CAP accounting for proportionately more of the income of lower income households.
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Josling and Hamway conclude that the switch from the DP method of support to either
the VIL or the CAP leads to a more regressive distribution of the costs of supporting
agriculture. It must be remembered that this work was undertaken before the UK
acceded to the EC. Therefore, the figures for the CAP were only estimates of the likely
costs. For example, Josling and Hamway could not have envisaged the large taxpayer
bill that has also become part of the CAP, due to the surpluses of many of the
commodities produced. This is likely to have effected both the overall cost and its
distribution.
A more recent piece of work (Hubbard, 1988) made allowance for the taxpayer costs
that had arisen under the CAP. Hubbard adopted a different approach to that of Josling
and Hamway. The initial consumer costs were calculated as the difference between the
EC price and that which would exist with no agricultural policies, multiplied by the
level of consumption. Allowance is made for likely increases in world prices of many
agricultural commodities if the CAP was discontinued. Hubbard estimated the
consumer cost for 1983 at £3,890 million (Table 7.4). This related to total food
expenditure in 1983 of £32,600 million. He, therefore, concluded that the CAP
effectively represents an implicit tax on food of around 14%. In order to examine the
distribution of this tax, Hubbard used data from the FES. Table 7.5 highlights some of
the results and illustrates the difference in the level of costs borne by low and high
income earners. The high income households pay more in absolute terms of the
implicit food tax, but when this figure is shown as a percentage of gross income, it is
the lowest income households that bear proportionately more of the costs (3.2% as
opposed to 1.3%). Hubbard (pp 34-35) notes that:
"... the consumer cost of farm support has been apportioned to each income
group on the assumption that food consumption patterns between income
groups are identical. Clearly in practice consumption patterns are likely to vary
with income level of income, and since the price of some agricultural
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commodities are supported to a greater extent than others, apportioning the total
consumer cost as undertaken here is an oversimplification. However the
general picture is likely to be little affected." (pp 34-35)
It is not immediately obvious that the likely effects of differing consumption patterns
will ensure that "the general picture is likely to be little affected" as Hubbard reasons.
If large differences exist, this could lead to discrepancies between his estimated cost for
each income level and that which actually occurs. Another problem with Hubbard's
work is that whilst figures for the total taxpayer costs involved in supporting UK
agriculture are calculated (Table 7.4), these costs are not apportioned between
households of different income levels. Finally, lack of use of inequality measures
makes it difficult to quantify the degree of inequality associated with farm support.
Table 7.4 The Costs of Agricultural Support in the UK, 1983
Item	 Cost (Cm)
Consumer Cost
Taxpayer Cost
of which	 CAP (FEOGA)
CAP (UK Exchequer)
Potatoes and Wool
Research and Development
Capital Grants
Administration
Rates Exemption
Excise Duty on Fuel
Tax Allowances
3,890
2,558
1,132
488
5
147
182
201
400
3
1,253
Total	 7,701
Source: Hubbard (1988)
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Table 7.5 Income and Food Expenditure by Level of Household Income UK, 1983
adult
£	 %	 £	 %
Gross Income	 2,090	 7,400
Income Tax
and National
Insurance	 7	 0.3
	
1,740	 23.5
Expenditure on
Food
	
565	 27
	
794	 10.7
Of which
implicit food
tax	 67	 3.2	 95	 1.3
Note: % figures are given as % of gross income
Source: Adapted from Hubbard (1988)
Ritson (1991), whilst not actually estimating costs to the consumer and taxpayer
directly, produces a framework from which the process could be undertaken. He notes
that it is not just by raising the price of foods that policies such as the CAP affect the
consumer; he lists food availability, food security and food quality as others.
However, for the purpose of this study it is the effect of higher food prices that is of
main interest. Ritson quotes other work that suggests the CAP costs £59 to every
taxpayer and £110 to every consumer in the EC per year. This is the usual way of
expressing the cost, but does not take account of the distributional effects of the CAP.
Ritson examines the question of reliability of the measurement of costs. First, he notes
that the price consumers pay is at the retail level, whereas most calculations of
consumer cost are undertaken further up the marketing chain. He argues that it is not
certain that the marketing margin will be independent of the wholesale price, so that the
whole cost of higher food prices will be passed on to the consumer. In the work by
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Josling and Hamway, and by Hubbard, it is assumed that all the costs are passed on to
the consumer.
Ritson suggests that the above problem is overshadowed by that of estimating levels of
world prices. He does not feel it is valid to take the prevailing gap between EC price
and the world price, multiply this by consumption and call it the consumer cost,
because this is likely to exaggerate the actual level of consumer costs.
It is evident that estimation of consumer and taxpayer costs is not a straightforward
task. Problems arise partly in the estimation of the total costs and partly in the
distribution of these costs between households of differing incomes. To overcome
these problems careful attention has to be given to the relationship between world and
EC prices. Also some method of examining food consumption patterns at differing
income levels would be beneficial. Finally, the relationship between wholesale and
retail prices needs to be better understood.
7.3 Estimation of Consumer Costs
7.3.1 Introduction
Estimation of consumer costs is necessary before the distribution of these costs
between households can be ascertained. In this section, two methods of estimation of
the level of consumer costs are made. One (the micro method) involves examination of
food consumption at the household level. The other (the macro method) examines the
total costs to the UK as a whole, and then reduces these to the household level. The
method of the micro approach will be described first.
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7.3.2 The Micro Approach
7.3.2.1 Data Sources
The micro approach involves the use of two government run surveys-the National Food
Survey (NFS) and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). The NFS has been
monitoring food consumption in the UK for 50 years. It was initiated during the
Second World War to examine the food intakes of the lower socio-economic classes.
Later, the survey was expanded to cover a whole cross-section of society and now
examines between 7 and 8 thousand households per year. The survey operates
continuously and is conducted using a three tier stratified random sampling scheme:
1) A number of Parliamentary constituencies are chosen, the number from each region
of the UK is calculated on the basis of the region's share of the percentage electorate;
2) Polling stations are chosen from each constituency;
3) Addresses from the electoral register of polling stations are chosen for interviewers
to call at.
The FES37 seeks to represent the entire household population and collects information
on all sources of income and levels of expenditure. The number of households
sampled is similar to that of the NFS. The NFS is a useful source of information
because it gives information on the consumption of foods in terms of grammes per
person, whilst the FES gives details of food expenditure in relation to levels of income
and expenditure on other items.
37For more information on the FES see Kemsley eta! (1980).
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7.3.2.2 Methodo'ogy of the Micro Method
The micro approach involves a number of steps. First those foods considered as major
expenditure items in the FES (Table 7.6) are chosen.
Table 7.6 Food Types Considered as Major Expenditure Items in FES.
Bread Rolls
	 Beef/Veal	 Butter
Flour	 Mutton/Lamb	 Margarine
Cake	 Pork	 Lard/Fat
Biscuits	 Bacon/Ham	 Fresh Milk
Cereals	 Other Meats	 Milk Products
Sugar	 Poultry	 Cheese
Syrup/Jam	 Sweets/chocolate	 Eggs
Second, the quantities of these foods consumed by individuals at different income
levels are obtained from the NFS. The next stage involves multiplying the units
consumed by the estimated per unit cost of support, to find the total costs of support for
each food type. Summing these costs over all the food types gives the total cost of
support to an individual at each income level. This figure, multiplied by the average
number in a household, gives a total cost of support to each household.
The estimated cost of agricultural support per unit, for each commodity, is simply the
difference between the EC price and the estimated world price. Estimated world prices
are again obtained from the databases used for the Newcastle CAP model. The world
prices are not adjusted for the possible effects of a price rise in the absence of any EC
price support policy. As Ritson (op. cit.) notes, this is likely to lead to an exaggeration
of the actual consumer costs of support. However, given that the analysis is over a
long time period, estimation of the effect of the CAP on the world price levels at
different stages in its development would be extremely difficult and highly unlikely to
produce reasonable results. The method followed here, although subject to the
weakness of being an exaggeration, allows for consistent estimates.
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7.3.2.3 Problems with the Micro Approach
In theory, the micro approach is an ideal way to measure the consumer costs of the
CAP, because it is based on information about consumption at the individual household
level. However, there is a basic drawback with this approach, in that the NFS survey
does not include information about quantities of food bought and consumed outside the
home. In recent years, food consumption out of the home has risen significantly. This
omission may lead to an underestimation of the absolute costs. As it is the high income
households that consume larger quantities outside of the home, the distribution of these
costs may also be altered.
If Table 7.6 is examined, it is clear that a number of the food types are not simply raw
products, but are processed to varying degrees. Josling and Hamway, when making
their estimations of the likely impact of accession to the EC, considered only the effects
on the basic raw food stuffs (milk, pork, flour etc.). They did not consider costs for
products like biscuits and cakes, which comprise of a mixture of basic supported
commodities (as well as other products). Without very detailed analysis of the
composition of each specific type of food and analysis of the price structure, an exact
cost cannot be obtained for these types of processed foods. However, some nominal
calculations have been made to estimate these costs. With cakes, for example, the
ingredients of butter, sugar, flour and eggs are accounted for. This may be an
oversimplification of the constituents, but does allow for some costs to be allocated.
The cost attributable to these products on an individual basis is relatively small and
therefore slight errors in the allocation of costs will not bias the results to any
significant extent.
A problem with compatibility between income classes arises with data for the FES and
the NFS. FES data are available for income quintiles. However, the only information
available from the NFS of consumption at different levels of income, is divided into
classes which are not always quintiles. As these-are the only data available for actual
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consumption, a compromise was necessary. Each income quintile, as given in the
FES, is allocated consumption patterns in accordance with those at similar (but not
identical) income levels from the NFS. This assumes that the lowest quintile of the
population as measured by the FES has consumption patterns which are similar to the
low income earners surveyed in the NFS, and so on for each of the five groups. This
method has the possible disadvantage of not exactly representing the 'correct' food
consumption at each quintile. However, as the NFS data is the only data available on
consumption of foods by households at different levels of income, it was decided that
the advantages outweighed the possible disadvantages.
A further weakness of the micro method is that it does not measure the consumption of
alcoholic beverages. This is a problem because the raw materials for alcoholic drinks
are often agricultural products which receive a level of support under the CAP regime.
Therefore, there will be costs which the micro method will fail to account for.
Frank eta! (1984) raise questions as to the reliability of the methodology of the survey,
and claim that the low response rates, sampling errors and problems with participation
could possibly bias the results. However, they make no attempt to quantify the level of
bias.
Due to the problems listed above, the micro approach appears a less than perfect
method for measuring consumer costs. It was decided to attempt another approach
which is more directly related to that undertaken by Hubbard (op. cit.).
7.3.3 The Macro Approach
7.3.3.1 Methodology of the Macro Approach
The macro approach involves a different line of reasoning to that of the micro approach.
Estimation of the total consumer cost of agricultural support is undertaken and this
figure is then expressed as a proportion of total food expenditure
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The macro approach, like the calculation of the consumer cost with the micro method,
involves a number of stages. First, information on the levels of production and
utilisation of major farm products in the UK (available from published sources 38) is
obtained. Second, for each commodity, the level of utilisation is multiplied by the
difference between the EC and world prices (the levels of world prices are the same as
those assumed for the micro approach). These figures are then summed over all the
commodities to obtain an overall cost. This can be expressed as a proportion of total
food expenditure in the UK. Thus, for every pound spent on food in the UK, x pence
can be attributed to the effects of the CAP. To express this cost at the household level
involves simply multiplying the total food expenditure of households in each income
quintile (given in FES) by the proportion that is assumed as a result of the CAP. A
worked example of the calculation for 1977 is given in Appendix 7.1.
The macro approach has the advantage that it includes agricultural products that form
the basis of alcoholic drinks, e.g. barley, and therefore implicitly accounts for the cost
of these products. Foodstuffs eaten outside of the home are also accounted for, as the
figures comprise the total utilisation of agricultural products.
7.3.3.2 Problems with the Macro Approach
As the macro approach is similar to that undertaken by Hubbard (op. cit.), the problems
are likely to be similar. First, no allowance is made for differing food consumption
patterns at different income levels. Apportioning cost simply on the overall expenditure
on food, and not allowing for these differences, may bias the results. Differences in
the level of consumption of selected foods between high and low income individuals,
for 1977 are shown in Table 7.-7.
38 Output and Utilisation of U.K Agricultural Produce (various years).
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Table 7.7 Consumption of Selected Foods at High and
Low Income Households (1977)
Income ( per week)
Food Type
	 >250	 <67
(grammes per week)
Bread/Rolls	 665	 1069
Flour	 165	 249
Beef and Veal
	
459	 199
Poultry/Other Meat 264
	 130
Butter	 120	 129
Margarine	 77	 115
Lard/Other Fat 	 28	 71
Sugar	 246	 418
Source: NFS (1977)
The low income earner consumes substantially more cereal based products and sugar,
whilst the high income earner consumes more meat products. Therefore differences in
the levels of support for these products will effect the actual distribution of costs.
Another problem with the macro method is that the FES data are based on expenditure
and not consumption. A high income earner is likely to consume food at more
expensive restaurants, so although he/she may be consuming the same quantity of
food, the cost is greater. Distributing the costs by expenditure and not quantity
consumed suggest that costs to the high income are biased upwards.
7.3.4 Conclusions about the Micro and Macro Methods
Both the micro and macro approach have advantages and disadvantages. The micro
method allows for differing quantities of foods eaten at different income levels, but has
the disadvantage that it does not account for the consumption of food outside the home.
The methodology of the macro approach ensures that it accounts for all food utilised in
the UK (within the boundaries of main crops), whether it is destined for catering or for
home consumption. However, it does not allow for differences in consumption
patterns.
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The main conclusion drawn is that the micro approach, because it does not include
consumption outside the home, will put a downward bias on the costs to the high
income households. In contrast the macro approach will bias the costs towards the
high income households, because it takes account of expenditure, and not the quantities
eaten outside the home. Since neither method is ideal, it would appear useful to employ
both to measure the costs to the consumer, and then compare the results in terms of
absolute value and distribution between income groups.
7.4 Estimation of Taxpayer Costs
Previous sections have dealt with methods of estimating the consumer cost of the CAP,
that is the costs associated with higher food prices. There is, in addition, a budgetary
cost involved with the CAP and this section deals with its estimation. The budgetary
cost arises, as mentioned earlier, mainly from the storage and disposal of surplus
agricultural production. The costs are met from the funds of the EC through the
EAGGF.39 Originally (prior to UK membership) the EC budget was funded by direct
contributions from the member states. However, since 1970 it has been funded by a
combination of three parts:
1) Customs revenue collected by member states under the common customs tariff.
2) Levies collected on agricultural imports and sugar production
3) Payments from member states assessed on a common Value Added Tax base in each
country (originally set at 1% but subsequently increased).
In theory, estimation of the taxpayer cost of agricultural support to UK households
should be easier than that of consumer cost as all UK transactions with the EC are
recorded and published (CSO 'Pink Book'). Also all budgetary costs of the CAP are
published annually by commodity (Agricultural Situation in the Community, ASIC).
Morris (1980) calculated the budgetary cost of the CAP by applying the proportion of
39European Agricultural GUidanCe and Guarantee Fund.
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total EC expenditure on agriculture to the UK's payments of customs duties and VAT.
The Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPO, 1977) used a similar method,
although they took the taxpayer cost as the total contribution to the EC and not the
proportion spent on agriculture. However, since these works were published changes
have been made to the UK's contributions. Towards the end of the 1970s, the UK
Government became concerned that it was bearing a disproportionate amount of the
cost of funding the EC. From 1980 ad hoc refunds were negotiated. These refunds
were formalised as VAT abatements in the Fontainebleu agreement of 1984. Therefore,
in order to calculate the taxpayer costs as Morris did, these refunds/abatements would
have to be taken into account.
There are however a number of problems involved with this approach. First, the
overall payments to the EC reflect political commitments. The UK is a net contributor
to the EC budget (payments to the budget are greater than receipts from it). Therefore,
part of the UK's contribution funds agriculture in countries who are net beneficiaries
from the EAGGF. It can therefore be argued that the cost of supporting UK
agriculture is not as high as payments to the EC budget would suggest.
In the 'Pink Book' the refunds are recorded when received and not for the year they
were applicable. In particular, in 1986 the UK received a large refund relating to
overpayment in previous years. The effect of this is twofold: first, it makes the
taxpayer costs recorded in those earlier year higher than they should be; and second, the
refund significantly reduces the cost for 1986. This problem can be overcome by using
figures which relate to transactions in the budget year of the EC rather than the UK.4°
This study wifi attempt to distinguishthe element of the UK's contribution to the EC
which reflects the cost of UK farm support from that which can be considered as farm
40 Th figures are published in The Government's Expenditure Plans (annual).
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support in other European countries. A possible method is one based on the UK share
of EC production for each commodity. Each commodity has a budgetary cost and this
cost can be apportioned to each country according to production share. For example, in
1977, the UK produced 29% of EC barley and therefore it is reasonable to argue that
29% of the budgetary cost for barley in that year should be assigned to the UK
taxpayer. If similar calculations are undertaken for each commodity these figures can
be summed to obtain an estimate of the total UK taxpayer cost.
Once the total taxpayer cost has been estimated it will be distributed between
households depending on their overall burden of direct and indirect taxation. This
method ensures that the taxpayer cost, whatever the actual level, will be distributed
between households in the same proportion as the total tax paid. Josling and Hamway
(op. cit.) argue that this method of distribution should be undertaken because it is not
reasonable to relate agricultural support to any specific form of taxation, eg. income
tax, VAT etc.
The estimation of the taxpayer cost, therefore, is undertaken as follows:
1) Total EAGGF expenditure on agricultural support is obtained for the year in
question.
2) For each commodity, this is distributed between countries on the basis of their
contribution to total production. Therefore, the UK's taxpayer cost as estimated here,
is related directly to the proportion of the EC's total production in each commodity
accounted for by the UK.
3) This cost is then measured as a proportion of the total tax receipts of the UK
government for the year in question.
4) This proportion, multiplied by the actual tax payments of households at different
income levels, gives the costs in terms of tax payments per household.
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The method adopted in this analysis is a direct attempt at assessing the cost to the UK
taxpayer of supporting UK agriculture. However, results using a similar method to
that of Morris and others (but allowing for the refunds/abatements to the UK
Exchequer) will be produced for comparative purposes.
7.5 Results
The results are analysed in two ways: first, there are the findings in relation to the level
of costs of agricultural support to the consumer and taxpayer; second, the distribution
of these costs are analysed. Using two methods of estimating the consumer cost and
five specific years produces a large volume of results. Therefore a number of years are
examined but detailed discussion is restricted to a single year (1977). However,
significant results from other years are reported.
The results of the analysis of consumer costs are restricted to the period 1977 to 1986
as it is assumed that before accession to the EC these costs were negligible. The
taxpayer costs include estimation for an additional year, 1972, as does the calculation of
total costs and examination of the distribution of these costs.
7.5.1 Consumer Costs (Micro Approach)
The costs for the main food products estimated by the micro approach are ifiustrated in
Table 7.8.
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Table 7.8 Estimated Consumer Cost of the CAP using the Micro Method (1977)
Beef and Veal	 3.95	 4.35	 4.58	 4.82	 9.1
MuttonandLamb	 9.37	 6.25	 7.2	 8.04	 13.22
OtherMeati	 13.46	 12.77	 11.6	 10.82 9.26
TotalMeat	 26.78	 23.37	 23.38	 23.68 31.58
Butter	 8.57	 8.6	 8.47	 9.19	 7.98
FreshMilk	 10.25	 10.46	 10.63	 11.41	 11.1
Cheese	 9.69	 10.27	 10.49	 11.21	 14.59
TotalMainMilkPmducts 	 28.51	 29.33	 29.59	 31.81 33.67
Otherfoods2	13.74	 12.7	 12.25	 12.15 12.22
Total Cost to Individual 	 69.02	 65.41	 65.22	 67.64 77.47
Average Number in Household 	 1.51	 2.47	 3.03	 3.25	 3.73
TotalHouseholdCost 	 104.32	 161.56 197.62 219.82 289.13
1)Other meat includes sausage,pies,etc, not poultry,ham, pigmeat.
2) Other foods comprise all those listed in Table 7.6 not shown here.
Table 7.8 indicates that the main consumer costs are derived from meat and milk
products. This is not surprising, because the level of support for these products is
substantial and they also make up a large part of the diet in the UK (even for those on
low incomes). The highest income households incur a much larger cost for beef and
lamb. This is due entirely to the quantities consumed, as the methods used make no
distinction between the quality of meat consumed. Average cost to the individual does
not vary substantially between income groups. The lowest income households have a
higher cost (per individual) than all other groups, except the top 20%. It is only when
the figures are brought up to the household level (by multiplying by the average number
of persons in a household) that the difference in costs become noticeable. This result
implies that the costs, when considered on an individual basis, are equally spread. The
household cost for each group as shown in Table 7.8 is re-presented in Table 7.9 and
Figure 7.2 with similar information from the other years examined.
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Table 7.9 The Household Costs of the CAP estimated using the Micro Method 1977 to
1986 (1977 prices)
Income Quintile
Year	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Cost
( per year)
1977	 104.32	 161.56	 197.62	 219.82	 289.13	 194.49
1980	 63.9	 105.36	 131.79	 152.79	 169.16	 124.6
1984	 56.16	 97.46	 116.05	 123.21	 135.95	 105.76
1986	 46.81	 75.79	 84.96	 90.32	 104.96	 80.57
Figure 7.2 Real Consumer Cost To Households Estimated by Micro Method
(1977 to 1986)
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The most striking feature of Table 7.9 and Figure 7.2, is the decline over the period in
the cost to the consumer (in real terms) of supporting agricultural production. This
decline is considerable at each level of income. A possible explanation for such a
decline can be related to changes in the consumption patterns of consumers. Table 7.10
lists the consumption (in grammes per week) of foodstuffs by a middle income
individual for the years under examination.
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Table 7.10 Consumption of Food by an Individual in Middle Income Bracket
Food Type	 Year
1977	 1980	 1984	 1986
Bread Rolls	 900	 854	 808	 797
Flour	 168	 130	 112	 93
Cake	 105	 99	 100	 103
Biscuits	 157	 155	 155	 155
Cereals	 240	 258	 284	 308
Beef and Veal	 231	 217	 185	 189
Mutton andLamb	 107	 126	 79	 78
Pork	 95	 124	 91	 106
Bacon/Ham	 116	 111	 96	 90
Other Meat	 350	 355	 362	 348
Poultry/Other Meats 	 175	 180	 198	 202
Butter	 128	 109	 75	 58
Margarine	 93	 97	 103	 103
Lard/Other Fat	 48	 48	 35	 31
FreshMilk	 2	 2	 2	 2
MilkProducts	 0.19	 0.22	 0.43	 0.70
Cheese	 107	 115	 113	 123
Eggs	 206	 185	 158	 141
Sugar	 305	 266	 219	 188
Syrup/Honey/Jam	 61	 51	 49	 51
The table illustrates the fact that in most cases consumption of food in the home is
declining (although only figures for the middle income bracket are shown, the other
groups indicate a similar pattern). This decline is particularly noticeable for specific
food types. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate changes in consumption of beef and butter
throughout the period.
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Figure 7.3 Trends in Beef Consumption 1977 to 1986
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Figure 7.4 Trends in Butter Consumption 1977 to 1986
Veer
Source: NFS (Annual)
The decline in consumption of beef and butter was not matched by an equivalent
increase in the consumption of other protected foods. This has led, in part, to the
decline in the level of costs to households of agricultural support.
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The decline in consumer cost is surprising given that the difference between EC and
world prices, if anything increased during the period (thus putting an upward pressure
on consumer cost), and it would appear that the weakness mentioned in the
methodology of the micro approach, that is not accounting for food eaten outside the
home, is responsible. The next section, analysing the results of the macro method, will
shed light on whether this downward trend is reproduced.
7.5.2 Consumer Costs (Macro Approach)
The macro results, because of the methods involved, are reproduced in a slightly
different manner than those of the micro approach. The total consumer cost is given
first, followed by results for households at different income levels. Table 7.11 details
the composition of total consumer cost for 1977. As with the micro method, it is meat
and milk products that constitute the majority of the costs. Similar calculations were
made for the other years under consideration and are presented, along with information
about the level of total food expenditure in the UK, in Table 7.12.
Table 7.11 Composition of Consumer Cost, 1977 (Macro Approach)
Product	 Units	 Consumption Consumer
Cost
(Cm)
Wheat	 000 tonnes	 5260	 34.72
Barley	 000 tonnes	 1900
Oats	 000 tonnes	 145	 1.91
Beef	 000liveanimals 4587	 1241.24
Sheep and	 000 tonnes	 233	 148.17
Lambs
Pigs	 000 tonnes	 918	 276.80
Poultry	 000 tonnes	 606.4	 5.06
Eggs	 million	 1127.8	 43.66
Sugar	 000 tonnes	 1054	 84.11
Milk Products	 million ltrs	 14406	 997.13
Total Cost
	 2832.80
1)No cost for barley as EC price was equal to world price in this
year
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Table 7.12 Total Consumer Cost of the CAP 1977 to 1986 (Macro Approach)
Year	 Total UK
	
Estimated	 Food Tax1
Food	 Consumer Cost
Expenditure
£m	 £m
1977	 16,057	 2,832.8	 17.6
1980	 23,655	 3,951.8	 16.7
1984	 29,304	 5,334.1	 18.0
1986	 33,059	 5,575.8	 16.8
Notes 1) Food Tax is Consumer Cost as a percentage of total food
expenditure
Table 7.12 relates the estimated consumer cost to the total level of food expenditure in
the relevant years. The percentage food tax shows how much of total food expenditure
is accounted for by the higher EC prices. Alternatively, using 1977 as an example, it is
possible to say that food expenditure would be reduced by nearly 18% if there was no
agricultural support. The results show very little variation in the percentage food tax
between years. The range for the whole period is only one and a half percentage
points. There is a steady rise in the consumer costs, but this is matched by a similar
rise in total food expenditure. In Table 7.13 and Figure 7.5 the costs are reduced to the
household level and are also deflated to base year prices.
Table 7.13 The Consumer Costs of the CAP estimated using the Macro Method (1977
prices)
Year	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Cost
(C per year)
1977	 83.84	 133.39	 167.24	 193.48	 256.89	 162.75
1980	 69.99	 119.58	 154.17	 179.17	 230.28	 150.64
1984	 75.13	 120.59	 150.07	 185.43	 238.48	 153.94
1986	 68.79	 109.97	 142.75	 171.27	 230.91	 144.74
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The results of the macro approach do not indicate a large downturn in the real costs to
consumers, although, on average, a slight reduction has occurred. Given that the same
level of world prices are assumed for both methods the explanation for the different
results must come from levels of estimated consumption. Table 7.14 highlights that the
utilisation of many agricultural products has increased.
Table 7.14 Utilisation of Major Farm Products in the U.K (1977 to 1986)
Commodity Units	 Year
1977	 1980	 1984	 1986
Wheat	 000 tonnes	 5260	 5030	 4903	 5272
Barley	 000 tonnes	 1900	 2050	 1871	 1609
Oats	 000 tonnes	 145	 140	 143	 158
Beef	 000 live animals 4587	 4511	 4457	 4073
Sheep	 000 tonnes	 233	 293	 302	 307
Pigs	 000 tonnes	 918	 949	 965	 1010
Poultry	 000 tonnes	 606.4	 615.2	 689.7	 751.3
Eggs	 million	 1127.8	 1068.1	 1027.7	 1018.7
Sugar	 000 tonnes	 1054	 1207	 1347	 1506
Milk	 million lirs	 14406	 15182	 15466	 15462
Source: Output and ulilisation of agricultural products in the UK (1982, 1987)
The micro approach indicated a large downturn in the level of consumption whilst the
macro approach shows no such trend. The differ.ence between the two figures may be
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explained in part by the consumption of food outside of the home and in part by the
consumption of alcoholic beverages. Both of these items, as already mentioned, are
accounted for in the macro approach but not in the micro approach. Whichever method
is used, the minimum conclusion to be drawn is that there has been no discernible rise
in the consumer costs during the period.
7.5.3 Taxpayer Costs
Having examined the costs of support to the household as a consumer of food it is now
necessary to examine tax costs. As mentioned earlier, this section will include figures
for 1972. Table 7.15 relates the estimated taxpayer costs to total tax revenue and
shows real levels of tax costs to allow for comparison between years. It highlights a
number of points concerning the taxpayer costs of supporting agriculture. Between
1972 and 1977 the real cost fell substantially in absolute terms and as a percentage of
total tax. This was due to two main factors. First, the EC minimum price method of
support initially meant a switch in the burden of farm support for the UK from the
taxpayer to the consumer. Second, the figure for 1972 was obtained from the White
Paper on Agriculture and includes all the costs of agriculture, such as the cost of the
Potato Marketing Boardt and capital development projects. The figure for 1977
includes only those cost attributable to the expenditure of the EAGGF and does not
include national policy costs.
Table 7.15 Taxpayer Costs Of Agricultural Support Policies in the UK
1972 to 1986
Tax	 Taxpayer Taxpayer Real
Year	 Revenue	 Costs	 Costs as a Taxpayer
% of Tax	 Costs £m
£m	 Revenue	 (1977 Base)
1972	 18,325	 290.28	 1.58	 616.96
1977	 44,750	 Z36.48 .
	 0.53	 236.48
1980	 73,154	 834.8	 1.14	 576.30
1984	 108,912	 1,514.68	 1.39	 783.80
1986	 125,647	 1,507.76	 1.20	 711.55
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Between 1977 and 1980 the cost to the taxpayer rises substantially. This is due to
removal of the increasingly large surpluses from the market, through intervention
buying and subsidised exporting, which is a cost to the EC budget and therefore to the
UK taxpayer. The cost of support appears to have peaked in 1984, both in relative and
absolute terms. A reason for this could be that the UK's share of production and
therefore of total cost in 1986 was lower than in 1984. Table 7.16 compares the
taxpayer cost as measured in this study with that using an alternative approach to
calculating the cost.
Table 7.16 A Comparison of Two Methods of Estimating Taxpayer Costs
Year Morris Methoda	Share of	 Difference
Productionb
£m
1977	 441.64	 236.48	 205.16
1980	 679.10	 834.80	 -155.70
1984	 1597.22	 1514.68	 82.53
1986	 1962.77	 1507.76	 455.01
a) Gross Contribution - Agricultural and Sugar Levies -
Refunds/Abatements. b) Method adopted for this study
It is clear that estimated taxpayer costs are different from the two methods. From the
earlier discussion the higher cost arising from the Morris method can be accounted for
by the cost to UK taxpayers of subsidising other EC producers. However, in 1980
there is an anomaly, with the taxpayer costs actually lower than those estimated here.
The reason for this appears to be the large refund (5645m) negotiated in this year.
Although abatements occur in subsequent years they are not as large a proportion of the
gross contribution.
Table 7.17 and Figure 7.6 indicate the taxpayer costs at the household level for the
selected years between 1977 and 1986 using the shares of production method.
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Table 7.17 Taxpayer Costs to Households at Different Income Levels 1977 to 1986
1977 prices
YEAR	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Quintile	 Quinlile Quintile Quintile	 Quintile
£
1977	 1.66	 4.78	 8.38	 11.68	 19.00	 9.04
1980	 5.32	 10.93	 19.67	 27.11	 44.12	 21.2
1984	 3.92	 8.52	 17.09	 25.66	 44.11	 19.86
1986	 4.93	 10.59	 21.35	 32.73	 56.07	 21.52
Figure 7.6 Real Taxpayer Costs To Households 1977 to 1986
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The taxpayer costs to households, unlike the consumer costs, have risen on average
during the period. The costs between 1977 and 1980 more than doubled (in real terms)
for all income classes. It can be seen from Table 7.17 and Figure 7.6 that the costs in
absolute terms have risen faster for the higher income groups. The top 20% of income
earners have had an increase from £19 per year to £56, whilst the bottom 20% have had
an increase of only £5 during the corresponding period. However, in relative terms the
increases have been similar. The difference highlighted in Table 7.16 between the
different methods of estimating total taxpayer costs are reflected at the household level
in Table 7.18.
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Table 7.18 Taxpayer Costs to Households at Different Income Levels 1977 to 1986
(using similar method to that of Morris)
1977 prices
YEAR	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Quintile	 Quintile Quintile Quintile	 Quintile
1977	 3.09	 8.87	 15.53	 21.66	 35.23	 16.76
1980	 3.49	 9.15	 16.45	 22.67	 36.90	 17.73
1984	 5.69	 12.37	 24.81	 37.25	 64.03	 28.23
1986	 6.41	 13.78	 27.79	 42.61	 72.98	 32.71
For all years other than 1980, the taxpayer costs to each quintile are higher under this
method of calculation. The difference between these figures and those calculated using
shares of production (Table 7.17) can be crudely interpreted as the subsidy from an
average household in each income quintile to other (ie. non-UK) European farmers.
For example, in 1986 the highest income earners contributed around £17 (ie.k73 - £56)
per household to support other EC fanners. On the same basis, in 1980 actual taxpayer
costs were less than those based on production, and effectively other European
taxpayers were subsidising UK agriculture.
7.5.4 Total Costs
The previous sections have examined the overall levels and distribution of consumer
and taxpayer costs. This section will concentrate on the combined costs and analyse
whether the contrasting patterns found for the taxpayer and consumer costs are reflected
in the trends for total costs. Total costs using the micro approach to estimate consumer
costs will be analysed first.
Table 7.19 and Figure 7.7 indicate the total costs for the micro approach between 1977
and 1986. (Again figures for 1972 are not reflected at the household level because of
incompatibility of the data).
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Figure 7.7 Real Total Costs per Household 1977 to 1986
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Table 7.19 Total Costs per household Estimated by Micro Method 1977 to 1986 (1977
Prices)
Income 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Year	 Quintile
£ per year
1977	 105.98 166.33 206.00	 231.50 308.12 203.52
1980	 69.21	 116.30 151.45	 179.90 213.28 145.80
1984	 60.08	 105.97 133.14	 148.87 180.06 125.62
1986	 51.74	 86.38	 106.31	 123.06 161.03 102.09
£I-2Q
44Q
Year
The results show that the decline in consumer costs outstrips the rise in taxpayer costs,
and a noticeable downward trend in the real cost of support can be seen for all income
classes. The decline is much greater, in absolute terms, for the high income
households, nearly £150 per year. The effect that this fall has on the distribution of
costs will be analysed in Section 7.7.
The estimated costs using the macro approach are shown in Table 7.20 and Figure 7.8.
It is possible to include the results for 1972 here.
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Table 7.20 Composition of Total Costs Macro Approach 1977 to 1986
(1977 Prices)
Year	 Taxpayer	 Consumer Total
Costs	 Costs	 Costs
1972	 616.96	 0	 616.96
1977	 236.48	 2832.8	 3069.28
1980	 576.3	 2728.09	 3304.38
1984	 783.8	 3682.31	 4466.12
1986	 711.55	 3849.17	 4560.72
Figure 7.8 Level and Composition of Total Cost 1972 to 1986
The large rise in the level of total costs between 1972 and 1977 is due to the
introduction of consumer costs. The overall costs continued to rise in real terms from
1977 to 1986, due, in part, to an increase in the absolute level of consumer costs and
also, up to 1984, a rise in the taxpayer cost. It is evident that after accession to the EC
and the corresponding change in policy, taxpayer costs are small in relation to the
estimated consumer costs.
The total costs at the household level for the macro approach are reproduced in Table
7.21 and also in Figure 7.9. The strong downward trend found with the micro
approach is not evident. Although real costs to the lowest 80% of households decline,
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this is only small compared to that found using the micro approach. The costs to the
highest 20% have risen.
Table 7.21 Total Costs Estimated by Macro Method 1977 to 1986 (1977 Prices)
Income 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Year	 Quinlile
1977	 85.51	 138.17 175.62 205.16 275.89 176.07
1980	 75.31	 130.51 173.84 206.28 274.40 172.06
1984	 79.05	 129.11 167.16 211.10 282.59 173.80
1986	 73.72	 120.56 164.10 204.00 286.98 166.26
Figure 7.9 Estimated Real Total Costs to Households by Macro Method 1977 to 1986
Year
The results from the macro approach, at the household level, show a remarkable
consistency in the level of costs, in real terms, over the 10 year period; The changes
between the years are slight. The consumer and taxpayer costs, in absolute terms,
have increased during most of the period (Table 7.20), but this rise has been matched
by increases in the tax revenue of the Government and expenditure on food. Thus, as a
proportion of both the consumers food expenditure and their tax payments, the costs
have not changed dramatically. From these results, the cost of agricultural support, in
real terms, has remained virtually unchanged to households in different income
quintiles (Table 7.21).
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The preceding analysis has used two methods to estimate essentially the same item,
namely the consumer costs of agricultural price support. The results vary considerably,
both in absolute levels and general trends, and therefore examination of the possible
causes of these differences needs to be undertaken.
A number of weaknesses (which were considered possible sources of bias) with both
methods were outlined. It is possible that these problems have an effect on the results.
The inability of the micro method to estimate costs for food eaten outside the home has
been mentioned. However, some idea as to the seriousness of this omission can be
seen in recent figures which estimate that more than a quarter of all meat is now
consumed outside of the home. 41 These figures indicate a serious deficiency in the
data used for the micro method. On the other hand the macro method, because it is
based on FES data includes the cost of food eaten outside the home. Although possibly
biasing the results in terms of the costs to the high income earners, this at least allows
the macro approach to include some estimation of this consumption.
7.6 Distribution of the Costs
As estimates of total costs of support have been made, it is now possible to consider the
distribution of these costs between households. Knowledge of the distribution of costs
is not, in itself, particularly useful unless it can be measured against the distribution of
other factors, such as income and tax payments. In this section, Gini coefficients are
used to show the distribution of income, taxes and costs from both the micro and macro
approaches. Although it has already been shown that the latter two methods produce
different results in terms of total costs, it will be of interest to see what effect, if any,
this has on the distribution of costs.
4 rhe Guardian, Monday 14th October, 1991
242
Before examining the Gini coefficients for income, some idea as to the distributional
effects of the CAP can be found by relating the percentage of costs borne by
households, at different income levels, to their share of income42 (Table 7.22).
Table 7.22 Share of Total Costs and Total Income by Households at Different Income
Levels (1977 Micro Approach)
Income 1st
	
2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Total
Taxpayer Costs	 3.66	 10.51	 18.41	 25.67	 41.75	 100
Consumer Costs	 10.73	 16.61	 20.32	 22.61	 29.73	 100
Total Costs	 10.41	 16.34 20.24 22.74 30.27 100
Total Income	 6.3	 12.12 16.33	 25.03 40.22	 100
Table 7.22 illustrates the regressive nature of the CAP in a number of ways. The
lowest quintile has 6.3% of total income, whereas the share of the top 20% of
households is 40.2%. If the distribution of the tax costs are examined, the lowest two
income quintiles pay proportionately less than they receive in income, while the top
three quintiles all pay more than their share of income, highlighting the progressive
nature of taxation. However, if the 'food tax' figures are examined a very different
picture arises. The lowest three quintiles all pay proportionately more of the costs of
consumer support than they receive in income, whereas the top 40% of households pay
proportionately less. This infers the consumer costs of support are disproportionately
borne by the low income households. The same pattern emerges when total cost
(consumer plus taxpayer cost) is considered. However the distribution of total costs is
not quite as unequal, because the progressively distributed taxpayer costs have been
added to the regressive consumer costs. Similar results are found for the other years
under consideration (shown in Appendix 7.11). The discussion so far has been based
on the results using the micro exaiiination, but the results in Table 7.23 show that the
overall picture is similar for the macro approach.
42	 Income considered is that after government payments but before tax.
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Table 7.23 Share of Total Costs and Total Income by Households at Different Income
Levels (1977 Macro Approach)
Income 1st
	
2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Total
Consumer Costs 10.04	 15.98	 20.03
	
23.18 30.77
	 100
Total Costs
	 9.71	 15.70
	
19.95
	
23.30	 31.34	 100
Total Income	 6.05	 9.55
	
16.05
	 24.31	 44.04	 100
The percentage of total costs borne by the lowest income quintile households under the
macro approach is slightly lower than that of the micro approach (9.71 compared to
10.41). However, it is still considerably more than their share of income. The results
from both the micro and macro approaches show that the cost of agricultural support is
more heavily borne by low income households.
Another way of examining the distributional effects of the costs of support is to
calculate, for each income quintile, the proportion of income accounted for by
agricultural support (this method was undertaken by both Josling and Hamway (op.
cit.) and Hubbard, op. cit.). Tables 7.24 and 7.25, highlight these percentages for the
micro and macro methods, respectively. A number of points can be made about these
results. First, the differences in the estimated level of costs between the micro and the
macro methods are reflected in the generally lower proportion of final income spent on
agricultural support under the micro method. Second, despite this difference, both
methods show similar trends over the period. Throughout the period there has been a
downward trend in the proportion of fmal income that is accounted for by support. In
the case of the macro method this fall is a result of a decline in the proportion of final
income spent on food, whilst for the micro method the fall is in part due to the major
decline in the estimated consumer costs. Within years, the costs of agricultural support
are a significantly higher proportion of final income for the low income households.
This highlights the regressive nature of the CAP.
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Table 7.24 Percentage of Final Income Spent on Agricultural Support 1977 to 1986
(Micro Approach)
Year	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile
1977	 6.3	 5.4	 4.9	 3.6	 3.3	 3.6
1980	 4.0	 3.6	 2.9	 2.5	 1.8	 2.5
1984	 3.2	 3.8	 2.8	 2.2	 1.5	 2.2
1986	 2.5	 2.7	 2.0	 1.6	 1.2	 1.8
Table 7.25 Percentage of Final Income Spent on Agricultural Support 1977 to 1986
(Macrn Approach)
Year	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile
1977	 5.8	 4.9	 4.6	 3.5	 2.9	 4.3
1980	 5.1	 4.7	 3.9	 3.3	 2.7	 3.9
1984	 4.7	 5.1	 3.9	 3.4	 2.7	 4.0
1986	 4.5	 4.6	 3.8	 3.1	 2.4	 3.7
The distributional impact of support for agriculture can be best quantified by the use of
Gini coefficients. It should be noted that when looking at the distribution of costs, that
a change in interpretation of the Gini must be undertaken. When analysing the
distribution of support, if the Gini coefficient was larger than that found for the
distribution of income then it could be stated that the support was increasing income
inequality. If the Gini coefficient for support was lower, then the policy was reducing
inequality. In the case of the distribution of costs, if the Gini is higher than that for the
distribution of income, then the costs are more unequally distributed and this has the
effect of reducing income inequality. If the Gini is lower, the costs are borne more
equally than income is distributed, indicating an increase in the level of inequality.
These situations are summarised inTable 7.26.
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Table 7.26 Interpretation of Gini Coefficients
Income	 Support	 Effect
0.5
	
0.7	 Increase in the level of inequality
0.5
	
0.5
	
No change in the level of inequality
0.5
	
0.3
	
Reduction in the level of inequality
Income	 Costs	 Effect
0.5	 0.7	 Reduction in the level of inequality
0.5	 0.5	 No change in the level of inequality
0.5	 0.3	 Increase in the level of inequality
Table 7.27 and Figures 7.10 and 7.11 reproduce the calculated Gini coefficients for
income, taxes and costs for the selected years 1972 to 1986, under both the micro and
macro approaches.
Table 7.27 Gini Coefficients for the Distribution of Income, Taxes and the Consumer
Costs of Agiicultural Policy 1972 to 1986
Year
Distribution	 1972	 1977	 1980	 1984	 1986
	
0.32	 0.33
	 0.34	 0.36
	
0.36
	
0.35	 0.39	 0.40
	
0.18	 0.16	 0.14	 0.13
	
0.19
	
0.20
	
0.20
	
0.21
	
0.18	 0.19	 0.18	 0.19
	
0.20	 0.22	 0.23	 0.24
Income'
Taxes2
Food Tax (Micro)
Food Tax (Macro)
Total Costs (Micro)
Total Costs (Macro)
0.36
0.41
N/A3
N/A3
0.41
0.41
1)Income is after (Jovernment payments but before tax.
2)Taxes includes both direct and indirect taxes
3) N/A = not applicable
Source of Income and Tax Data: Social Trends (annual)
43 The figures for 1972 are slightly different th?n those for the other years. The 1972 figures are
calculated on the basis of 12 income classes rather five. This is due to changes made to the Social
Trends publication. Unlike 1977,where it was possible to combine the deciles into quintiles, the
incomes were grouped according to actual income and not by percentages. The numbers in each group
were not given so it was not possible to group them. The effect this would have on the measurement
of the Gini is shown in Benson (1970), namely that an increase in the number of cells is likely to
reduce the level of inequality. However, it is likely that the change will be marginal and for the
purpose of comparison, it is advantageous to include the figures for 1972.
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Figure 7.10 Gini Coefficients for the Distribution of Total Costs and of Income,
1972 to 1986
Figure 7.11 Gini Coefficients for Food Tax and Tax Costs 1977 to 1986
Year
Table 7.27 illustrates a number of points about the distributional aspects of the CAP
and also about the distribution of income and taxes. The distribution of income has
remained fairly constant throughout the period (the Gini varies between 0.36 and 0.32).
The level of Gini is fairly low indicating a relatively even distribution of income. The
Gini coefficient for taxes is consistently higher than that for gross income, indicating
that tax payments are more unequally distributed than income, highlighting the
progressive nature of the UK's tax system.
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For comparison, the Gini coefficients for the micro method were calculated using the
taxpayer costs shown in Table 7.18. The method by which these costs are allocated
ensures that the distribution of taxpayer costs will be the same as those shown in Table
7.27. However, the distribution of total costs alters slightly in some years because of
the difference in the weighting of the unequally distributed taxpayer cost to the equally
distributed consumer cost. In 1977, 1980 and 1984 the Gini coefficient is 0.19 rising
to 0.21 in 1986. Although the absolute level of costs vary considerably using the two
methods, the change in the distribution of costs is minimal.
Differences in the absolute level of consumer costs as measured by the micro and macro
methods lead to differences in the Gini coefficients for the distribution of these costs
(Table 7.27). The distribution of consumer costs estimated using the micro method has
become more equal over the period. The fall in the Gini coefficient, from 0.18 to 0.13,
can, in part, be attributed to changes in the level of consumer costs borne by low and
high income earners as shown in Table 7.28. The level of costs to the lowest income
households has fluctuated, but has shown no obvious downward trend. However, this
is not the case for the highest income earners whose average consumer costs have
declined steadily. Thus, the absolute difference between the lowest and highest income
earners has narrowed from £185 to £123. As a consequence, the distribution of costs
as measured by the Gini has become more equal.
Table 7.28 The Consumer 'Food Tax' of the Lowest and Highest Income Earners
1977 to 1986 (Micro Approach, nominal prices)
Income
Year	 1st	 5th	 Difference
Quintile	 Quintile
1977	 104.32	 289.13	 184.81
1980	 92.56	 245.04	 152.48
1984	 108.53	 262.71	 154.18
1986	 99.20	 222.42	 123.22
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The same is not true for consumer costs as measured by the macro approach. The Gini
coefficient has shown a slight increase from 0.19 to 0.21. This has occurred because
the costs to the highest income earners have been rising faster than those on low
incomes (Table 7.29).
Table 7.29 The Consumer 'Food Tax' of the Lowest and Highest Income Earners,
1977 to 1986 (Macro Approach, nominal prices)
Jncome
Year	 1st	 5th	 Difference
Quintile	 Quintile
Cost ()
1977	 83.84	 256.89	 173.05
1980	 101.39	 333.57	 232.18
1984	 145.19	 460.85	 315.66
1986	 145.76	 489.3	 343.54
The above table indicates that even though the cost to an average low income household
has been rising, the difference between the two groups has risen (accounting for the
increase in the Gini coefficient).
In 1972 (before the UK's membership of the EC) the cost of agricultural support was
borne entirely by the taxpayer. This meant that the cost of agricultural support was
more unevenly distributed than income. The low income household's share of total
income was greater than their share of the costs of agricultural support (reflected in a
Gini for the distribution of total costs of 0.41 compared to a figure of 0.36 for income).
However, as the figures for 1977 show, after joining the EC, the distribution of total
costs, whether measured by the micro or macro method, became more evenly spread
(the Gini coefficient being approximately halved). Costs are now more evenly
distributed than income, which will have led, ceterus pan bus, to a greater inequality of
income.distribution in society. The Gini cbefficient for total costs, as measured by the
micro method, fluctuates little during the period (aside from the drop in the Gini
coefficient from the pre EC year to the post EC years), and is consistently below that
derived from the macro approach. The macro approach shows a rising Gini coefficient,
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indicating a more unequal distribution of total costs and therefore a more even
distribution of income.
If the differences in the level of costs associated with using the micro and macro
approaches had not been reflected in different distributions, then it could be reasoned
that the differences in methodology would not seriously alter the conclusions drawn
about the distributional effects of the CAP. However, the two methods do indicate
contrasting patterns. The suggestion that the micro approach may lead to an under-
estimation of the costs borne by high income earners (due to it not accounting for food
eaten outside the home) and the fact that the macro approach may upwardly bias the
amount high income earners pay (because it takes no account of quantity eaten)
suggests that the actual costs and their distribution lies somewhere between the two sets
of figures. If this is the case, then the conclusion may be drawn that the results found
in this section indicate upper and lower bounds of the likely distribution of costs. As
both sets of figures indicate a more even distribution of costs than of income, the
regressive nature of the CAP is confirmed.
The question remains as to whether the system of payment has become more regressive
through the period or not. The micro results indicate little change, whilst the macro
findings indicate a slightly progressive trend. However, whichever method is used, the
costs are more evenly distributed than income, indicating that the CAP still leads to a
worsening of the relative position of the low income households.
7.7 Sensitivity Analysis
This chapter has been based on a number of assumptions. First, the assumption was
made that any increase in the price paid to producers would lead to an equivalent
increase in consumer prices. Second, assumptions have been made as to the level of
world prices for agricultural products. Analysis of the effect of changing these
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assumptions was undertaken and is reported fully in Appendix 7.111. The conclusions
from this analysis are:
1) Changing the relationship between producer and consumer price significantly alters
the estimated level of costs, but has little effect on their distribution.
2) Changing the assumed level of world prices significantly alters the estimated level of
costs, but not the distribution.
3) The above findings suggest that the results in this chapter are insensitive to changes
in the basic assumptions and therefore can be accepted with a degree of confidence.
7.8 Conclusions
This chapter set out to build a framework by which the overall consumer and taxpayer
costs of agricultural support could be measured so that analysis could be undertaken of
the distribution of these costs (both within years and over the period as a whole).
Estimation of the consumer costs was undertaken using two methods. The micro
approach involved the use of data that only accounted for food eaten inside the home,
leading to an under-estimation of the level of costs and also a probable bias in their
distribution. The macro approach was based on the level of expenditure rather than
consumption, therefore the cost of support was likely to have been exaggerated for
those who ate better quality (more expensive) foods. In turn this would have led to a
probable bias in the distribution of the costs. Use of the micro and macro methods led
to wide variations in the results and it can be concluded that problems with the available
data was partly the cause.
It is felt, that despite its weaknesses, more weight should be placed on the fmdings
from the macro approach. This is because it does account for all food consumed within
the UK and the data sources are more reliable than the NFS. The macro method has
It will be remembered that the question of the reliability of the data was raised by Frank et a! (op.
cit.).
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shown that the real level of costs has not varied significantly over the period, and that if
anything, the total costs have become distributed slightly more progressively.
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Appendix 7.1 The Macro Approach to estimating Consumer costs at each
Income Quintile
The total expenditure on food in the UK in 1977 was £16,057 million. Using the
methods described in Chapter 7 consumer cost for this year was estimated at £2,832.8
million. Therefore it can be argued that without support, total food expenditure would
have been £16,057m - £2,832.8m = £13,224.2m, or put another way, the cost of
agricultural support represents 17.6% of total food expenditure.
The average expenditure per household on food at each income quintile is given in the
first row of Table A7.1. From the earlier calculations it is assumed that 17.6% of this
expenditure is due to the operation of the CAP. The cost of the CAP is therefore
17.6%e of the average food expenditure of each quintile.
Table A7. 1 Calculation of Cost of CAP by Quintile (1977)
Income	 Quintile
1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th
Expenditure
on Food ()
	
475.23 756.08 947.96 1096.68 1456.14
Cost of Cap (%) 17.6	 17.6	 17.6	 17.6	 17.6
CostofCAP() 83.84
	
133.39 167.24 193.48 256.89
Source FES and Authors Estimates
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Appendix 7.11 Tables A7.2 to A7.4
Table A7.2 The Percentage Of Total Costs Borne by Households at Different Income
Levels (1980 Micro Approach)
Income Quinlile 	 Total
Percentage of-	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th
TaxpayerCosts	 3.94	 10.32	 18.55	 25.57 41.62	 100
ConsumerCosts	 10.26	 16.91	 21.15	 24.53	 27.15	 100
Total Costs
	
9.48	 15.93	 20.74 24.64 29.21	 100
Totallncome	 5.86	 11.04	 17.81	 24.63	 40.66	 100
Table A7.3 The Percentage Of Total Costs Borne by Households at Different
Income Levels (1984 Micro Approach)
Income Quintile	 Total
Percentage of-	 1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th
Taxpayer Costs
	 3.95	 8.58	 17.21	 25.84 44.42	 100
Consumer Costs	 10.62	 18.43 21.94 23.30 25.71	 100
Total Costs	 9.57	 16.87 21.20 23.70 28.67 100
Totallncome	 6.65	 10.01	 16.95	 24.64 41.75	 100
Table A7.4 The Percentage Of Total Costs Borne by Households at Different
Income Levels (1986 Micro Approach)
Percentage of-
Taxpayer Costs	 3.92	 8.43	 16.99 26.05 44.61	 100
Consumer Costs 	 11.62	 18.81	 21.09 22.42 26.06	 100
Total Costs
	 9.79	 16.34 20.12 23.28	 30.47	 100
Total Income	 6.05	 9.55	 16.05 24.31	 44.04	 100
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Appendix 7.111 Sensitivity Analysis
A7.1 Introduction
This appendix reports some sensitivity analysis on the results found in Chapter 7. In
addition, the relationship between producer and consumer prices is examined to assess
the validity of the commonly made assumption that higher farm-gate prices are passed
on to the consumer on a one-for-one basis. It is clear that the assumption of such a
relationship is fundamental to the calculation of the cost to consumers of agricultural
policies that increase farm-gate prices. The analysis will also take in to account the
debate as to the levels of world prices that should be used.
A7.2 Relationship between Producer and Consumer Prices
This section attempts to examine the relationship between producer and consumer
prices for a number of agricultural commodities. In so doing it aims to ascertain
whether the assumption of a one-for-one relationship between changes in farm-gate and
retail prices is valid (i.e. where an x pence rise in producer price is passed on as an x
pence rise in consumer price). Of major concern is whether alterations to the assumed
relationship change the levels of inequality associated with costs of support, as
estimated in Chapter 7.
It is reasonable to postulate the existence of three possible scenarios. The one-for-one
increase, as assumed in Chapter 7 and by other authors, has already been considered.
An alternative scenario is promoted by Ritson (op. cit, p 124) who reasons that:
"It is also not certain that the marketing margin (the gap between retail and
wholesale prices) will not be independent of the wholesale price so that the
whole cost of higher wholesale prices will be borne by consumers."
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His argument, therefore, is that part of the increase in farm gate prices will be absorbed
in the marketing chain and will not be passed on to consumers. This argument is
unconvincing, because the marketing of farm products, to a large extent, takes place
within a competitive industry. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that each link in the
marketing chain will be operating at minimum margins. Any increase in the farm price,
if not passed on to the consumers, will make the business (transport, processing,
butchery...etc.) unviable. It is unlikely that operators in a competitive industry can
withstand sustained reductions in their margins. This argument, suggests that any price
change will be passed through the marketing chain to the consumer on at least a one-
for-one basis.
Another possible alternative is that an increase in producer prices will lead to a greater
than one-for-one increase in the retail price. This scenario is possible if finns within
the sector work, for example, on a percentage mark up, rather than on a fixed margin.
The next section by using data on the level of producer and consumer prices over a
period of time, will attempt to identify a relationship between the two. This will help
establish which of the scenarios best fits the data.
A7.2.1 Regression Analysis of Consumer Prices on Producer Prices.
In order to examine the relationship between consumer and producer prices an analysis
was undertaken using price data on a selected number of food items. The food types
were selected to represent varying degrees of processing, from carcase meat to biscuits.
Annual data for 1972 to 1986 on prices paid by the consumer were obtained from the
NFS. Prices paid to producers are reported in the Annual White Paper on
Agriculture.45 Where possible, the prices paid by consumers and those received by
producers were expressed in the same units, e.g. pence per kilogram (although this was
45The only exception is for liquid milk, where prices to the producer and the consumer are obtained
from the MMB's Dairy Facts and Figures (various yeai).
256
not possible for some products, such as bread). The price levels were deflated to a
common base year (1977) to eliminate the effect of inflationary trends. Table A7.5 lists
the chosen products.
Table A7.5 Food Items chosen for Regression Analysis
Producer Product 	 Consumer Product
Beef
Pigmeat
Sugar Beet
Milk
Milling Wheat
Beef
Cooked Ham
Sugar
Liquid Milk
Cheese
Bread
Biscuits
Simple regressions were undertaken between the retail and farm-gate prices to establish
whether any easily identifiable relationship emerged. The price of bread was regressed
on the price of wheat, the price of sugar on sugar beet, the price of cooked ham on
pigmeat etc. Estimation took the form of:
Pc =	 Pp +
Where P and Pp are prices paid by consumers and received by producers, respectively
and .t is an eiror tenn with the normal classical properties.
The results for these regressions are reproduced in Table A7.6
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Table A7.6: Estimation of Relationship between Producer and
Consumer Prices
Regression	 R2	 a	 J3
Cooked Ham
onPigmeat	 0.39
Sugar on
	
0.04
Sugar Beet
BeefCarcaseon 0.24
Beef
Cheese on Milk 0.07
Biscuits on
	 0.04
Wheat
Bread on	 0.003
Wheat
Liquid Milk	 0.92
on Milk
t-statistics in brackets
sample size=15
70.72	 2.64
(1.13)	 (2.87)
9.65	 0.16
(2.2)	 (0.7)
85.29	 2.07
(1.4)	 (2.1)
3.28	 0.53
(2.69)	 (0.99)
95.52
	
0.08
(9.58)	 (0.71)
111.12	 -0.08
(8.56)	 (-0.19)
7.25
	
1.16
(6.12)	 (9.57)
The overall results are poor, with low R2 and very few of the coefficients are
significant.46 There are only three cases where the 13 coefficient is significant; these are
liquid milk with milk, cooked ham with pigmeat and beef with beef carcase. These
results will be analysed in more detail. The regression for cooked ham on pigmeat, has
a fairly low R2 of 0.39 but a significant f3 coefficient. The results suggest that the
relationship between producer and consumer price is such that a 10 pence per unit
increase in the former wifi lead to a 26.4 pence rise in the latter. Clearly, this is
considerably larger than the one-for-one relationship assumed before. Similarly, the
results for beef indicate that the relationship is very different from the one-for-one
460n examination of the data it was decided that a log regression may be more suitable. The
equations, therefore, were re-estimated in both single and double-log forms. The fits were not
noticeably improved and the results are not presented here.
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assumption. A 10 pence rise in the producer price for carcase beef will lead to a 20.7
pence increase in the consumer price of beef. The R 2 of 0.24 is lower than that for that
for pigmeat and the f3 coefficient is only just significant. Milk has a much better fit than
either ham or beef. The R2 is 0.92 and the f3 coefficient is highly significant. This
result indicates a much closer one-for-one relationship, with a 10 pence per unit rise in
the producer price leading to an 11.6 pence increase in consumer price.
The results from the analysis are not strong enough to support any of the three possible
alternatives and consequently cannot be used to argue categorically the effect of price
changes. There are a number of possible explanations as to why the results are not
strong. First, the data used was highly aggregated (one figure was taken for consumer
price and one for producer price for each year). Second, the analysis makes no
allowance for possible changes in the marketing margin over time.
An indication of the problems of measuring the relationship between producer and
consumer prices is given by Digby (1989). Using Meat and Livestock Commission
(MLC) data he calculates the price spreads for a number of meats. His results for beef
are reproduced in Table A7.7.
Table A7.7 Beef Price Spreads 1978 to 1987
Year	 Producer	 Consumer	 Margin	 Margin
Price (pub)	 Price (pub)	 (pub)	 (%)
1978	 56.7	 74.8	 18.1	 24.1
1979	 65.2	 85.2	 20.0	 23.5
1980	 65.9	 95.5	 29.6	 31.1
1981	 76.3	 108.2	 31.9	 29.6
1982	 83.9	 122.9	 39.0	 31.9
1983	 81.6	 123.6	 42.0	 34.1
1984	 81.6	 125.7	 44.1	 35.3
1985	 80.7	 126.1	 45.4	 36.0
1986	 80.7	 128.5	 47.8	 37.2
1987	 82.0	 130.4	 48.4	 37.1
Source:Digby (1989)
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Digby's analysis shows a large steady increase in both the absolute and percentage
margin over the ten year period. The absolute margin rises from 18p/lb to 48p/lb,
whilst as a percentage of the retail price it increases from 24 to 37. It is this change in
marketing margin that is likely to cause difficulty in assessing how changes in producer
price effects the consumer price.47
It is evident that the relationship between producer and consumer prices and the
working of the marketing chain is less than straightforward. The simple analysis of
changes in the relative prices has not shown any consistent pattern. However, as the
purpose of this section is essentially comparative, it was decided that, despite the poor
fits, it would be of interest to analyse the effect on the level and distribution of
consumer costs of altering the assumed relationship.
A7.2.2 Altering the Producer-Consumer Price Relationship
In order to assess the sensitivity of the results to changes in the assumed relationship, a
number of changes were made. The significant relationships between producer and
consumer prices identified in the regression analysis were used to re-estimate the costs
to consumers. This meant that for beef, cooked ham and milk, the rise in producer
prices was reflected in a rise of consumer prices in ratios of 1:2.64, 1:2.07 and 1:1.1,
respectively. Furthermore, the assumption was made that the beef relationship holds
for all carcase meat.48 For the food products for which the regressions failed to
indicate a significant relationship the one-for-one assumption was retained. These
changed assumptions mean that the cost to the consumer will be higher than that
previously calculated. The estimation was undertaken for 1977, using the micro
approach with the new price levels.
47 In the regression analysis of the relationship between producer and consumer beef prices, a time
trend was added to allow for the increase in margin. However, it did not significantly improve the fit.
48This is a reasonable assumption as all carcase meat undergoes similar processes, in terms of
slaughter and marketing.
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Table A7.8 reports results concentrate on the level and distribution of costs using the
different assumptions.
Table A7.8 Consumer Costs (micro approach) 1977
()
1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Estimate	 Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Original	 104	 161.5	 197	 219	 289	 194
New	 154.9	 235	 288	 321	 446	 289
Difference	 50.9	 73.5	 91	 102	 157	 95
%Difference 48.9
	 45.5	 46.2	 46.6	 54.3	 49.0
Table A7.8 confirms that the assumption of a greater than equal change in prices for
some food has led to a marked increase in estimated costs (i.e. the food tax). This
increase is not uniform between income quintiles, because of different consumption
patterns (highlighted in the previous chapter). The second quintile has a rise of 45% in
estimated costs, but for the highest income earners the increase is over 54%. The
change in estimated costs can also be represented as a percentage of the total income of
households (Table A7.9).
Table A7.9 Percentage of Final Income Spent on Agricultural Support
(Micro Approach) 1977
1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th	 Average
Estimate	 Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile	 Quintile
Original	 7.16	 5.84	 5.36	 3.93	 3.26	 4.24
New	 10.59	 8.44	 7.74	 5.66	 4.92	 6.22
From Table A7.9 it can be seen that the effect has been to widen the gap between the
low and high income earners. With a one-for-one assumption the total cost of
agricultural support accounted fr 7% of the final income of the lowest income
households, and just over 3% of the highest income households. However, under the
alternative assumption there is twice the percentage point rise to low income earners as
to the high income households, and thus a widening has occurred in the proportion of
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final income accounted for by agricultural support, between low and high income
earners.
The above results show that the different estimation procedures lead to different levels
of costs. However, as it is the distribution of costs that is of primary concern, Table
A7. 10 reports the Gini coefficients for consumer and total costs under the original and
new assumptions.
Table A7.10 Gini Coefficients
Estimation Consumer	 Total
Costs	 Costs
Original	 0.184	 0.170
New	 0.180	 0.165
The results of the calculation of the Gini coefficient show only small changes in the
distribution of costs under the alternative assumptions. The Gini for consumer costs
has fallen by 2% indicating a slightly more regressive (even) cost distribution. A
similar pattern is reflected for total costs. The results suggest that changes in the
assumed relationship between wholesale and retail prices may alter the actual level of
costs, but not significantly the distribution of these costs.
Overall, the results suggest that the regressive nature of the CAP is not altered by
changing the ratio of producer to consumer price levels. This analysis, although only
undertaken for one year, infers that the results found in Chapter 7, concerning the level
of inequality associated with the cost of agricultural support, are not particularly
sensitive to changes in the basic price assumption. The next sections examine whether
the results are significantly affected by differing world prices.
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A7.3 Changing the level of World Prices
In Chapter 7 the world price levels used were from a single source (the Newcastle CAP
model data base) and were not adjusted to allow for any possible effects from changes
in agricultural policy. The second part of this sensitivity analysis assesses the
distributional effects of changing the base (that is the level of world prices) from which
the costs are estimated. It is evident that different world prices will alter the absolute
level of estimated costs. However, of more importance to this study is whether these
changes lead to significant alterations in the distribution (as measured by the Gini
coefficient) of these costs.
Harvey and Hall (1988) reported a number of different world price levels for 1986, and
the ones selected for comparison are reproduced in Table A7. 11.
Table A7.11 EC and Selected World Price Estimates for 1986
Commodity	 E.0 Support Newcastle CAP Newcastle	 O.E.C.D
Price	 Free Trade
ECU/Tonne
Common Wheat 182
	 89	 136	 155
Durum Wheat 333
	 139	 224	 149
Barley	 169	 76	 138	 83
Maize	 195	 62	 160	 73
OtherCereal	 169	 95	 139	 102
Sugar	 325	 190	 218	 210
Pigmeat	 1516	 1335	 1452	 1192
Poultry	 1364	 875	 1079	 965
Eggs	 992	 680	 890	 773
Beef and Veal 3087
	 2183	 2622	 1893
Sheep Meat	 3949	 1692	 3396	 2001
Liquid Milk
	 284	 77	 223	 170
Butter	 3178	 1362	 2227	 1993
Skimmed Milk 1694
	
916	 1479	 1363
Cheese	 3742	 1683	 2799	 2860
Olive Oil	 2693	 1337	 1635	 1703
Source: Harvey and Hall (1989)
The first column in Table A7. 11 presents intervention prices fixed by the EC for the
relevant commodities. The other columns give estimates of the level of world prices.
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The second column (Newcastle CAP) consists of the prices used in Chapter 7. The
third column presents Harvey and Hall's estimates of price levels if agricultural
protection was removed (world-wide) and a situation of free trade existed (These prices
are directly derived from the United States Department of Agriculture's SWAPSIM
model). Ritson (op. cit.) describes this situation: "Under this alternative less would be
produced in Europe, more would be consumed and this would have the effect of raising
world prices" (,p 87). If there was no support in 1986, world prices would have been
higher and therefore the cost of support would have been lower. The increase in
assumed world prices varies between commodities. The final column reproduces
OECD estimates of current prices in 1986. The difference between the prices used in
Chapter 7 and those that arise after trade liberalisation are understandable given the fact
that they are based on different assumptions. It is clear that the sets of prices vary
widely and that these differences will be reflected in the estimated level of costs.
The initial comparison was undertaken using the methodology of the macro approach,
substituting in the new estimates of world price. The results for all three sets of prices
are reproduced in Table A7.12.
Table A7.12 Estimated Costs under Different World Price Assumptions (1986)
Assumption Consumer	 Taxpayer	 Total
Cost	 Cost	 Cost
Original	 5,576	 1,508	 7,084
O.E.C.D	 5,112	 1,508	 6,620
Free Trade	 2,306	 1,508	 3,814
Figures rounded to nearest million
As expected, the results indicate differences in the estimated level of both consumer and
total costs. With the assumption of free trade there is a large reduction in consumer
costs. The OECD prices yield consumer costs that are slightly lower than those
originally estimated. These changes lead to slightly lower total costs under OECD price
levels and much lower total costs with the free trade estimates. As with the original
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analysis these new consumer estimates can be expressed as a percentage of total food
expenditure (Table A7.13).
Table A7.13 Estimated Food Tax with Different World Prices
Assumption Consumer	 Food	 Food Tax
Cost	 Expenditure
%
Original	 5,576	 33,059	 16.9
O.E.C.D	 5,112	 33,059	 15.5
Free Trade	 2,306	 33,059	 7.0
The differences in consumer costs lead to large differences in the 'Food Tax', from 7%
with irade liberalisation to 17% with the original price levels. This highlights the large
variation that can occur in the measurement of the level of costs of agricultural policies
depending on the choice of world prices.
Having examined differences in the level of costs, Table A7. 14 shows the distribution
of costs under the varying sets of prices. The table highlights the distribution of costs
under the micro as well as the macro approaches.
Table A7. 14 Gini Coefficients for the Distribution of Costs
Distribution	 Original	 O.E.C.D	 Free Trade
Income	 0.36	 0.36	 0.36
Tax Costs	 0.40	 0.40	 0.40
Consumer Costs (Micro) 	 0.13	 0.13	 0.13
Consumer Costs (Macro)	 0.21	 0.21	 0.21
Total Costs (Micro) 	 0.19	 0.19	 0.24
Total Costs (Macro) 	 0.24	 0.24	 0.27
A number of points can be made about Table A7.14. The change in world prices
appears to have no effect on the distribution of consumer costs as measured by the
micro and macro methods. Under the macro approach, costs are distributed according
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to expenditure on food. So a 20% food tax will be distributed in the same way as a
10% tax. The micro approach is not forced to follow the same distribution, yet the Gini
does not alter. The results indicate that, although the distributions of consumer and
taxpayer costs remain the same, the distribution of total cost varies with the free trade
price estimates. This apparent anomaly is a result of changes in the composition of total
costs. Taxpayer costs are distributed more unevenly than consumer costs. Therefore if
the proportions (weightings) of taxpayer and consumer costs alter, then so will the
value of the Gini coefficient for total costs. Using the OECD price levels, the more
evenly distributed consumer costs decrease relative to taxpayer costs but only slightly,
and there is no change in the Gini coefficient. However, using the free trade price
levels, with the more unevenly distributed taxpayer costs becoming a greater proportion
of total costs the Gini coefficient alters significantly. Figure A7.1 highlights the
differences in both the level and composition of costs.
Figure A7.1 Level and Percentage Composition of Costs under Varying World Price
Assumptions
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The sensitivity analysis using different world price levels has produced a number of
interesting results. With both a small and large decrease in the estimated level of
consumer costs the distribution of these costs, using the micro method remained the
same. (It has already been noted that the macro method ensures that the distribution
will be the same). These findings indicate that the results discussed in Chapter 7 hold
with different sets of world price levels. The regressive nature of payment by the
consumer for agricultural support is not increased or diminished by higher world price
estimates. However the level of world prices does effect the distribution of total costs.
These changes, as already reported, are a result of the composition of total costs, with a
reduction in consumer costs relative to taxpayer costs resulting in a more progressive
system of payment and vice versa. Nevertheless, the large fall in consumer costs under
the relatively high estimates of world prices (free trade), results in a small change in the
Gini coefficient for total costs. This infers that the results are insensitive to the actual
base from which the costs are measured.
A7.5 Conclusions
The sensitivity of the results from estimation of consumer and taxpayer costs detailed in
Chapter 7 has been assessed. Two of the basic assumptions were altered, cost re-
estimated and new Gini coefficients calculated. The results indicate that the
distributions of cost were not significantly altered. This promotes a degree of optimism
as to the validity of the original results.
The use of the macro method for comparative purposes may be criticised to a certain
extent because it ensures that a consumer cost of £2,000 million is distributed the same
as a cost of £7,000 million. This is due to the fact that the costs are expressed as
proportions of total food expenditure. The only effect of altering world price levels is
to change the composition of, and the distribution, of total costs. Therefore, if the
methodology of the macro method is accepted, it can be reasoned that the distribution
obtained relates to any level of prices and adequately represents the inequality
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associated with the costs of agricultural support. However, it is necessary to note that
the analysis using the micro method (for measuring the change in costs associated with
altering the assumed producer-consumer price relationship) also showed little change in
the distribution of the costs.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions
This study set out to assess the effect on income inequality of the distribution of the
costs and benefits of agricultural support. Each chapter has analysed separate issues
and conclusions have been drawn throughout. The purpose of this final chapter is to
draw on the fmdings that appear most relevant.
Initially, some general concepts involved in such a task were examined. The
discussion highlighted that a number of definitions and assumptions must be made
before an examination of inequality of any kind can be undertaken. For the purpose of
the study of agricultural income distribution the following general definitions were
made: the measurement of 'well-being' was income (as defined by Cowell, op.cit.);
the income unit was the farm business; and the distribution analysed was the size
distribution of incomes. In the case of assessing the income effects of the costs of
agricultural policy, the definition used was the household, and the income was that
generated by the household.
The review of previous work on the subject of income inequality in agriculture assessed
how researchers had addressed the general concepts involved. The review highlighted
differences in the methods used which seemed to be partly a result of differing aims and
also partly a result of subjective judgements. In particular, the studies diverged over
the definition of farm income, the measurement of the level of support, the
appropriation of this support between farms, and the measurement of inequality.
A clear split between different sides of the Atlantic emerged. The more comprehensive
income definitions (those incorporating income other than from farming) were almost
exclusively found in the work undertaken in America. Methods by which the estimated
levels of support and income were disaggregated between farms varied. Much of the
American work used data which grouped farms into ales classes. Evidence suggests
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that grouping farms by sales class does not allow for an accurate representation of
whether it is the high or low income farmers that receive most of the benefits. The use
of SMD's as a method of grouping farms, or any measure that relates to farm size, is
likely to lead to similar problems to those associated with sales classes. Farm size,
although known to be correlated to a certain extent with income, does not necessarily
reflect the distribution of income. If some assessment of the effect of support policies
on income distribution is required then farms should be analysed in terms of income
classes and not farm size.
The inequality measure used in the the majority of the literature was the Gini
coefficient, with (in most cases) no justification for choosing this over any of the other
possible inequality measures. Gregory (op. cit.) (and to a lesser extent Josling and
Hamway, op.cit.) discussed the use of the Gini, and concluded that it was the best
measure available. Others either made no attempt to quantify the degree of inequality,
or used the Gini, with no explanation of the methodology.
A significant part of the study followed the line of research undertaken by Gregory (op.
cit.) and critically assessed the possible measures of inequality available to the
researcher. The results of the examination suggested that there is no single measure
which is universally acceptable. A number of possible inequality measures satisfied
given criteria but the choice between them became subjective. Each measure had certain
advantages and disadvantages which, depending on individuals' preferences, either
justified or precluded its use. However, for this research, the Gini coefficient and
Atkinson's Index were selected as the most appropriate measures available. The
possible use of a specific functional form as a method for simplifying the problems
associated with measuring inequality was discussed. The lognormal was shown to
have a sound theoretical background, a number of convenient properties and to fit data
sets in a considerable number of cases.
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The choice of inequality measure was just one issue arising from the review of
literature, others were analysed in Chapter 4. Farm Business Survey data sets were
used to measure the levels of income inequality within agriculture in the North of
England. Initially, the FBS data were shown to be inappropriately classified for the
analysis of income distribution. Their reclassification highlighted the usefulness of
cluster analysis for grouping agricultural data. Estimated level of inequality using the
Gini and Atkinson's Index were compared. The results using the Gini coefficient and a
low c figure appeared promising. Although indicating differences in the cardinal level
of inequality, the ordinal rankings of the distributions were very similar. With a low e
value the analysis appeared to be producing complete and non-conflicting results.
However, on further investigation a number of problems became evident.
First, the use of differing c values led to contradictions in the ordinal ranldngs of
distributions. In particular, the ordinal ranking of distributions by the Gini coefficient
and Atkinson's index began to diverge as the e value increased. Second, because of the
occurrence of negative incomes, the likelihood of cell bias was high in certain
distributions. Third, by altering the definition of income, the cardinal and ordinal
rankings changed, thus confusing the issue further. Fourth, changing the method by
which farms were classified into size groups, led to conflicting results as to the
relationship between the distribution of farm support and that of income.
After these findings, it could have been concluded that the whole process of measuring
inequality was flawed, because the researcher could arrive at virtually any result, by
altering the methods used. This raised the question of the best method by which to
tackle further analysis. The research turned to the use of functional forms and the
advantages of specifying the form of the distribution. In particular, one advantage was
that specifying the lognormal ensured different inequality measures would no longer
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conflict.49 Also, because the distribution was approximated the need for grouping into
cells and the subsequent classification problems were removed. Therefore, use of the
lognormal became the most practical way around the problems found with conventional
analysis.
The only income data available for the length of time required for the study were related
to dairy farms. Due to the negative incomes in the sample, a proxy for income (NVA)
was used. Support and NVA were found to be lognormally distributed, and this
facilitated calculation of the Gini coefficients. However it must be emphasised that the
lognormal is only an approximation and is not likely to fit all data sets.
On a national basis quintile analysis was undertaken. The percentage of total support
and NVA going to farms ranked by income quintiles was calculated. In one sense the
quintile analysis showed the unequal nature of price support, the top 20% of farmers
receiving between 40 and 50% of support over the period. However it also showed
that, for this quintile, the proportion of total support received was less than the
proportion of total income.
Gini coefficients were used to quantify the levels of inequality associated with the
national distribution. The results on a national level, showed remarkably little change
in the distribution of both support and income, considering the changes in policy that
had occurred. Support was consistently more evenly distributed than income,
suggesting that if support was removed income would become even more unequally
distributed.
was noted in the text that because inequality measures would no longer conflict the need for two
different measures was nullified. The Gini was retained because of greater ease of inteipretation, whilst
Atkinson's index was discarded.
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Regional analysis highlighted that the national results obscured variations between
regions and temporal changes. The regional analysis also showed that there was little
change in the relative positions of the regions over the years, in terms of their share of
support and income. Both the regional and national results indicated no significant
trends in the level of income inequality. It was argued that this 'stability' in inequality
might be a result of the effects of agricultural policy. Of course, this premise is difficult
to substantiate, because it is not known how the structure would have changed in the
absence of agricultural support. The regional analysis highlighted that as price support
gave to producers in accordance with their production, some regions received
substantially more than their share of producers whilst others received notably less.
The average amount received per farm varied by up to £30,000 in any one year between
regions. The relative position of smaller farmers had not deteriorated due to the
operation of price support, because over the 15 year period the dairy sector showed
little change in inequality.
It was clear little had changed in terms of levels of inequality despite the changes in
policy. A policy alternative (the Producer Entitlement Guarantee) which could improve
the relative position of the smaller farms was examined purely in terms of its impact on
distribution of income and support. Two methods of implementation were considered.
PEG1 considered a reduction in the total level of support, whilst PEG2 maintained the
total level of support. The distribution of support between farms became markedly
more equitable as the restriction on the amount of production eligible for support was
tightened. However, under the scenario of maintaining total support, the fall in
inequality was substantially higher than under the alternative. On a national basis,
instigation of a PEG policy was shown to reduce the inequality associated with income
distribution in dairy farming, ceterus paribus. At the regional level, large differences
became evident as to the effect of the policy. Not surprisingly, the reduction in
inequality within regions with small average herd sizes was less than in the regions
with large average herd sizes. The use of inequality measures enables a quantification
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of the differences in the reduction of inequality. Under PEG2, with an entitlement level
of 200,000 litres, 6 out of the 9 regions increased their level of total support. The
PEG2 option led to a redistribution of income from the East, South East and South to
the other regions (Wales in particular).
PEG2 resulted in a greater reduction of inequality and redistribution of income, because
low income producers benefited absolutely as well as relatively. The more restrictive
the PEG the more they benefited. However, of more interest is the large percentage of
producers who benefit. The lowest three (four) quintiles all increased their share of
support with a PEG of 200,000 litres (300,000 litres). Of course, as no extra support
is injected, the increases to the lower quintiles have to come from the top quintile(s). It
is questionable whether such a large transfer is possible without significant long-term
effects. It must be remembered that NVA was considered, rather than NET or MIT.
Therefore, although the PEG brought the quintiles to similar levels of NVA, when rents
and labour are considered the top quintile are likely to be considerably worse off.
Having examined the distribution of the benefits of agricultural support to farmers, the
natural progression was to examine the distribution of costs and how this affected
income distribution. Initially a review was undertaken, which showed the scarcity of
research on this topic. The aim was to build a framework by which the absolute
consumer and taxpayer costs of agricultural support could be measured, so that analysis
could be undertaken of the distribution of these costs (both within years and over the
period as a whole). Estimation of consumer costs was undertaken using two methods
referred to as the micro and macro methods. These methods led to wide variations in
the results. The micro approach indicated that the distribution of consumer costs
became more equally distributed during the period, with the Gini coefficient falling
from 0.18 to 0.13. However, the macro approach showed a marginal increase in the
Gini coefficient from 0.19 to 0.21. The contrasting results from the two methods were
partly explained by limitations in the data. The micro approach did not account for food
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eaten outside of the home. As richer households are likely to consume more out of the
home, then a larger proportion of their costs were ignored. The macro approach was
based on the level of food expenditure. As richer households are likely to eat better
quality foods their costs are likely to be exaggerated. Therefore the macro approach
was likely to bias the costs towards high income households whilst the micro was
likely to bias them towards low income households. The results of the micro and
macro methods were stated as the possible extremes of the costs to the consumer.
The UK taxpayer costs were estimated as a proportion of the total EC tax bill. The
proportion being based on the UK's share of production of each commodity. The level
of taxpayer cost estimated by this method differed from that estimated using published
data sources, but these differences had little effect on the distribution of the costs.
The move from national to EC agricultural policies led to a dramatic equalisation of the
distribution of total costs, because the major burden of costs switched from just
taxpayers to consumers and taxpayers. However, since this switch there has been very
little change in the distribution of total costs. The consumer results differ from the
producer, because the UK's accession to the EC and the adoption of the CAP appeared
to have little effect on the distribution of support to farmers, but did have a great effect
on the distribution of the costs. The regressive nature of agricultural support was
highlighted, whichever of the two methods of calculating consumer costs was
examined. The distribution of total costs was consistently more equal than the
distribution of income. This meant that the costs were borne disproportionately by the
low income households. Again, this result is not surprising, but inequality was
quantified and also examined over a number of years.
The analysis of the distribution of the costs of agricultural policy was based on a
number of assumptions. First, any increase in the price paid to producers was assumed
to lead to an equivalent increase in consumer prices. Second, assumptions were made
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as to the level of world prices for agricultural products. A form of sensitivity analysis
on the results to changes in these assumptions was undertaken, but results indicated
that the distributions of cost were not significantly altered. This promoted a degree of
optimism as to the validity of the original results.
At this juncture the logical step would appear to have been a comparison of the
distribution of the costs and benefits between farmers and households at different
income levels. This should have enabled an answer to the question "Does agricultural
support lead to a transfer of income from the rich to the poor, from poor to poor, from
poor to rich or even from rich to the rich?" However, the inherent weakness of the data
on farm incomes effectively removes the possibility of valid assessment of the transfer
effects. It is still possible to use the consumer and taxpayer results to assess the effects
on the level and distribution of total household income of different policy options
discussed in this study.
Table 8.1 Level of Household Income by Quintile and Change in Income under
Various Policies (1986)
1st	 2nd	 3rd	 4th	 5th
Policy	 Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile 	 Gini
Existing Income
Support Removedb
Support Removedc
PEG Policvd
	
3,500	 5,520	 9,280
Change
	
156	 255	 348
	
71	 119	 170
	
84	 111	 24
14,060	 25,470	 0.363
432	 608	 0.359
219	 321	 0.362
-18	 -202	 0.358
a) costs esumatea usmg me macro memoa.
b) Assuming total costs estimated with no allowance made for possible changes in
world prices.
c) Allowances made for possible changes in world prices.
d) Assuming existing level of costs but borne entirely by taxpayers.
The transfer from the existing policy to one of no support (with no change in level of
world prices) increases the average income of a household in the lowest quintile by
£156. Allowing for possible changes in the world price levels virtually halves the
estimated benefit to low income households of the removal of support. If the same
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level of support was maintained but funded through the tax system the lowest quintile
would still benefit. This contrasts with the position of the high income households.
With the removal of support they would benefit to the extent of £600 (or £300
depending on method of calculating the costs). However if support was funded
through the tax system only they would over £200 a year worse off. There is clearly a
marked change in the absolute levels of income under the different policies. However,
examination of the Gini coefficients puts the findings of Chapter 7 into perspective.
Although the costs of support are not equally spread, removal of support (or
transferring the costs from the consumer and taxpayer to just the taxpayer) would lead
to an almost negligible change (under 0.01) in the Gini coefficient. It must be stressed
that these comparisons are of a static nature. In the longer term, the benefit to the low
income households may be negated because of changes in the cost of living. The
income of the low income households is made up almost entirely of Government
benefits. These payments are often index linked, that is they change with changes in
the level of inflation. Inflation is measured by the Retail Price Index (RPI). Food
items form a large proportion of the 'basket of goods' used to calculate the RPI.
Therefore, changes in food prices will effect the rate of inflation and thus the level of
benefits received. If the transmission from food prices to RPI and state benefits was
perfect then it could be argued that policies which raised prices would have a neutral
impact on the low income households, because their income (from benefits) would rise
to offset the cost of higher food. However, the transmission is unlikely to be perfect
and therefore it can be argued that the lowest income households would gain some
benefit from the removal of price support.
The definition of income of farmers used for the main part of this study was simply
NVA; thus other sources of income and family income were not considered. This was
enforced by data availability. The main problem with the income definition was not that
it prevented an examination of the distribution of income or support to farmers (NVA
was found to adequately represent NFl in this case), but that it prevented an objective
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welfare assessment of the transfer from the consumers and taxpayers to the farmers.
However, even if income data from all sources were available, it is not clear that this
would be enough to conduct a 'welfare' analysis. It is difficult to judge the quality of
life of a farmer just from income. A well-known saying states that "A tenant farmer
lives rich and dies poor". How should you value the advantages (and disadvantages)
of rural over urban life? Knowledge of all sources of income may not solve all the
welfare problems, but in terms of assessing income transfer effects of agricultural
policy it would be advantageous.
Another issue raised by this study was the acceptance of the validity of the use of
inequality measures in general. In Chapter 5 it was noted that the concentration of
support had increased (a similar level of total support was being received by fewer and
fewer dairy farmers). This change was not 'picked up' by the inequality measures,
because by definition they are invariant to the number of persons receiving support.
Therefore, support has become concentrated in fewer and fewer individuals yet
inequality has not changed. There is scope for the use of concentration measures to
assess the distributional effect of agricultural policy and also changes in the structure of
the industry in general.
Another weakness with the study is that the agricultural data did not include all farm
types, so it is possible that the results are not representative for the agricultural sector as
a whole. In order to conduct a more objective analysis, income data for all farm types
and for all sources of income needs to be accumulated. The real transfers between the
poor and the rich can then be measured and assessed.
In conclusion, this study has shown that agricultural policy has not increased the level
of inequality within the dairy sector. Indeed it may have reduced the level of observed
inequality since support has been shown to be more equally distributed than income.
The way in which the costs are distributed only marginally increases inequality for
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society as a whole, and the accusation that agricultural policy is 'unfair', on the
fmdings of this analysis, is difficult to prove.
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